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ABSTRACT 
 
The relationship between religion and development is a relatively new research area, 
complicated by the arguably ‗secular reductionism‘ and ‗materialistic determinism‘ of 
mainstream development theory and practice. 
 
Against this backdrop, this doctoral study examines the relationship between Islamic 
and mainstream development discourses, analysing the complex power relations at 
work within the discursive practices of the development field through a conceptual 
apparatus comprised of a Foucauldian notion of power and discourse and a 
Laclauan view of hegemony.   
 
The objective of this study is to develop a better understanding of how Islamic 
development policy making and makers have made meaning of the central issues of 
development and progress as expressed in the body of theory and practice that 
makes up the development field.  
 
Interestingly, Islamic thinkers were already criticising the Euro-centric nature of the 
development discourse in the 1950s and 60s. They proposed an Islamisation of 
knowledge, particularly in the field of economics, as a way of overcoming a perceived 
‗Western‘ domination. 
 
In pursuit of the question as to how ‗Islam‘ relates to the issue of development and 
progress, this thesis explores the genealogy of the mainstream and the Islamic 
development discourses, illustrated by a selected case study within the development 
field in Bangladesh. Having re-cast development within an Islamic framework, and in 
opposition to what is perceived to be the secular-materialist mainstream, the Islami 
Bank offers an insight into how particular truth claims are formulated and upheld in 
the battle to fill the concept of development with meaning. 
 
Theoretical and methodological implications emerging from this research study 
demonstrate the value of applying a more rigorous use of the concepts of power and 
hegemony within a post-development framework by mapping the complexity of 
discourses struggling within a given terrain in order to better understand power 
relations and their effects. 
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INTRODUCTION TO THIS DOCTORAL RESEARCH 
 
This doctoral research study focuses on conceptualisations of development within an 
Islamic context, illustrated by a single ‗telling‘ case study situated in the development 
policy field of Bangladesh.  The underlying objective of this study is to gain a better 
understanding of how Islamic development policy making and makers have made 
meaning of the central issues of development and progress. These issues appear to 
be primarily a ‗Western‘ concern, expressed in the body of theory and practice that 
makes up the development field in the form of the academic discipline of 
development studies and the activities of bi-lateral and multi-lateral agencies such as 
the World Bank and a host of governmental and non-governmental organisations.  
 
The claim that ‗development‘ is primarily a Western or Euro-centric endeavour is one 
of the key criticisms raised by the critique of ‗development‘ itself, posited by 
‗alternative‘ and ‗post-development‘ thought. From the late 1980s onwards this 
‗school of thought‘ started questioning the very nature and desirability of 
‗development‘, adding to a host of already existing, somehow diametrically opposed 
positions on how to achieve ‗development‘, ranging from modernisation theory to 
participatory approaches. Interestingly for this study, Islamic thinkers such as Abul 
‗Ala Maududi and Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr were criticising the Euro-centric nature 
of development in the 1950s and 60s. They proposed an Islamisation of knowledge, 
particularly in the field of economics, as a way of overcoming a perceived ‗Western‘ 
domination, although their criticism was not underpinned by a deep analysis of power 
relations or a hegemonic theory.   
 
In more systematic fashion, inspired by the French philosopher Michel Foucault, 
post-development scholars suggest that development is a discourse that creates and 
orders the problem that it seeks to address, whilst they urge an analysis of the 
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apparatuses of power and domination.  Foucault (1977) argued that power relations 
are embedded within social relations, exercised through institutional practices that 
discipline thought and action.  
 
This study, therefore, seeks to understand how meaning is made of development in 
the Islamic discourse against the backdrop of mainstream ideas pertaining to 
progress and modernity. In doing so, this study will take a critical and non-
essentialised approach to investigating both ‗Western‘ and ‗Islamic‘ discourses. 
 
In pursuit of this research question the study explores how development has been 
conceptualised in the mainstream and the alternative Islamic discourses. It is not 
about development practice or how poverty may manifest itself (income, capabilities 
etc.), different dimensions of poverty (rural, urban, child etc.), how poor people 
perceive their situation or the impact of poverty reduction-type interventions.  
 
The key underlying question for this research is how discourses frame the making of 
meaning, particularly in the Islamic development field. In pursuit of the research 
question, the thesis addresses some of the complex power relations at work within 
discursive practices of the development field, using a conceptual apparatus 
comprised of specific Foucauldian interpretations of power and discourse combined 
with Laclau‘s hegemonic theory.  By focusing on the internal workings and 
discourses of the development field, the author argues that this exploratory study 
enables us to gain new insights into theoretical and practical dilemmas inherent 
within making truth claims about development, be it in the mainstream or alternative 
Islamic discourses.  To do this, genealogies of the mainstream and Islamic 
development discourses are offered, against which the contextualised policy practice 
of a selected Islamic development actor is explored to understand various 
hegemonic practices and formations within the development field in Bangladesh.    
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Chapter overview 
After problematising the arguably antagonistic relationship between mainstream and 
alternative Islamic articulations of development, this thesis offers in Chapter 1 a 
series of definitions and interpretations of the key theoretical concepts employed in 
the study.  The conceptual apparatus is comprised of theoretical interpretations of 
power, discourse and hegemony, informed primarily by the works of Foucault and 
Laclau.  By using this conceptual apparatus, the author argues, important dynamics 
in the relationship between development and religion in the policy-making process 
can be explored. 
 
The concern for understanding how discourses constitute knowledge and power in a 
particular field, as argued by Foucault, was taken on by the post-development 
school. Yet, post-development is not without considerable and valid criticism either. 
To overcome the theoretical weaknesses around the essentialised use of concepts of 
power and hegemony apparent in the post-development literature, the author 
combines a number of theoretical approaches to provide a robust conceptual toolbox 
for this research.   
 
Chapter 2 provides a discussion as to how this conceptual framework was turned 
into an analytical strategy, consisting of Foucauldian genealogical approaches and 
critical discourse analysis. Data gathered to support the study include genealogical 
material, open-ended interviews, experiential and participant observation field notes 
and a review of a variety of documents (policies, organisational publications, etc.). 
 
In order to understand where the issue of development arose from, Chapter 3 
provides a genealogy of the mainstream development discourse. It identifies three 
dominant assumptions embedded within the mainstream development project: the 
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importance of economic growth and modernisation and the reign of a materially-
determined understanding of poverty in the policy-making field.  
 
Chapter 4, in turn, provides a genealogy of how Islamic thought has made meaning 
of the issue of development, which appears to have only been a concern to Muslim 
intellectuals as a response to the economical, military and cultural expansion of the 
‗West‘. In response to this, Islamic revivalist movements arose that dealt with issues 
of progress and development in fundamentally different ways, whilst the moral 
concern of poverty has remained largely unaddressed despite a body of knowledge 
called Islamic economics that seeks to set out a system to achieve socio-economic 
justice. 
 
After establishing the ‗global‘ or macro structures of the mainstream and Islamic 
development discourses, Chapter 5 investigates the meso structures of these 
discourses in the field of development policy making in Bangladesh, contextualised 
by what this study refers to as the Bangladeshi political ‗rollercoaster‘. The struggle 
of the semiotic process around development in Bangladesh manifests itself in the 
form of an antagonistic frontier between political Islam and more secular worldviews 
ranging from socialist to neo-liberal. These appear to be united by their opposition to 
those that see Islam as a complete way of life, in which all affairs, including 
development policy-making, must be governed by Islamic principles. 
  
Chapter 6 explores the local or micro articulations of the discourses identified in the 
form of a single ‗telling‘ case study of the Islami Bank Bangladesh‘s Rural 
Development Scheme. This sheds light on the question at the centre of this doctoral 
thesis as to how discourses frame policy-making. Data supporting this case study 
(interviews, field notes, published and unpublished organisational documents) 
illustrate the severity and complexity of struggles between a range of discourses and 
 - 12 - 
practices. Informed by hegemonic theory, concepts of floating signifiers and nodal 
points are applied to illustrate and discuss hegemonic practices and formations 
within a unifying logic along the antagonistic frontier between mainstream and 
Islamic articulations of development. Several issues emerge as a result of this case 
study, which underline the value of enriching discourse analysis through the use of 
ethnographically inspired field research. 
 
Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation, summarising the key findings, which point to 
several considerations for further research, in terms of theory and method generally 
and development dialogue specifically. 
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CHAPTER 1: LOCATING AND CONCEPTUALISING THIS STUDY 
 
1  Introduction: setting the scene 
There is increasing evidence to suggest that not only is religion regarded by the poor 
themselves as an important factor contributing to their well-being (see, for example, 
the World Bank‘s ‗Voices of the Poor‘ study, Narayan & Petesch, 2002), but also that 
religious institutions or faith-based organisations have a significant contribution to 
make to development (Marshall & Marsh 2003; Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003; 
Berger 2003; Clarke 2006 & 2007; Clarke & Jennings 2008; Deneulin & Bano 2009; 
Ter Haar 2011).  
 
This doctoral study examines the relationship between the religion of Islam and 
development at the level where Islamic religious discourses (see section 1.2 on how 
religious discourses are understood) have been constructed as ‗global‘ normative 
narratives that seek to order economic, social and political affairs in relation to 
worldly progress akin to development (see Chapter 4 for a discussion of the Islamic 
development discourse).  
 
The relationship between religion and development is a relatively new research area, 
as in the social sciences and especially in development studies there has been very 
little substantive engagement of the topics together (Ver Beek, 2002; Sellinger, 2004, 
Deneulin & Rakodi 2011)1.  Clarke outlines the underlying problematique: 
―Development studies has traditionally neglected the role of religion and faith 
and their role in the lives of the poor throughout the developing world. Like 
other social sciences, it was heavily influenced by secularisation theory. […] 
This influence was evident in two key respects: in ‗secular reductionism‘ – the 
neglect of religious variables in favour of other sociological attributes such as 
class, ethnicity and gender – and in ‗materialistic determinism‘ – the neglect 
                                                 
1 There seems to be, however, a new trend, signified by, for example, the Religions and 
Development Research Programme at the University of Birmingham, where the author was a 
research associate. 
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of non-material, especially religious motivations in explaining individual or 
institutional behaviour.‖ (Clarke, 2007: 77) 
Therefore, it is assumed that the relationship between mainstream development 
studies and religious discourses pertaining to progress, both in the material but also 
in the spiritual sense, is antagonistic. However, despite the claim that development 
had been reduced to a secular-materialistic endeavour, a resurgence of religious 
discourses in international relations (Huntingdon, 1996; Haynes 2007, Rees 2011) 
and a growing awareness of religious development actors (Benthall and Bellion-
Jourdan 2003; Berger 2003; Clarke 2006 & 2007; Clarke & Jennings 2008, Deneulin 
& Bano 2009, Ter Haar 2011) has taken place. This resurgence might lead us to 
assume that the relationship between religion and development is further 
characterised by conflict and antagonisms, ranging from diverging conceptual 
understandings of what development might entail and how it should be understood, 
to strategies and priorities for ‗doing‘ development. The assumption of an 
antagonistic relationship between religion and development will be further 
investigated in section 1.2. 
 
The hegemony of mainstream development and the antagonism hinted at above 
might also be evident in the way development, both as a philosophical concept and 
human endeavour, has been criticised. Amongst the broad range of critiques and 
alternatives offered are social theories of religious traditions which have postulated 
alternative development approaches, such as those espoused by, for example, 
Islamic economics.  
 
The focus of this doctoral research study lies in developing a better understanding of 
how Islamic development policy making and makers have made meaning of the 
central issues of development and progress that appear to be primarily a ‗Western‘ 
concern. Of particular interest is seeking to understand how mainstream and 
alternative, in this instance Islamic, development and poverty reduction strategies 
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have been conceptualised, respectively, and what kinds of relationships these 
conceptualisations engender in the development field.   
 
The claim that development is primarily a ‗Western‘ endeavour is one of the key 
criticisms raised by the critique of ‗development‘ itself, posited by ‗alternative‘ and 
‗post-development‘ thought (see section 1.4. for a more detailed discussion on post 
and alternative development). This ‗school of thought‘ started questioning the very 
nature and desirability of development, adding to a host of already existing, 
somehow diametrically opposed positions on how to achieve development, ranging 
from modernisation theory to participatory approaches. Inspired by the French 
philosopher Michel Foucault, post-development scholars suggest that development is 
a discourse that orders and creates the problem that it seeks to address (Escobar, 
1995), whilst they urge an analyses of the  
―apparatuses of power and domination within which [the] texts of 
[development] are produced, circulated and consumed … [and] the links 
between the words, practices and institutions of development, and between 
the relations of power that order the world and the words and images that 
represent the world‖ (McEwan, 2002: 129).   
 
After this brief introduction, the remainder of this opening Chapter sets out the 
objectives of the study, identifies its location, conceptual framework and the key 
terms for the research. 
  
1.1 Objectives of this doctoral study 
Against the backdrop of the problematique described above, this study seeks to 
explore how development has been conceptualised in the mainstream and an 
alternative discourse, namely that underpinned by Islamic social theory and claimed 
to be operationalised in various degrees by Muslim institutions working in poverty 
reduction and development.  
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In exploring how issues of development and progress have been conceptualised, 
understanding of how meaning is made, both through the mainstream and alternative 
Islamic development discourses, is imperative. The research is not about 
mainstream or alternative development practice, how poverty may manifest itself 
(income, capabilities etc.), different dimensions of poverty (rural, urban, child etc.) or 
how poor people perceive their situation or the impact of poverty reduction-type 
interventions. Rather it seeks to explore how, at the assumed antagonistic frontier 
between mainstream development theory and Islamic social theory, Islamic 
development approaches have been framed.  
This study does not focus on ‗truth seeking‘ but strives to provide ‗understanding‘ of 
how ‗truths‘ are produced and sustained in the development field. Truth and 
knowledge are regarded as plural, contextual, and historically produced through 
discourses, which demands, within the context of this study of development, an 
analysis of texts, language, policies and practices of the different actors. Such an 
analysis is of course an interpretation within the confines of the researcher imposing 
his or her world view upon an ‗object‘. But inevitably all qualitative research is 
interpretative, seeking in the critical hermeneutic tradition to understand but not 
necessarily to explain (Kincheloe and McLaren 2003). 
As religious discourses pertaining to development are at the heart of this study, the 
next section will offer some preliminary definitions of the key concerns and terms. 
 
1.2 Religious discourses and development: Antagonisms between 
mainstream and alternative discourses in development 
 
In the development studies literature, multilateral, bilateral and secular non-
governmental organisations based in the OECD member states have been classified 
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as ‗mainstream‘ development actors. More recently, a number of scholars (Escobar 
2001; Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003; Clarke 2006 & 2007; Clarke & Jennings 
2008) have begun to focus on alternative development actors that fall outside this 
mainstream category, whether they are termed ‗Southern NGOs‘, ‗faith-based 
organisations (FBOs)‘ or ‗global justice networks‘ (Dugger 2011). However, the 
question of what exactly distinguishes these actors from those of the mainstream 
remains unanswered, primarily because not much conceptual work has been 
undertaken (see exceptions, for example Clarke, 2006, for a  typology of FBOs) . 
 
The problematique that this knowledge gap constitutes appears not just to be related 
to what Clarke (2007) termed the hegemony of ‗material determinism‘ in 
development thinking, but also to the way religion and religious discourses are re-
produced, conceptualised and understood in the social sciences. In this light, 
Haynes, for example, stresses the function of religion not just as a personal belief 
system but also as giving rise to ―a desire to grapple with social, economic or political 
issues‖ (Haynes, 2007: 30). This reflects Clarke‘s (2007) charge that development 
studies is a social science that gives priority not just to the secular over the spiritual 
but also imposes that the spiritual ought to remain confined to the religious sphere, 
as has been the case in political development and secularisation from the European 
Enlightenment onwards. 
 
Reflecting the complexities of dealing with religion in development, Deneulin and 
Bano (2009) suggest that a reductive approach, based on a secular conception of 
the social world, which focuses only on the strengths or weaknesses of a particular 
religion in relation to specific developmental objectives, is not a helpful mechanism to 
understand, evaluate or engage religious actors. These complexities appear to 
revolve around the difficulty of conceptualising religion, particularly across cultural 
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boundaries, compounded by the absence of a universal understanding of the role of 
religion between the occident and the orient (Asad, 1993).  
 
In general two approaches are offered, which seek to define religion either 
functionally or substantively. Functional definitions focus on the role of religion in 
terms of the construction of norms and views. The renowned anthropologist Geertz 
proposes that religion is a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, 
persuasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in its adherents by formulating 
conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions in an 
aura of factuality that makes the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic 
(Geertz, 1973: 90). Therefore, in the functional definition, religion provides a 
mechanism by which meaning is made and priorities established and legitimised. On 
the other hand, for those who focus upon substantive definitions, religion is all about 
content: a belief in the supernatural, transcendental and the sacred (Flood, 2006). 
Both definitions have been contested and debated since the religious sociologist 
Bellah pointed out in the 1960s, in search for a contemporary, more universally 
applicable understanding which he termed ‗civic religion‘, that it is extremely difficult 
to come up with a brief and simple definition of religion (Bellah, 1964). Even though 
this study is concerned with the relationship between religion and development, it 
cannot delve into this lengthy and inconclusive debate. However, what is relevant to 
this investigation is the more recent argument by social constructionists, who have 
pointed out that the definitional debate is misplaced since religion is a modern 
concept that developed in the unique historical context of Christianity and cannot be 
regarded as universal.  Asad, for example, argues that ―there cannot be a universal 
definition of religion, not only because its constituent elements and relationships are 
historically specific, but because that definition is itself the historical product of 
discourses‖ (Asad, 1993: 29). 
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This thesis adopts Asad‘s genealogical understanding of religion as a discourse that 
is driven by time and place and, in turn, also shapes time and place. This approach 
mitigates the lack of definitional and conceptual clarity of the elusive concept of 
religion and also has the potential to populate the conceptual vacuum in dealing with 
the relationship between religion and development, particularly the semiotic 
processes involved.  
 
As mentioned previously, due to the assumed focus of ‗mainstream‘ development 
discourses on secular materialism (Clarke 2007) and the assumed focus of religious 
discourses on ‗other-worldly‘ concerns, an interesting - real or imagined - 
antagonistic frontier has come into existence vis-à-vis the way meaning is made of 
issues such as ‗development‘ and ‗progress‘. This antagonistic frontier is 
underpinned by opposing assumptions about the role of secularism and religion in 
society, economics and politics, although both development and religious discourses 
are concerned with the meaning of ‗progress‘ or a ‗better life‘ (Deneulin and Rakodi, 
2011). The conflict appears to be further fuelled by a dialectic relationship between 
religion and development, where both discourses define themselves in opposition to 
each other.  
 
This antagonism is particularly relevant for the conceptual dimension of this study 
which seeks to investigate the relationship between Clarke‘s (2007) materially 
determined ‗mainstream‘ development discourse and ‗alternatively‘ constructed 
articulations of concerns for progress and development. The term antagonism used 
here refers in the social sciences to a force or factor that is an active resistance, 
opposition, or contentiousness in relation to another entity. Especially in discourse 
theory, which seeks to understand the struggle for meaning, it is a key concept for 
denoting conflict. An antagonistic frontier, moreover, is the space in which two 
discourses collide (Winther, Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 47-48).   
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In the relationship between mainstream and religious development discourses, this 
antagonism, arguably, goes beyond disagreements about the objectives of 
development, touching upon how development is conceptualised, what kind of 
ontology underpins it and how development knowledge can be derived (Haynes, 
2007).  
 
Such a complex antagonistic frontier is clearly underpinned by power relations 
between different discourses in the process of making meaning of development. 
Power is a complex concept within the social sciences and various disciplines offer 
different approaches. Flyvbjerg (2001), summarising this debate, categorises these 
different approaches into those that conceptualise ‗power as entity‘ and those that 
view ‗power as force relations‘.  The ‗power as entity‘ approach is concerned with 
power in terms of its possession, sovereignty and control. ‗Power as force relations‘, 
on the other hand, conceives of power as applied in strategies and tactics, contingent 
upon context and social relations.   
 
Offering particular insights for this study, Foucault argues against a view of power as 
something that someone or something can possess or acquire, much in line with the 
‗power as relations‘ tradition (see Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002).  In Foucault‘s 
sense, ‗power is exercised‘ through social relations (Foucault 1978). This study 
adopts Foucault‘s conceptualisation of power, which will be further discussed in 
section 1.5.1. 
 
The next section briefly introduces the rationale for selecting Islamic development 
thought as an alternative development discourse. 
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1.2.1 Islam as an alternative development discourse 
Particularly relevant for this doctoral study is the lack of research investigating the 
meaning-making processes around the notion of development in Islamic thought. 
The reason for selecting Islamic religious discourses here as an alternative 
development discourse lies in the fact that proponents of, for example, Islamic 
economics claim that the religion espouses a model of development that is distinct 
from the mainstream (see Chapter 4 for a discussion of the discourse of Islamic 
development). Rakodi (2011) singles out Islamic alternative approaches as a more 
recent challenge to conventional models that have failed to provide economic growth 
in Muslim countries: ―[t]he quest to develop theory and practice in Islamic economics 
has been particularly noteworthy in this respect‖ (Rakodi 2011, b: 35). This 
perspective is also more generally highlighted by post-development scholars such as 
Rist (2003), who refer to the ‗conceptual landscape of dissent‘ from mainstream 
development (Rist 2003: 43) that can be found in indigenous and alternative visions 
of development such as in Islamic economics. 
 
More specifically, contemporary Islamic thinkers such as Ziauddin Sadar (1977, 
1987, 1999) stress the suitability of Islam as an alternative development paradigm 
that challenges the hegemony of ‗Western-type‘ development models. Sardar (1977) 
quotes from the manifesto of the Muslim Institute as a way of justifying the need for 
Islam‘s alternative development discourse on the basis of failings of other 
discourses:  
―Conversely, after about 200 years of sustained growth, development and 
world domination, the Western civilization (including the communist 
experiment) has predictably failed to provide mankind with a viable framework 
for social harmony, moral and spiritual fulfilment and satisfaction and 
international peace; Western civilization has in fact created more problems of 
greater complexity for mankind than those it has solved. […] The Western 
civilization‘s greatest achievement – the production of goods and services on 
an unprecedented scale – has, because of the nature of social relationships 
in both capitalism and communism, destroyed the moral fabric of human 
personality and society, and has led to mortal conflicts at social, political, 
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economic and international levels.‖ (Sardar, 1977: 55, c.f. The Muslim 
Institute, Draft Manifesto)  
 
This statement is not unproblematic (see Chapters 3 and 4 for a fuller discussion of 
mainstream development and Islamic social theory) but it delineates the ‗battle lines‘ 
of this specific antagonistic frontier between the truth and counter-truth claims made 
by proponents of mainstream and Islamic development discourses. Whilst these 
claims might be based on what Rakodi (2011b: 35) regards as the setting up of 
‗straw men‘ that construct mainstream development as ‗Western‘ and monolithic and 
counter-construct the alternative along opposing claims, they appear to be driven by 
and drive the relationship of actors in the development field. The underlying real or 
constructed antagonism informs the way actors, such as those associated with the 
process described by Sardar above, articulate their policies and practices and might 
also frame development interventions. 
 
Hence, the battle ground for this real or imagined conflict of ideas and concepts 
particularly pertaining to what might be called development knowledge, lies at the 
heart of this study. Truth claims about the conceptual nature of development, its 
desirability and modes of and priorities for operationalising development are likely to 
offer insights about the power relationships in the struggle for meaning between 
mainstream and alternative Islamic development discourses. 
 
The next section, therefore, discusses how the discursive relationships between 
mainstream and alternative Islamic development discourses and their internal 
semiotic processes can be conceptually understood within the problematique of this 
study.  
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1.3 A conceptual framework for understanding mainstream and 
religious development discourses and their relationship 
 
Problematically, due to the neglect of religion in development studies, there is no 
generally accepted conceptual framework for studying the relationship between 
religion and development (Rakodi, 2007).  This opens up both challenges and 
opportunities. The challenges revolve around the validity of truth claims made in the 
absence of a generally accepted conceptual framework, whilst the opportunities 
centre around allowing for a more exploratory, discursive and hermeneutic approach 
that assembles a conceptual/theoretical toolbox (Ball 1994) which helps to explore 
the central issues identified in the problematique discussed. Deneulin & Rakodi 
(2011), for example, that attention has to be given to social and historical processes 
of meaning creation, requiring a shift from positivist to interpretivist research 
methods. 
 
The key concern that the absence of such an established conceptual framework 
raises, particularly the power relationships between different discourses in a field, 
can be located within the concern raised by the critique of development itself, posited 
by alternative and post-development thought, which was briefly introduced in the 
previous section. The next section provides a more detailed critical discussion of 
alternative and post-development thought, its efforts to provide a new conceptual 
understanding of how development works and categories for its analysis. This 
discussion will also assess how a post-development conceptual framework could be 
applied to this study of the relationship between mainstream and Islamic alternative 
development discourses.                                                                                           
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1.4 Locating this study: the post-development critique of development 
and alternative development  
This section provides a critical review of the post-development literature, 
emphasising its theoretical and methodological position and criticisms thereof, 
particularly where relevant to this study. 
 
At the very core of the post-development critique is the notion that development has 
not worked. This gave rise to a new school of thought in the late 1980s and 1990s 
within the body of knowledge that makes up development studies, that of post-
development theory (Kiely 1995).  Post-development scholars have formulated a 
range of positions from an outright rejection of development (anti-development) 
(Simon 1997; Kiely 1999) to the formulation of alternatives to mainstream 
development (Escobar, 1999).  They are, however, united in urging, as a starting 
point, an analysis of the apparatuses of power and domination (McEwan, 2002: 129) 
at work in the development field, which is particularly interesting in regards to the 
problematique outlined at the beginning of this chapter.   
 
Post-development scholars are not the first critics of development (see discussion of 
dependency theories in Chapter 3) but they differ in their very conceptualisation of 
development, attempting to formulate an alternative to development rather than an 
alternative form of development within the established parameters of mainstream 
development discourses. They claim that mainstream development is part of the 
problem and is not the solution. 
 
Interestingly, Islamic development thought, such as that expressed by Sardar (1977) 
in the previous section, pre-dates this current debate and can be traced to the much 
earlier works on Islamic economics by Abu ‗Ala Maududi (Ahmed, 1978) and 
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Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (Wilson, 1998), who proposed in the 1950s and 60s an 
alternative Islamic development approach. 
 
As a reflection of an overall trend in social sciences at the time, the emergence of 
post-development theory was heavily influenced by post-structuralism (Crush 1995), 
with particular emphasis on the Foucauldian links between discourse, knowledge, 
power and truth (see section1.5).  Post-development, inspired by Foucault, 
understands development as an apparatus of institutions, technical terminology and 
practices that regulate the realms of thought, subjectivity and action (Escobar 1995).   
 
Post-development theorists argue that development is neither a theory nor a policy. 
Rather it is a story, a narrative (Escobar 1995) or, in short, is a ‗discourse‘ (Pieterse 
2001: 13).  To define development as a discourse seeks to stress that is not 
objective and value-free, but has been constructed through what is regarded as 
‗socially acceptable knowledge‘ (Andersen 2003).  
 
The main arguments of post-development theory were published in the 1990s in 
three key texts:  ‗The Development Dictionary‘ (first edited by Wolfgang Sachs in 
1992); ‗Encountering Development:  the Making and Un-Making of the Third World‘ 
(written by Arturo Escobar in 1995) and ‗The Post-development Reader‘ (edited by 
Mahid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree in 1997).  The Development Dictionary and 
Post-development Reader is a compilation of essays that heavily criticise some key 
mainstream concepts such as ‗development‘, ‗environment‘, ‗needs‘, and 
‗participation‘ and explore their genealogy within the mainstream..    
 
Despite different positions, post-development theorists all express substantive doubt 
about the theoretical assumptions of modernisation, economic growth and 
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interventionism. These assumptions are seen as based on a Euro-centric worldview 
that equates development with ‗Westernisation‘. Moreover, Sachs (1992) criticises 
both modernisation and development as myths, arguing that they are constructs 
based on a European understanding of ‗modernity‘.   
 
In The Post-Development Reader Rahnema and Bawtree (1997) claim development 
is a tool of ‗Western‘ hegemony that imposes ‗Western‘ thinking and discourse about 
how the world should be.  Hence, at the centre of the post-development argument is 
the need to expose the power structures of the mainstream development discourse, 
which in their eyes defines the problem and issues prescriptions from a ‗Western‘ 
perspective. The fight against Westernisation lies also at the core of Maududi‘s 
Islamic economics programme (Ahmed, 1978), whilst Sardar heavily criticises the 
euro-centric nature of the development endeavour (1977, 1987, 1999). 
 
Interestingly in the context of this study, development is likened by some to the ‗new 
religion of the West‘ (Rist 1997).  Apart from some very strong rhetoric, scholars such 
as Escobar explain the theoretical objective of post-development as an exposition of 
the Eurocentricism of mainstream development and its operation as a 
power/knowledge complex (Escobar 1992b). Post-development scholars argue that 
development proceeded by defining ‗problems‘ such as poverty or population growth 
and identifying abnormalities such as the illiterate or the malnourished to be clinically 
treated (Peet and Hartwick 1999: 148).   
 
The proponents of post development theory also criticise the centrality of economics 
in all aspects of development, particularly as it mostly takes the form of neo-liberal 
economics (Esteva 1992). Ne-Dione et al. (1997) underline this charge by arguing 
that mainstream development promotes an economic conception of life. In this ilk, 
post-development theory opposes mainstream development discourses as being the 
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key instruments for the expansion of the capitalist model.  Post-development is 
arguably anti-capitalist, as it denounces the ‗fallacy of the capitalist promise‘ (Sachs 
1992).   
 
As an alternative conceptualisation of development, Islamic economics is built on 
rejecting both capitalist and socialist doctrines, as al-Sadr‘s early work demonstrates, 
where he counter-constructs ‗our economics‘ (in Arabic ‗Iqtisaduna‘) for the Muslim 
world (Wilson, 1998). Islamic expressions of alternative development are also 
grounded in the assumption that knowledge is power, leading thinkers to embark on 
an Islamisation of knowledge project, although - as Chapter 4 discusses in the form 
of a genealogy of Islamic approaches to development - with limited success. 
 
After its heyday in the late 1990s, post-development lost some of its currency, not  
least due to a range of sustained and justified critiques which will be further explored 
in the next section. 
 
1.4.1 Critiques of the post-development critique  
 
Whilst the post-development school offers a valuable and important critique of the 
nature of development, in turn a wide range of counter-critiques has arisen that 
particularly deal with the embedded assumptions and applications of post-
development theory (Kiely 1995; Corbridge 1998; Pieterse 1998, 2000, 2001; Nustad 
2001; Curry 2003). 
 
As a starting point, for post-development scholars the advent of the ‗development 
discourse‘ is classified as an ‗irruption event‘ in Foucaldian vein (Foucault 1972). 
Commonly, the inaugural address of former US president Harry Truman on January 
20, 1949 is seen as the invention of ‗underdevelopment‘ (Escobar 1995; Korff and 
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Schrader 2004).  Esteva (1992) quotes Truman‘s speech to emphasise the new 
semiosis: 
We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our 
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and 
growth of underdeveloped areas … what we envisage is a program of 
development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing … More than 
half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery.  Their 
food is inadequate, they are victims of disease.  Their economic life is primitive 
and stagnant.  Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to 
more prosperous areas.  For the first time in history humanity possesses the 
knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people …I believe that 
we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of 
technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better 
life … Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace.  (Truman 1949 cf. 
Esteva in Sachs 1992) 
 
Even more critically, Rist argues (1997: 70) that the primary objective of the speech 
was to set out a new bi-polar world order with the notion of development being the 
answer to ‗the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas‘ being secondary.   
 
Moreover, the idea of development goes back further than 1949 (Fanon 1963; Nandy 
1983; Rist 1997; Harcourt 2004) and defining Truman‘s speech as the single irruption 
event would be to ignore hundreds of years of colonial history in which the equivalent 
of development was utilised to justify colonialism, as exemplified by the term ‗White 
Man‘s Burden‘ (Easterly, 2006). In fact, the intellectual concern for growth and 
international development was first expressed by the founding fathers of economics, 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and has continued to be a concern in the history of 
economics literature (see Roll, 1992). For example, considerable aid transfers were 
made in the 1930s prior to the Bretton Woods system and still currently, most bi-
lateral aid is given to previously colonised countries (Gardner and Lewis 1996). 
 
Nevertheless, post-development often mistakenly, perhaps intentionally due to its 
post-colonial intellectual heritage, links the emergence of the development field with 
particularly African and Asian decolonisation.  Escobar emphasises the ‗colonizing 
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mechanisms of development‘ (Escobar 1992b: 142) and its ‗colonisation of reality‘ 
(Escobar 1995: 5).   Rahnema (1992: 124) describes development as the ‗colonising 
of the mind‘.  But Brigg argues that such statements are the product of ‗inappropriate 
hyperbolic rhetorical devices‘ (Brigg 2002: 422) rather than rigorous analysis.  
 
Other key critiques that are particularly insightful for this study have pointed to a 
range of theoretical weaknesses in post-development thought. Arguably 
development is a complex field offering diverse viewpoints and development theory 
is not monolithic, although most post-development theorists argue in an essentialised 
manner that development discourse is always underpinned by notions of modernity, 
economic growth, interventionism and a reliance on scientific and technological 
knowledge (see, for example Sachs in ‗The Development Dictionary‘, 1992). Post-
development discourse also tends to reduce enormous and diverse geographical, 
historical and cultural spaces to, for example, the ‗West‘. (see Gasper 1996; 
Corbridge, 1998).   
 
The rejection of all development, either conceptually or in its current form, by both 
the anti-development and alternative development articulations of post-development 
as discussed above, would also imply, argues, for example Curry (2003), a ruling out 
of technology-based advancement in critical areas such as health, education and 
material well-being.  However, hunger, poverty, malnourishment and destitution as 
material needs exist and need to be addressed beyond a concern only for the 
apparatus of power created by the domination of the development field through 
‗Western‘ language and culture (Knippenberg and Schuurman, 1994). An 
overreliance on the essentialised concepts of local social movements and traditional 
technologies as a way of building a ‗counter-hegemonic formation‘ (Escobar 1995: 
226) has, arguably, led to a romanticised view of ‗local cultures‘ (Corbridge 1998; 
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Kiely 1999; Gidwani 2002) which ignores the positive opportunities technology could 
provide (Ullrich 1992; Alvares 1992; Escobar 1995).   
 
It can hence be argued that development is much more complex than the 
simplification of post-development allows. Simplifying development might be primarily 
politically motivated similar to Islamic expressions of alternative development 
concerns, which, whilst they are predating the post-development school in the form 
of early Islamic economics, are also held a post-colonial political response (Kuran, 
1995). 
 
Despite the diverse and wide-ranging criticisms of post-development discourse, 
some of which have been briefly discussed in this section, the critique of 
development by post-development thought must be regarded as an overall helpful 
process that has both expanded the intellectual boundaries of the field of 
development studies (Brigg 2002) and raised some foundational questions about the 
purpose of such studies. Moreover, despite the limitations of post-development 
thought, some more recent development scholars, for example Cornwall and Eade 
(2010), have continued to deconstruct the development discourse, shedding 
conceptual light on ‗developmentspeak‘ (Eade, in Cornwall and Eade, 2010: viii) 
similarly to the seminal work of Sachs‘ Development Dictionary (1992). 
 
Crucially, post-development theory can provide an important conceptual dimension 
to understand issues such as knowledge, power and antagonism, which are 
essential for the study of antagonistic discourses within the development field. The 
next section discusses the key concepts in the lead-up to outlining the conceptual 
toolbox that drives this study. 
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1.5 Conceptualising research on discourses in international development 
 
Mainstream and alternative discourses appear to vie for legitimacy in the 
international development field. Of particular interest to this study is how Islamic 
approaches to development relate to the currently dominant formations, such as the 
Washington / post-Washington Consensus, in the process of making meaning of 
development.  
 
Due to their focus on power relationships, post-development theories and concepts 
are extremely relevant to this study. Hence it seems to be acceptable to conclude 
that ―addressing post-development‘s shortcomings is more useful than dismissing or 
limiting its potential‖ (Brigg 2002: 436). 
 
As Brigg (2002) points out, the many criticisms of post-development theory arise 
primarily from its lack of theoretical depth in applying Foucault. Given that 
Foucauldian concepts of discourse – as constituting and constituted by knowledge, 
truth and power - are so central in the post-development endeavour, the criticism is 
valid. Since the heyday of post-development, signified by the publication of the 
seminal texts discussed, these concepts remain underutilised or are used in an 
essentialised fashion, as has been discussed above. As Brigg (2002), for example, 
points out, the overall argument of post-development is characterised by a lamenting 
of the Eurocentricism and injustice of mainstream development that is not backed by 
a robust Foucauldian analysis. Kiely (1999), more challengingly, claims that post-
development theory is confused over the question of power 
 
Hence, whilst inspired by the analytical starting point of the post-development school, 
which has to unravel the relationship between knowledge and power, this study must 
go further. In this light Brigg (2002) argues for the need to employ the Foucauldian 
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conceptual understanding of power more rigorously in order to recognise that power 
is not a concrete entity but something that is relational. Given the complexities of and 
changes within the development field, both in theory and practice, it has to be 
expected that power relations are also in flux and are constantly actively and 
passively renegotiated.  Using Foucault‘s more differentiated concept of multi-
dimensional power, the development field appears to be a layered apparatus, where 
power relations exist at, within and between the macro, meso and micro levels rather 
than power being exercised in a static or linear fashion.  Therefore understanding 
how power in the development field at the macro but also at the meso and micro 
levels is produced and sustained, a process which in political sciences is referred to 
as ‗hegemony‘, is an important corner stone for the conceptual framework of this 
study. 
 
Due to the shortcomings of post-development theory in formulating a robust and 
comprehensive conceptual framework for such an analysis, a theoretical toolbox of 
key concepts as suggested by Ball (1994) will act as the conceptual apparatus for 
this study. 
 
The concepts at the core of this study, namely power, discourse and hegemony have 
diverse meanings and have been applied in a multitude of ways in the social 
sciences. As it is beyond the remit of a doctoral dissertation to provide a full critical 
discussion of each concept, this next section explains how these concepts are 
interpreted for the purposes of this research study, within the problematique of 
understanding discursive relationships in the development field outlined in the 
previous sections.  The conceptual discussion provided here establishes the 
theoretical framework and lens that has been utilised in this research, based on a 
critical reading of the conceptual work of the post-development school as suggested 
by Brigg (2002) and attempted by, for example, Teamey (2005). 
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1.5.1 Power 
The notion of power is central to theories of discourse and hegemony as well as to 
post-development theory as discussed in section 1.4.  Due to its focus on 
understanding the antagonistic relationship between mainstream and alternative 
development discourses, the concept of power is deeply embedded within all aspects 
of this study.   
 
As argued by Foucault, there is no single dominant power, but rather an intricate 
network of power relations, running above, below, through and between social 
practices at the macro, meso and micro levels.  It is most useful for the purposes of 
this research to use this interpretation of power, particularly given the emphasis on 
power relations within the development field that is relevant in the analysis in the 
later chapters.   
 
Foucault argues that power relations are embedded in social relations, which are 
framed by the discursive nature of the social world (Andersen, 2003).   Moreover, 
Foucault (1978, 1980) differentiates between notions of sovereign power and bio-
power.  Sovereign power is related to social practices where rule is carried out by 
force, whilst bio-power refers to individual self-discipline, which is a form of 
internalised surveillance and self-regulation, exercised through standard practices 
that discipline our ways of thinking vis-à-vis those which are considered socially 
acceptable (Foucault 1978).   
 
Foucault developed a theory of power/knowledge/truth which suggests that power in 
society cannot be pinpointed, but is spread across different social practices 
(Andersen 2003).  In this understanding of power, knowledge (or what counts as 
knowledge) and truth (knowledge that is valued as truth) are inextricably bound 
together.  Foucault explains: 
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We should admit rather that power produces knowledge; that power and 
knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. (Foucault 1977: 27) 
 
Power/knowledge/truth forms an unbreakable triangle.  All three are internalised 
through discourses and discursive practices.  As Foucault (1980) explains: 
There cannot be possible exercises of power without a certain economy of 
discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association.  
We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise 
power except through the production of truth. (Foucault 1980: 93) 
 
According to Foucault (1972, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1984), knowledge is socially and 
historically constructed and not just a reflection of reality. Further, truth is a discursive 
construction and different regulatory arrangements for knowledge determine what is 
true and what is false.  There are therefore multiple knowledges, multiple discourses 
that continually compete for space and legitimacy. Said (1979) elaborates 
significantly on the links between power and discourse: 
Discourse exists within an uneven exchange with various kinds of power 
shaped to a degree by the exchange with power political (colonial or imperial 
establishment), power intellectual (reigning sciences), power cultural 
(orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), power moral (ideas about what 
we can and cannot do). (Said 1979: 8) 
 
An additional aspect of the concept of power is the notion of domination. This term is 
especially significant for this research, which explores hegemonic articulations within 
power relations.  Fowler (2000) argues that the notion of domination coincides with a 
Foucauldian interpretation of power: 
Domination is not merely power over a group, it is also a relationship of 
meaning between individuals in which recognition of legitimacy ensures the 
persistence of power. (Fowler 2000: 72) 
 
Such a fluid, relational and contingent understanding based on a Foucauldian 
interpretation is the most useful interpretation of power for the purposes of this 
research study.   
 - 35 - 
1.5.2 Discourse 
Whilst there is a range of definitions for discourse, generally referring to written or 
spoken communication, in its most basic form it can be defined as a particular way of 
talking about and understanding the world (Phillips and Jørgensen 2002). The 
understandings of discourse vary widely, depending upon one's ontological and 
epistemological positioning.  These range from describing discourse as an utterance 
(Todorov 1984) to a practice, with conditions, rules and historical information 
(Escobar 1995).  The different understandings of how discourse constitutes social 
reality see Phillips and Jørgensen (2002: 19), who provide an insightful diagrammatic 
overview, for the discussion of which there is insufficient space in this doctoral study. 
Michel Foucault is perhaps first and foremost associated with having created an 
agenda for the analysis of discourse (Andersen 2003). For Foucault (1972) 
discourses are constitutive of and constituted by power relations, particularly through 
the way power and knowledge are fused in the practices that comprise history (Ball, 
1990: 2).   Discourses are never static and any utterance should be treated when it 
occurs, as a moment of a sudden ‗irruption‘ (Foucault 1972).   
For the benefit of this study, ‗discourse‘ will be understood in the way originally 
developed by Michel Foucault in his early work, especially the Archaeology of 
Knowledge (1972), as systems of thoughts composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of 
action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the worlds 
of which they speak.  
Moreover Discourse Analysis is both a theory and a method (Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough 1999). While its theoretical dimension is discussed in this chapter, 
discourse analysis will also serve as the research methodology, as explained in 
Chapter 2. 
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Discourse analysis is a general term for a number of approaches to analysing 
written, spoken or signed language use (Blommaert, 2005). It evolved, together with 
semiotics and sociolinguistics, in the late 1960s and 1970s, and focused on the study 
of the meaning of language in context, rather than on the abstract structures of 
texts.The common starting point for all approaches to Discourse Analysis is 
‗language in use‘ (Wetherall et al 2001). Unlike traditional linguistics, it goes beyond 
the boundary of words, sentences and texts, with a focus on semiotic processes that 
compete to frame the ‗global' structures, such as an overall topic and the schematic 
organisation of a discourse as a whole (Blommaert, 2005).  
This latter aspect is of particular importance to this study, which investigates the 
struggle of mainstream and alternative discourses to achieve and maintain 
hegemony in the development field. The next section of this chapter, hence, 
discusses theories of hegemony.  
 
1.5.3 Hegemony 
Traditionally, the concept of hegemony denoted the dominance of one country over 
other countries and is used most commonly in a negative sense. Although this 
understanding of hegemony is arguably overly simplistic and essentialising, it has 
been widely used as a political concept, particularly by Marxists. Antonio Gramsci 
has been credited for bringing the concept of hegemony from the political to the 
intellectual arena (Fontana 1993). 
 
Gramsci developed his theory of hegemony as a political prisoner in Italy in the late 
1920s and early 1930s. His notion of cultural hegemony, predating Foucault, 
establishes a clear connection between power/knowledge and the subject 
hegemonised (Fontana 1993). According to Gramsci, the supremacy can be 
established in two different ways: firstly, in the Foucauldian sense as sovereign 
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power through physical domination or coercion and, secondly, as bio-power through 
‗intellectual and moral leadership‘ (Femia 1987: 24). Gramsci‘s notion of hegemony 
is based on his concept of cultural domination, i.e. that the prevailing commonsense 
is formed in culture, similar to Foucauldian self-disciplining (Peet 2002).  Ultimately 
hegemonic rule is rule through the creation of consent that imposes a particular world 
view on all (Femia 1987). 
 
Gramsci‘s concept of cultural hegemony has been developed further by Ernesto 
Laclau to make it more relevant to the political complexities of contemporary society 
and global relations (Townshend 2004: 284).  Hegemonisation for Laclau consists of 
the imposition onto elements of a certain way of relating to each other (Andersen, 
2003: 56). 
 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985; 2001) have developed Gramsci‘s notion of hegemony 
further by arguing that hegemony is only possible when something exists that can be 
hegemonised (Andersen 2003). It is hence a process rather than a state, the 
argument for which has been further developed by Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000), 
who suggest that hegemonic practices seek to create hegemonic formations.   
 
In pursuit of one of this study‘s objectives - that of analysing the power relations that 
discourses arguably create - Laclau‘s argument that the main purpose of discourse 
analysis is to uncover the general hegemonic relationship of ideas in society 
(Andersen 2003) is utilised. This approach is based on a number of conceptual 
developments that mark Laclau‘s departure not only from the then dominant Marxist-
structuralist view that had traditionally dealt with issues of antagonism and hegemony 
but also from Foucauldian conceptualisations of discourse, although the latter will  
continue to remain at the core of this study.   
 
Laclau‘s approach to discourse is, whilst based on Foucault, more developed in as  
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far as he differentiates between articulation (practice) and discourse (system) 
(Andersen 2003). He further differentiates between discursivity and discourse, 
denoting the difference between relational and fixed meaning. As Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985: 112) point out: ―Any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the 
field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre.‖ Discursive 
relations make this centre pivotal, as none of the differences are totally fixed. Laclau 
refers to these at best partially-fixed centres as ‗nodal points‘ (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985): 
―The practice of articulation, therefore, consists in the construction of nodal 
points which partially fix meaning; and the partial character of this fixation 
proceeds from the openness of the social, a result, in its turn, of the constant 
overflowing of every discourse to the infinitude of the field of discursivity‖ 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985:113)  
 
The relationship between articulation and discourse is hence dynamic and consists 
of different elements of signification, which only obtain identity and influence through 
their mutual antagonistic and conflicting differences in the discourse.   At an 
antagonistic frontier, Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 131) explain that antagonism and 
conflict do not necessarily emerge at a single point but rather can occur in multiple 
locations.    
 
Moreover, Laclau and Mouffe (1985; 2001) have offered the concepts of logics of 
difference and logics of equivalence to further explain the construction of social 
antagonisms and operations of hegemonic practices and formations in discursive 
systems. A logic of equivalence unifies elements within different discourses toward 
something they are all opposed to.  Equivalences are identified between them, 
creating a unified logic, linking the differences, into a chain, thus reducing and 
simplifying the number of possible positions (Andersen 2003).   
 
A logic of difference is not unified as an opposition to something else.  There is no 
antagonistic frontier, although there might be contested poles within the logic.  For 
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example, it can be argued that development in a general sense is a logic of 
difference that unifies actors, institutions, policies and theories within the 
development field to a significant extent.  In relation to religious discourses, however, 
mainstream development represents a logic of equivalence, in that is united through 
notions of secular modernity and material determinism against notions of ‗other-
worldiness‘. Both the genealogies of mainstream and Islamic concepts of 
development explained in Chapters 3 and 4, and the case study in Chapters 5 and 6 
will illustrate this argument.  
 
Through his discourse analytical approach, Laclau offers a differentiated and 
advanced perspective on hegemony for this study. Due to the floating and unfixed 
nature of discourses, signifiers and the signified are not irreversibly tied to each 
other. Their relationship is more of layering or floating, hence Laclau‘s reference to 
the ‗floating signifier‘ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). The discursive field is therefore 
marked by struggles over which floating ‗signifiers‘ are to be tied to which ‗signified‘, 
through the above mentioned nodal points (Andersen 2003: 55).  Consequently, 
hegemony for Laclau is the attempt to generate fixation, likened by him 
metaphorically to ―writing in water. It is something impossible, unstable, and 
vulnerable, but to a certain extent still something that can be accomplished‖ (Laclau, 
1985: 107). Hegemonisation therefore consists in the imposition onto elements of a 
certain way of relating to each other, creating the space for a politics of signifiers 
(Andersen 2003). Hegemonic analysis, hence, investigates how discourses are 
established through never-concluding struggles over the fixation of floating elements 
of signification. 
 
The value of using Laclau‘s work lies in its utility to analyse the process of 
hegemonisation within a field such as international development, in which a range of 
discourses compete for legitimacy and influence over how meaning is made of the 
core issues.   
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1.6 Conclusion 
Against the backdrop of meaning-making of core issues such as ‗progress‘ and a 
‗better life‘ there is an antagonistic frontier between mainstream secular and 
alternative Islamic articulations of development. The question that drives this study is 
how the mainstream and alternative discourses frame contemporary 
conceptualisations of development, particularly in an Islamic context with its focus on 
‗other-worldly‘ issues.  
 
Due to its purpose of seeking understanding about how the development endeavour 
has been constructed, the critical review of post-development theory above 
constitutes the location of the study, which will attempt to overcome its theoretical 
and methodological shortcomings.  In spite of the many criticisms, the post 
development school‘s underlying critique of development remains a potent 
conceptual and analytical tool, providing a valuable conceptual starting point for 
understanding the process of meaning making within competing development 
discourses. 
 
In order to establish a toolbox that overcomes the conceptual shortcomings of post-
development theory, however, a more robust application of concepts of power, 
discourse and hegemony is required. Therefore this study‘s conceptual apparatus 
has to be comprised of: 
 
- Rigorous application of Foucault‘s multi-dimensional understanding of power 
in both its ‗sovereign‘ and particularly in its ‗bio‘ articulations; 
- Foucault‘s conceptualisation of discourses as constituting and constituted by 
knowledge, truth and power, and  
- Laclau‘s hegemonic theory.   
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This toolbox will provide the conceptual lens through which the antagonisms between 
mainstream and alternative Islamic discourses in the development field will be 
interrogated.  Equipped with this toolbox, the next chapter will refine the research 
question and elaborate on the methodology for addressing it.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: ANALYSING DISCOURSE AND POWER 
RELATIONSHIPS 
 
2 Introduction and summary of the research study 
The relationship between mainstream and Islamic religious discourses is at the heart 
of this doctoral study, specifically in relation to how meaning is made of the central 
issues of development and progress. This relationship would appear to be central to 
the ways in which interactions are played out within the policy space, through 
particular notions of development truths and their desirable outcomes, institutions, 
policies and social and discursive practices. 
 
In Foucault‘s sense, as has been argued in the previous chapter, these discourses 
are constitutive of and constituted by power relations, thereby seeking to dominate 
the meaning-making process. In pursuit of understanding these relationships, this 
study therefore must seek to reconstruct and interpret some of the ways in which 
power is exercised through relations between actors, institutions, knowledge and 
discourses within the development field.  
 
2.1 Conceptualising the analytical strategy for this doctoral study 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, an analysis at the macro, meso and micro 
levels is imperative, as the dominant and alternative discourses are constitutive of 
and constituted by power relations that are played out at all levels in the Foucauldian 
sense and not just at the macro level, as the post-development school argues 
(Bendaña 2004: 25).  
 
Due to the inherent complexities of such an endeavour, Chouliaraki and Fairclough 
(1999: 99) suggest that a ‗charcoal sketch‘ is a useful tool to estimate the 
boundaries, actors, their relations and the structures of a field. Such an initial sketch 
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is offered in Fig.1. This illustrates, in a simplistic and schematic manner, the 
antagonistic relationship between mainstream and Islamic development discourses, 
suggesting that there is a need to consider the types of ideas, attitudes, courses of 
action, beliefs, institutions and institutional practices that systematically construct the 
dominant development and the alternative Islamic discourses, in order to guide the 
research design. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Antagonistic relationship between mainstream and Islamic 
development discourses 
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The methodology to operationalise the conceptual framework discussed in Chapter 
1, which seeks to elucidate complex power relationships, will have to be multi-
pronged to allow for a three-tier analysis at the macro, meso and micro levels. In 
order to trace back the development of the respective discourses and their global 
narratives, a historiographical tool referred to as a Foucauldian genealogy (Wetherell 
et al, 2001) will be deployed for the macro analysis. To further investigate how 
discourses frame the thought and hegemonic practices in the development field, 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) will be deployed as the field research methodology 
in a single case study in Bangladesh. The next section offers a clarification of the 
research question and provides a methodological discussion. 
 
2.2 Refining the research question 
 
At the heart of this doctoral study lies the question as to how discourses ‗frame‘ the 
meaning-making process in regards to issues of development and progress along 
the antagonistic frontier between mainstream and Islamic conceptualisations. It does 
not aim to provide discourse commentary which might seek to expose an underlying 
hidden, deeper meaning or an essential truth. Foucault (1972: 234) called discourse 
analysis ―pure description of discursive facts‖, meaning a focus on the signifier rather 
than the signified.  In line with Foucault‘s analytical strategy about the importance of 
a non-reductionist approach which focuses purely on the discourse (Andersen 2003), 
the ‗how‘ in the research question addresses in this study seeks to deal with 
‗development‘ by neither seeking to describe or ontologise it (i.e. the ‗what‘ or the 
contents of development policy) nor to focus on its cause (i.e. ‗why‘ particular policies 
were drafted in a particlar manner). In the Foucauldian sense, only a ‗how‘ question 
about a statement (see below for a discussion about Foucault‘s use of the term) can 
grant full attention to the statement (the signifier) itself without immediately shifting 
away from it (Andersen 2003).  
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In the research question, the term ‗frame‘ has been chosen with reference to the 
process of framing in social theory, which offers a range of meanings beyond the 
simple semantic of ‗constructing‘, ‗articulating‘ or ‗setting in frame‘ (Oxford Dictionary, 
2009). The reason why the instrumental term framing was chosen to articulate the 
research question for this study was to link it to the more specific understanding of 
the concept of ‗frame‘ as a schema of interpretation, a collection of anecdotes and 
stereotypes or discourses that generate ‗understanding‘ (Geoffman, 1974).  Framing 
is seen as an unavoidable control over the individual's perception of the meanings 
attributed to words or phrases (Scheufele 1999). In this analysis of meaning-making, 
Benford and Snow‘s (2000) framing approach is a helpful concept. The concept of 
frames refers to ―interpretative schemata that offer a language and cognitive tools for 
making sense of experiences and events in the ‗world out there‘ – what is elsewhere 
called discourse (e.g. Foucault, Laclau & Mouffe)― (Benford and Snow, 2000: 614).  A 
frame, in other words, is the window through which entities view the world and 
framing is the construction of this window, thereby denoting ―an active, processual 
phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction‖ 
(Benford and Snow: 614). Hence, the diction of the research question, when 
deploying the term ‗frame‘, refers to a process of understanding the interpretative 
schemata used to make sense of the world. 
 
Since the framing approach is conceptually underpinned by understandings of 
discourse, which will serve as the main conceptual and methodological tool for this 
study of meaning-making and the power relations that it is underpinned by, the 
research question is about how discourses give meaning to development. Of 
particular interest is the situation where a discourse has given rise to a hegemonic 
formation, arguably, the mainstream development discourse, whilst an antagonistic 
discourse continues to act as the primary frame for alternative policy making, as is 
assumed to be the case with Islamic development thought.  
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Hence, in order to understand what role these antagonistic discourses play in the 
process of making meaning of ‗development‘, a detailed and historically 
contextualised investigation into the nature of these discourses is imperative, 
followed by an exploration of practices within the development policy field to illustrate 
the power/knowledge nexus. In pursuit of the research question - how do discourses 
frame contemporary ‗Islamic‘ conceptualisations of development - the core query that 
will help to elucidate this is an identification of the breadth and depth of assumptions 
embedded within the dominant mainstream development and alternative Islamic 
discourses in the literature and the case study context. From there, a number of 
questions arise: 
o What positions do mainstream and Islamic development thinking 
respectively espouse in relation to: 
 the human being (nature, agency, the social world, values) 
 the political, economic and social order (epistemology, nature, 
doctrine) 
 poverty (conceptualisation, measurement, outlook) 
 progress, growth and development (conceptualisation, 
measurement, philosophy, 
operationalisation/interventions/strategies) 
 
o What type of concepts are used by mainstream and Islamic 
development actors in development policy-making and why?  
 How, if so, are these different? 
 Where, if so, is the overlap? 
 Are any potential dissonances due to diverging underlying 
discourses on poverty and development?  
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o What is assumed about why development practices are done and how 
they are done? 
 Which social practices, relationships and/or events are 
included and/or excluded? 
 At what level of abstraction are they represented? 
 What is the proximity of the organisation to the supposed 
beneficiaries? 
 Who is funding these practices? 
 
o What is the nature of the development policy field? 
 How is the development discourse framed? 
 Does the use of terminology influence the type of 
relationships between actors, and if so how? 
 How much scope is there for countering dominant 
development and poverty reduction discourses? 
 What factors shape the way that State and Islamic institutions 
perceive their respective roles in poverty reduction policy 
making? 
 Historical perspective (civil society, political processes, 
development strategies etc) 
 Mandate, motivation & legitimacy 
 Power relations 
The next section sets out the methodology deployed to address the research 
question. 
2.3 Methodology 
This study seeks to deconstruct and interpret some of the ways in which power is 
exercised through relations between actors, institutions, knowledge and discourses 
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within the development space.  The assumption is that the dominant discourse 
constitutes (or frames) the power relations in the Foucauldian sense.  The dominant 
discourse is hence central to the ways in which interactions are played out within the 
field, through particular notions of development truths and what is deemed to be the 
desirable outcome of development.  
 
The starting point for this study lies in the Foucauldian understanding of power 
through the production of truth and knowledge as discourses. Hence discourse 
theory, both as a conceptual tool, as discussed in the previous chapter, and  as 
methodology offers a particularly insightful approach to understanding meaning-
making, as is perhaps most clearly evident in the process of policy-making, 
especially where dominant and alternative discourses compete. The next section will 
consider in more detail how discourse analysis is used as a methodology, in terms of 
both a Foucauldian genealogy at the macro-level and hegemonic analysis and 
Critical Discourse Analysis at the meso and micro level.  
 
2.4 Discourse analysis 
Discourse analysis as a method, similarly to the theoretical discussion in Chapter 1, 
has a range of interpretations. But the main focus is the analysis of language in use 
(Wetherell, 2001), with a particular focus on the ‗global' structures, such as the 
overall topics and the schematic organization of the discourse or conversation as a 
whole (Blommaert, 2005). Of particular interest for this study are the following: 
 
 The relations between text and context  
 The relations between discourse and power  
 The relations between practices and the communicative dimension of 
discourse 
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This study will therefore investigate patterns within the language of development in 
order to understand how these constitute aspects of a larger societal context. This 
type of Discourse Analysis seeks to draw out the social nature and historical origins 
of the phenomenon studied, in the case of this study, development itself. The basic 
assumption here is that the language available enables and constrains not only the 
expression of ideas but also social practices (Wetherell, et al 2001). This approach 
has given rise to historical studies known as genealogies which trace back the 
development of discourses (see Chapters 3 and 4 for genealogies of the mainstream 
and Islamic development discourses). 
2.4.1 Foucauldian discourse analysis 
Perhaps more than any other scholar, Michel Foucault is credited with originating 
discourse analysis, although he explicitly did not set out to found a school of thought 
(Andersen 2003).  In his strongest theoretical work, ‗The Archaeology of Knowledge‘ 
(originally published in French in 1969), Foucault provides an excursion into 
discourse analytical methodology, reiterating that the approach to analysis he is 
outlining is only one possible procedure, and that he is not seeking to displace other 
ways of analysing discourse or render them invalid. Within the range of analytical 
strategies suggested by Foucault, knowledge archaeology and genealogy are the 
methodological tools most relevant to this study (Andersen, 2003).  
 
‗The Archaeology of Knowledge‘ (1972) is Foucault‘s first major attempt at 
rationalising and systematising his prior works, although it was not intended to be a 
‗method‘ (Andersen 2003: 8). Foucault‘s very concern with analysing discourse has 
often been mistaken for a search for deeper meaning behind a discourse, leading to 
the charge that he is a structuralist (Jones, 1994). Given the influence his Marxist 
teacher Althusser had on him (Andersen 2003:2), it is easy to assume that he is a 
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structuralist, but Foucault focuses on differences rather than overall structures which 
might pre-determine the meaning of semantic elements (Andersen 2003). 
 
For Foucault (1972), ‗statements‘ - derived from ―enoncés" (Foucault 1969: 141), 
which is also often translated as ‗enouncements‘ - are the building blocks of 
discourse. A statement or enouncement is an abstract matter that enables signs 
(which are understood as a discrete unit of meaning in semiotics) to assign specific 
repeatable relations to objects, subjects and other enouncements (Andersen 2003). 
Statements are not just utterances or speech acts, but they are an articulation of 
socially accepted rules that establish meaning (Gutting, 1994).  
 
Hence, discourse, as defined by Foucault, is a demarcated body of formulated 
statements that are linked together through a socially agreed sequence, creating a 
particular meaning. Regularities that can be found in the form of such particular 
sequences can produce discursive formations within a discourse. Foucault used the 
concept of discursive formation in relation to his analysis of large bodies of 
knowledge, such as political economy and natural history (Foucault 1972).  
 
Foucault‘s fundamental concern is the questioning of discursive assumptions by 
challenging the notion of individual will, as he understands every utterance to take 
place within the boundaries of a specific discourse to which certain rules of 
acceptability apply (Andersen, 2003). As discussed in Chapter 1, Foucault traces the 
role of discourses in wider social power relationships, emphasizing how truths are 
produced and maintained. Foucault (1977, 1980) argued that power and knowledge 
are inter-related and therefore every human relationship involves a struggle and 
negotiation of power. Discourse, according to Foucault (1977, 1980, 2003) is related 
to power because it operates by rules of exclusion. Discourses therefore include 
excluding procedures, not just of arguments and themes, but also of groups 
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constructed as ‗other‘ and denounced as outsiders, as evident in his research about 
the discourse of madness (Foucault, 2006).  
 
In this light, it is evident that for Foucault discourse analysis is not merely textual 
analysis. Texts are not simply independent discursive units: 
― … no book can exist by its own powers; it always exists due to its 
conditioning and conditional relations to other books; it is a point in a network 
; it carries a system of references – explicitly or not – to other books, other 
texts, or other sentences …‖ (Foucault, 1970 c.f. Andersen, 2003)  
 
Discourse analysis is, hence, concerned with the way statements are dispersed and 
demarcated in society (Andersen 2003). A prominent example of Foucauldian 
discourse analysis is Said‘s work ‗Orientalism‘ (1979) that investigates the ‗Western‘ 
construction of the Orient as ‗the Other‘:   
Orientalism [is a] systematic discourse by which Europe was able to manage – 
and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, 
scientifically and imaginatively. (Said 1979: 3) 
 
 
2.4.2 Knowledge archaeology and Foucauldian genealogical analysis  
Knowledge archaeology and genealogical analysis cannot be separated and have 
often been portrayed as two phases of Foucault‘s work. In some ways, genealogical 
analysis could be regarded as the historical dimension of knowledge archaeology 
(Andersen, 2003). Whilst archaeological analysis seeks to describe discourses as 
regularities in the dispersion of statements, including the displacement over time of 
these regularities, genealogical analysis seeks to open up the discursive field 
through tracing practices, discourses and the lines of connection to different 
institutions, historical conflicts and strategies of control. This analytical dimension is 
the one which has inspired particularly the post-development school, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, in its quest to unravel the ―apparatuses of power and domination within 
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which [the] texts of [development] are produced, circulated and consumed‖ 
(McEwan, 2002: 129). 
 
Particularly Foucault‘s concept of genealogy as a counter-history of the position of a 
subject which traces the development of people and societies through history is 
widely regarded as one of his most powerful contributions to the analysis of power 
structures (Andersen, 2003). As outlined in Chapter 1, Foucault‘s primary concern 
was with understanding the operations of power through examining the development, 
dispersion and control over knowledge. Although genealogy is very much a 
methodology for analysing history, it does not adopt a traditional historical method 
(Carabine, 2001). Foucault's ideas of genealogy were greatly influenced by the work 
that Nietzsche had done on the development of morals through the exercise of 
power. In his genealogical approach, which is regarded as controversial by 
conventional historians, he picks up on Nietsche‘s critique of history that had focused 
on the fallacy of antiquarian or monumental historiographies, which in his view 
reconstruct history as a ‗mummification‘ or instrumental ‗harmonisation‘ of events 
respectively (Nietzsche, 1988). Foucault also describes genealogy as a particular 
investigation into those elements which "we tend to feel [are] without history" 
(Foucault, 1980b: 139), which are often unquestioned and have become 
commonsense, although they are, as Foucault argues, products of construction. 
 
In order to unravel the process of historical and social construction, according to 
Foucault (1972), discursive formations can be analysed as the regularity of 
dispensation of statements which produce objects, subjects, conceptual networks 
and strategies. Therefore the aim of knowledge archaeology is to detect the rules 
that govern the way different statements come into being in discursive formations. 
―Rules in this context mean rules of acceptability, that is, rules about when a 
statement is accepted as a reasonable statement‖ (Andersen, 2003: 14).  
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Moreover, whilst knowledge archaeology focuses on regularity, genealogical analysis 
seeks out the continuity or more likely the discontinuity of transformation (Andersen, 
2003). The continuity and discontinuity of difference is a tool for observation, 
employed in order to distinguish discontinuity in that which presents itself as 
continuity and to examine possible continuities in that which presents itself as new, 
different or unique (Andersen, 2003: 20). This leads to investigation as to how an 
object has been construed historically in different ways and in different settings, not 
just through events but also in terms of active strategies and practices. As Andersen 
points out: 
―Genealogy provides no explanation of causality. … The lines of descent 
simply imply an originating affiliation, that … [an object, the author] ties 
together and transforms elements from previous discursive strategies and 
practices into its own process of construction. Moreover, there is no simple 
seriality in which discursive strategies successively supersede each other. 
Conversely, a new strategy can easily emanate through transformation of 
elements from a specific discursive formation while this strategy is sustained. 
… The endpoint of genealogy determines which discourses and discursive 
kinships one discovers.‖   (Andersen, 2003: 22)    
 
After setting out the conceptual parameters for Foucauldian discourse analysis, the 
next section will discuss how a genealogical analysis can be applied to a specific 
field, in the case of this study, the realm of mainstream and alternative Islamic 
development theory, policy and practice. 
 
2.4.3 Operationalising Foucauldian Genealogical analysis 
In order to trace the power/knowledge networks evident in development discourses a 
full Foucauldian genealogy would need to be undertaken. As a first step in both 
genealogical analysis and knowledge archaeology stands the construction of an 
archive of the relevant discourse. As Foucault (1998: 263) put it: ―One ought to read 
everything, study everything. In other words, one must have at one‘s disposal the 
general archive of a period at a given moment. And archaeology is, in a strict sense, 
the science of this archive.‖ Not until the archive is established is it possible to inquire 
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about discursive formations, particularly why a specific statement or discursive 
formation occurred and not another (Foucault, 1972).  
However, Carabine (2001) suggests that genealogy can also be used to provide a 
‗snapshot‘ of a particular moment without tracing its full history. Given the limitations 
of a PhD thesis, coupled with the exploratory nature of this study, the author will not 
attempt to carry out a genealogical analysis that truly considers ‗everything‘. 
Nevertheless, this study attempts to provide such ‗snapshots‘ of the two discourses 
which will be historically contextualised. Data sources for the genealogies are both 
the primary texts, the seminal works of the respective discourses, and alternative 
views that may be important to tracing continuity and discontinuity. Moreover, as 
outlined by Foucault (1972), secondary texts such as policies will be essential in 
understanding how power is operationalised. In addition, this study will seek to 
identify different perspectives in the discourses; how and when these emerged and 
how they were received from within the mainstream and Islamic development fields.   
 
According to Carabine (2001), it is difficult to identify the different stages of 
genealogical analysis step by step as ―though following a recipe‖ (2001: 285), 
although she does offer the following indicative programme: 
 
 identification of themes, categories and objects of the discourse; 
 looking for absences and silences, that is, what is not present or not spoken 
of that one might expect to be;   
 analysing inter-relationships between discourses.  
 considering the context for an issue.  
Carabine (2001: 280 - 285) 
Methodologically-speaking, genealogical analysis is a combination of a range of 
techniques, a toolbox. This study cannot provide a genealogy that includes inter-
textual analysis embodying entire orders of discourse within the mainstream and 
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Islamic development fields. However, it will provide in Chapters 3 and 4 an 
exploratory genealogy of the mainstream and Islamic development discourses, 
including the analysis of a range of texts found to be the most ‗telling‘, the most 
relevant to address the research questions. 
 
2.5 Critical Discourse Analysis  
 
For the meso and micro level analysis of development policy in the field, a 
methodological toolbox based on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) will seek to 
capture and interpret narratives in pursuit of ‗de-constructing‘ and interpreting the 
assumptions and power relations that drive the discourse at the antagonistic frontier 
between mainstream and Islamic notions of development in Bangladesh. The 
following section will outline the methodological approach taken during fieldwork in 
Bangladesh during November 2008 and May 2009, the findings of which are 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
In addition to the more linguistic theory-based discourse analysis, Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) draws from social theory and the works of Foucault, Gramsci, 
Habermas and Bourdie in order to examine knowledge and power relations involved 
in discourse, some of which have been discussed in the previous chapter.  CDA is 
the interdisciplinary  study of discourse that views language as a form of social 
practice and focuses on the ways social and political hegemonisation can be 
perceived in text and talk (Fairclough 1995 a), founded on the Foucauldian notion 
that there is unequal access to language and related resources, which are controlled 
by organisations. Therefore, the patterns of access to discourse and communicative 
events such as policy-making are an essential element for CDA. It is this linguistic 
relativism which underlies CDA (Clark 2007: 144). 
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In some ways CDA acts as an umbrella for any approach in the realm of socio-
linguistics that wishes to portray itself as politically radical, although its expressions 
are very diverse (Hammersley 1997: 244). The socio-political implications of CDA 
have, hence, attracted criticism for a supposed political agenda that is not clearly 
grounded in linguistics (see Stubbs 1997; Jones 2007). This is because CDA 
scholars tend to criticise the structures of the socio-political context, rather than 
focusing only on an analysis of the specific structures of text or talk, running the 
danger of being accused of what Van Dijk (2001) terms ‗dissident research‘. 
 
Despite this criticism, a number of studies of the development context have 
incorporated critical discourse analysis into their research (see for example 
Fairclough 2003; Giri et al. 2004; Teamey 2005, Fairclough 2006) and regard CDA 
as a powerful tool to locate the various agendas and to perceive the power structures 
created within a particular space (Escobar 1995).  As an analytical framework, CDA 
has also been likened to Bhaskar‘s (1986) concept of ‗explanatory critique‘, which 
underpins the ontological and epistemological position of this study.  
 
Norman Fairclough is perhaps the most prominent CDA scholar and his conceptual 
and methodological work will form the basis of the approach adopted by this study 
takes to CDA as a method. Particularly useful here is Fairclough‘s three-dimensional 
framework for studying discourse, combining micro, meso and macro-level 
interpretation.  Based on a micro analysis of syntax, structure, genres etc. and the 
processes of discourse production and consumption, Fairclough (1995 a) provides a 
method for understanding the broad, societal currents that are affecting the discourse 
studied. This will form the analytical strategy for the case study part of this research, 
as it provides an avenue to analyse individual development policies, how they are 
produced and applied in the development field in Bangladesh, and their discursive 
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relationships with various mainstream actors and a selected Islamic development 
actor. 
 
2.5.1 Operationalising Critical Discourse Analysis  
This study seeks to ‗deconstruct‘ (see section 2.6.1 below for a brief discussion of 
the term) and interpret some of the ways in which power is exercised through 
relations between actors, institutions, knowledge and discourses within the 
development field.  
 
In this light, Fairclough (2001 b: 236-39) proposes the following analytical framework 
for CDA: 
 
Stage 1: Identification of a social problem that has a semiotic, ‗meaning-making‘ 
aspect 
From the outset, CDA‘s ‗critical‘ nature is underlined by the way it pursues not 
necessarily a research question but a social problem (Fairclough, 2001 b: 236). It is 
not just concerned with analysis, but seeks to discern connections between language 
and other elements in social life and is committed to progressive social change 
(Fairclough, 2001 b: 230). 
 
Stage 2: Identification of obstacles to the social problem being tackled through 
 analysis of the network of practices it is located within 
 analysis of the relationship of semiosis to other elements within the particular 
practice concerned 
 analysis of the discourse (the semiosis itself) by means of interactional, 
interdiscursive, linguistic and structural analysis (the order discourse),   
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Stage 3: Consideration of whether the social order (network or practices) ‗needs‘ the 
problem 
An analysis of who benefits most from the way social life is currently organised is 
helpful in identifying potential hegemonic formations 
 
Stage 4: Identification of possible ways past the obstacle 
This analytical element serves to identify difference (gaps and contradictions) within 
the network of practice. 
 
Stage 5: Critical reflection on the analysis 
Due to CDA‘s focus on emancipatory change (Habermas, 1971), Fairclough‘s final 
step is a reflexive critique of the analytical process to establish whether it has 
brought about change.        
(Fairclough, 2001 b: 230) 
 
Given that there is no agreed upon method of ‗doing‘ CDA, Fairclough‘s proposed 
analytical framework for CDA as discussed above provides a useful tool for the 
analysis of development policy-making in an Islamic context in Bangladesh (see 
Chapters 5 and 6, where the use of this methods will be fully contextualised). Due to 
its objective of ‗deconstructing‘ how the mainstream development discourse frames 
organisational policy-making, CDA has to be regarded as an appropriate tool of 
analysis, since it focuses on the process of meaning making within social processes. 
However, Fairclough‘s more structuralist leanings put him conceptually at odds with 
Foucauldian discourse ‗theory‘, although as Fairclough admits, Foucault‘s work has 
been an important theoretical point of reference for CDA (Fairclough and Wodak, 
1997). 
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But as CDA sees language or discourse playing a key role in social processes whilst 
allowing for a critical engagement with the research question, CDA will be utilised for 
the micro level analysis, although through a combination of the tools of analysis that 
are most suitable to address the research question.  The next section outlines which 
tools have been used in the meso and micro-level analysis of the development field 
in Bangladesh and the case study of an Islamic development actor, the Islami Bank 
Bangladesh Ltd. 
 
2.6 Key analytical tools and associated categories 
The analytical strategy for this part of the research is comprised of a toolbox, based 
on CDA. Such an analytical strategy could be described as critical policy analysis, 
based on Shore and Wright‘s (1997: 12) contention that policy language and 
discourse provides a key to analysing the architecture of modern power relations.  
 
This critical policy analytical toolbox seeks to provide insights into both the 
background and the context of policies and practices, including their historical 
antecedents and relations with other discourses. Underpinned by CDA, it is 
comprised of a number of key analytical tools and categories, discussed in the 
following sections.  
 
2.6.1 Deconstruction 
Deconstruction is an approach, introduced by Martin Heidegger in the realm of 
philosophy and applied by Jacques Derrida to textual analysis (1978). With 
deconstruction, Derrida seeks to pursue the meaning of a text to the point of 
exposing the supposed contradictions and internal oppositions upon which it is 
founded (see Sallis, 1987). 
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Deconstruction seeks to show that any text is not a discrete whole but contains 
multiple meanings. However, an interpretative reading cannot go beyond a certain 
point, which Derrida refers as an aporia in the text, terming deconstructive reading 
‗aporetic‘ (see Sallis, 1987).  
 
Even though, as Andersen (2003: 49) points out: ―Deconstruction has always clearly 
accompanied discourse theory … .‖, Foucault (2006) was very critical of Derrida‘s 
approach, particularly in respect to deconstruction as a reading of what is not in the 
text. In order to retain conceptual clarity, this thesis, will use the term ‗deconstruct‘, to 
imply the general notion that a text is not a discrete entity and in order to derive 
understanding it must be ‗deconstructed‘ which will be done through the primarily 
Foucauldian conceptual and analytical apparatus discussed.  
 
Interestingly Laclau (1996) elaborates this further by insisting on using both 
discourse analysis and deconstruction in a circular relationship: deconstruction 
pinpoints hegemonisation mechanisms, the unfolding of which within discursive 
battles of history can be studied in discourse analysis, which in turn is able to prove 
deconstruction of central concepts (Andersen, 2003).  
 
2.6.2 Inter-textual analysis 
The notion of inter-textuality (Fairclough 2003), for the purposes of this research 
study, aims to locate ‗external‘ relations between one text and other texts which are 
external to it yet are in some way brought into it.  This is how texts ―draw upon, 
incorporate, recontextualize and dialogue with other texts‖ (Fairclough 2003: 17). It 
may not be possible to identify other texts and voices that are included within a 
particular text with great precision, but it is useful to have ‗some rough idea of them‘ 
(Fairclough 2003: 47).  This approach seeks to identify, vis-à-vis Foucault‘s concept 
 - 61 - 
of bio-power (1978; 1980) which includes texts and voices, what texts and voices are 
excluded and also, importantly what significant absences there are? 
 
2.6.2.1 Voice 
The concept of voice is linked to inter-textuality within and between texts and 
narratives.  As this research study explores constructed and counter-constructed 
conceptualisations of development, the space that is provided for different types of 
voices is a key category of analysis. Of particular relevance is, how within the 
narratives observed different voices are articulated, categorised and their knowledge 
base referenced. It is not only important what is said against the background of what 
is not said (Fairclough 2003), but equally which voices are ‗audible‘ and which ones 
are not. 
 
Voices can be difficult to determine due to the need for policy texts to appear 
coherent and consensual. However, some differences in types of genres and their 
consequential differences in discourses and styles might be noticeable. 
   
2.6.2.2 Assumptions 
A further dimension of inter-textual analysis is the identification of assumptions that 
are implicitly shared and connect one text to other texts, to the world of texts. 
Fairclough (2003: 40) defines assumptions as ‗presuppositions, logical implications 
or entailments and implicatures‘, which represent hegemonic articulations through an 
implicit unifying logic or ‗common ground‘ Fairclough (2003).  Assumptions remain 
‗unsaid‘, but taken as given (Fairclough, 2003: 40) 
 
Assumptions are not generally attributed or attributable to specific texts and are often 
produced in a style that makes it appear that they are supported by consensus.  
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Examples would be the positive assumptions that development buzzwords (Cornwall 
and Brock 2005) conjure up or the way that globalisation is equated with ‗economic 
progress‘ (Fairclough 2003).  The language is typically neutral, though the 
assumptions might actually be highly contentious. 
 
Such assumptions can, according to Fairclough (2003: 55) be distinguished into 
three types: 
 Existential assumptions:  about what exists; 
 Propositional assumptions:  about what is or can be or will be the case; and 
 Value assumptions:  about what is good or desirable. 
 
Due to qualitative differences between these types of assumptions, they might find 
different linguistic expression in terms of style or genre.   
 
2.6.3 Hegemonic analysis 
Based on Laclau‘s model for the production of hegemony (see Chapter 1) as a 
process of fixating meaning, hegemonic analysis investigates how discourses are 
established through never-concluding struggles about the fixation of floating 
elements of signification. Hegemonic analysis will be an essential tool to understand 
policy-making in the antagonistic frontier between secular mainstream and Islamic 
development discourses in Bangladesh. For this analysis, an understanding of the 
space or field in which hegemonisation takes place is essential, as is the notion of 
orders of discourse. 
 
2.6.3.1 Field and orders of discourse 
As has been argued in Chapter 1, any field such as the development field is 
comprised of discourses, knowledge, policies and discursive practices that are all 
intertwined, struggling and competing for legitimacy and influence.  
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The concept of field was formulated by Pierre Bourdieu as a setting in which actors 
and their social positions are located (Bourdieu, 1984). The position of each 
particular actor in the field is a result of interaction between the specific rules of the 
field, the actor's set of socially learnt dispositions, skills and ways of acting (referred 
to as habitus) and their social, economic and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984). The 
concept of field is further explained by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992): 
A field may be defined as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations 
between positions.  These positions are objectively defined, in their existence 
and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or 
institutions, by their present and potential situation in the structure of the 
distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands 
access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their 
objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology). 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97)  
 
Conceptualising the development field as an intangible space rather than as a 
‗metaphor for a socially-framed location‘ (Jenkins 1992) where individual and 
institutional actors engage in development-related activities assists this study in 
investigating the relationships between actors, because within such a field, actors, 
organisations and institutions constantly interact according to the rules constitutive of 
the field.  
 
Those who are in control of a given field, are able to take existing knowledge and 
practices and utilise them for their own purposes, but they will always have to 
contend with the opposition of those they dominate (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 
73). We can see the dynamics of a field, played out in its structure but also in the 
distances, gaps, and asymmetries that occur between the different forces that face 
one another within that field (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999).  For this analysis, 
Bourdieu and Wacquant‘s conceptualisation of field (1992) coupled with Chouliaraki 
and Fairclough‘s identification of the spaces which illustrate the dynamics of the field 
provide valuable conceptual  tools with which to map out the logic behind the 
development field. 
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In a field, the social restructuring of relations between, or the networking of, diverse 
genres and discourses is referred to as orders of discourse (Fairclough, 2001 b: 
235).  The orders of discourse include the range of all the genres and discourses 
which are in use within a specific field, operating both in conflict and in accordance 
with one another (Phillips and Jørgensen 2002). This order is explained by 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) as the organisational logic of discourses in a field.  
This aspect is of particular importance to this study since it investigates the struggle 
of mainstream and alternative discourses to achieve and maintain hegemony against 
the backdrop of competing discourses.  
 
2.6.3.2 Policy 
An in-depth examination of the development field would be incomplete without an 
analysis of ‗policy‘.  Policies rarely exist in isolation, rather they are shaped by 
previous policies and existing laws, organisational guidelines and clients‘ dictates, as 
Hogwood and Peters (1983: 1) argue.  Ball (1994a: 15) contends that a study of 
policy needs to incorporate both text and discourse, as they are ‗implicit in each 
other‘.  A policy text will also have a variety of interpretations by any number of 
readers. Policies as ‗texts‘ are coded and given meaning ‗via struggles, 
compromises, authoritative public interpretations and re-interpretations‘ and are 
decoded ‗via actors‘ interpretations and meanings in relation to their histories, 
experiences, skills, resources and context‘ (Ball 1994a: 20).  In the Foucauldian 
sense, policies are a form of ‗political technology‘ used as instruments of bio-power 
(Foucault 1980, 1991), shaping people through the forced adaptation of positions 
constructed for them within the dictates of particular policies (Ball 1994a: 21).  
Policies and their related ‗expert knowledge‘ can form solutions to pre-determined 
problems within a field   ‗ignoring time, space and historical, cultural and social 
 - 65 - 
aspects surrounding the locality in which they are designed and implemented‘ (Ball 
1997: 258). This is particularly the case within the field of development..   
 
For the purposes of this research study, Ball‘s interpretation of policy as 
incorporating both text and discourse and the power relations that surround them, will 
be employed, particularly in its Foucauldian use of concepts of discourse, knowledge 
and power.   
 
The value of perceiving policy as discourse helps to see knowledge, meaning the 
analysis of problems and identification of remedies and goals, and practice as a set 
of claims about how the world should be. Policies are therefore understood in this 
study as operational statements of norms and values with prescriptive intents.   
 
Vis-à-vis the above analytical tools and categories, a critical analysis of the 
development discourse in Bangladesh will be offered, both through a contextualised 
hegemonic analysis of the development field in the country and a case study of an 
Islamic development actor. The next section explains the approach taken to the case 
study research. 
 
2.7 Case study approach 
The CDA-based micro-level analysis of meaning making in the development field will 
be offered in the form of a case study, to further explore how the macro and meso 
power relations are manifested in the power relations of an Islamic development 
actor. A case study is often an account used to illuminate a particular issue (Thomas, 
1998: 307). This is underlined by Stake (2000: 236) who argues that a case study 
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implies the choice of subject to be studied, defined by the researcher‘s interest in an 
individual case or cases. 
   
This study uses a single case to explore and understand, in depth, the 
interrelationships and inner workings of discursive processes in the development 
field in Bangladesh. Yin (1994) suggests that the rationale for single case studies can 
be threefold: a case might be critical, unique or revelatory. This is further developed 
by utilising Mitchell‘s concept (1984) of a ‗telling‘ case. The Islami Bank Bangladesh 
has been selected as a basis for a theoretical exploration of the research questions 
vis-à-vis the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 1. The Islami Bank, as 
Chapter 6 will explore, is the largest private commercial bank in Bangladesh and has 
a considerable rural development programme. It is an important development actor 
deeply steeped in a particular Islamic development discourse that appears to be 
located at the antagonistic frontier between mainstream and Islamic 
conceptualisations and manifestations of development and therefore was expected 
to offer significant insights. 
 
‗Telling‘ case studies are categorised by Stake (2000) as intrinsic (the case is of 
interest in itself), instrumental (highlighting a particular point), or collective (studying a 
number of cases jointly). The Islami Bank is both intrinsic and instrumental, although 
not necessarily representative of any other or a collective of Islamic development 
organisations.  This, within the critical realist ontological position (Bhaskar, 1975, 
1979, 1985) of this study, is not a problem since creating a sample or a ‗typical‘ case 
is not deemed possible within the critical realist view of the social world. A telling 
case, however, is expected to add insights in the sense of Bhaskar‘s (1986) concept 
of an explanatory critique. The selected case will be by default instrumental to the 
overall argument of the thesis because it is in itself a reality constructed both by the 
primary actors and also through the researcher‘s eyes (O‘Laughlin 1998).   
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Within an overall qualitative approach that is retroductive and seeks to interpret, 
deconstruct and re-construct a social construct, a case study will, moreover, help to 
create understanding in the hermeneutic tradition. 
 
In order to deconstruct and reconstruct the narratives and social practices that make 
up the development discourse, data from three sources may be utilised: 
ethnographically-inspired interviews, experiential data and documentary data, which 
will be discussed in the next section.   
 
2.7.1 Ethnographically-inspired interviews 
In the classical sense, ethnography is meant to capture the social meanings and 
ordinary activities of people (Brewer 2000). In this study the focus shifted from 
individual  to organisational actors, although people are still at the core of the 
narratives and voices that make up an organisation. Whilst not an outright 
ethnography, the field work for this study was ethnographically-inspired in the sense 
illustrated by Heyl as a project ―in which researchers have established respectful, on-
going relationships with their interviewees, including enough rapport for there to be a 
genuine exchange of views and enough time and openness in the interviews for the 
interviewees to explore purposefully with the researcher the meanings they place on 
events in their worlds (Heyl 2001: 369). 
 
A six-months internship from November 2008 to May 2009 at the Islami Bank in 
Dhaka provided an opportunity to carry out an organisational ‗ethnography‘, providing  
an insider perspective2 of the policy-making processes within an Islamic setting.  
                                                 
2 In a previous professional capacity I had met the then Chairman of the Islami Bank, Shah 
Abdul Hannan, who facilitated my internship with the Bank at the highest level. This door-
opener, coupled with the fact that I was seen as an insider due to my work with an Islamic 
INGO in Bangladesh, created a relatively open dialogue, despite that fact that I had to 
occasionally ‗prove‘ my personal faith position.  
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Arguably this is not a classic ethnography in the anthropological sense, since the six-
month field work period might be barely sufficient for an ethnographic study 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1995)  Instead, it primarily instrumentalised participant 
observation (Jørgensen 1989) by relying heavily on experiential data (Strauss 1987). 
As outlined, this ethnographically inspired fieldwork was conducted in ‗compressed 
time mode‘ (Jeffrey and Troman 2004: 538) with a six-month stint, drawing heavily on 
previously established contacts in and considerable prior knowledge of the 
mainstream and Islamic development fields in Bangladesh.  
 
Moreover, the ethnographically-inspired work with the Islami Bank provides an 
important empirical-discursive foundation for the case study, utilising ‗ethnographic‘ 
techniques through which to gain closer proximity to the organisation that is at the 
centre of the research study. In this sense ethnography is has inspired the 
methodological approach for the field research, which, as discussed,was  
conceptually grounded in discourse analysis and used ethnographic approaches to 
identify micro-level discourses and power relationships.  
 
The internship and the ethnographic approach taken allowed for a number of 
conversational, semi-structured and open-ended interviews or discussions with key 
informants (Mikkelsen, 1995), not just at the Islami Bank but also in the wider 
development field, such as multi-lateral donor organisations, government 
departments and non-government organisations.  The rationale was to be able to 
compare and contrast the policies and practices of different types of organisations, 
and also to interpret the reality constructed by the Islami Bank.  Altogether 40 such 
semi-structured / open-ended formal and informal interviews were conducted - see 
appendix A for a list of all the organisations involved. Please note that due to the 
sensitive political nature of Bangladesh, all interview references have been kept 
anonymous to protect the integrity and respect the wishes of the interviewees. 
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Therefore interview references used in later chapters are coded to only reveal the 
organisation and date the interview took place. 
 
The interviews were ethnographically-inspired, particularly in that they were handled 
as ‗a form of dialogue‘ (Fairclough 2003:43). In order to establish a level of rapport 
with the informants, interviews were conversations or a dialogue (Riddell 1989).  
Hence, many interviews were informal, although extensive notes, following a more or 
less standardised pattern for ease of analysis (Mikkelsen, 1995), were taken during 
them. In a search for ‗authentic‘ conversations it was also chosen not to utilise a 
recording device. Moreover, some interviews with key informants evolved into 
ongoing dialogue during the duration of the field work.  
 
Key informants (Mikkelsen, 1995; Woodhouse, 1998) were critical in the formation of 
the case study that underpins this thesis, as they are insiders, who are willing to be 
informants and act as guides and translators of cultural mores and, at times, jargon 
and language (Fontana and Frey 2003: 76). Key informants, however, often are also 
giving voice to the multitude of sub-narratives that can be found in an organisation, 
which adds layers of a complexity to this field study of an organisation. However, in 
interpreting institutional discourses, the presence of sub-narratives requires that 
individual voices are heard and located on a spectrum of analytical categories 
(O‘Laughlin 1998). For the benefit of this study, the genealogical analyses of 
Chapters 3 and 4 will provide such categories. To provide internal analytical 
parameters to situate the institutional narratives, the ethnographic rapid appraisal 
tool of a transecting ‗walk-through‘ (Pratt and Loizos, 1992) was also deployed to 
situate informants within the physical/spatial organisational power structures of the 
Islami Bank. 
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Through several key informants, links with a number of related organisations were 
established. Through good fortune as a result of attending a short executive course 
at Dhaka University‘s Development Studies Department entitled ‗Understanding 
Development‘, contacts with informants from other organisations including 
Government Departments and some key academics were made.  Additional 
interviews were arranged through a snowball effect (Burgess, 1984; Wasserman and 
Faust, 1994), in which further interviews were set up through the recommendations 
of initially identified key informants.  This snowballing aided and was aided by a 
stakeholder analysis that sought to establish policy influences in the field in which the 
Islami Bank operates and has an institutional footprint (Roche, 1998) – see below. 
 
Interviews within the Islami Bank, following an interview guide (see appendix B)  that 
was either circulated in advance to key informants where required to gain access or 
carried out spontaneously, was facilitated through my legitimate presence as a 
researcher on an internship. The interviews were semi-structured or open-ended. All 
were carried out in English and hence represent a snapshot of the English-speaking 
elite within the field. 
 
2.7.2 Experiential data 
Experiential data (Strauss 1987) was primarily gathered through participant 
observation (Pratt and Loizos, 1992) based on the access afforded by, but not 
restricted to, the internship with the Islami Bank. Participant observation can have a 
number of dimensionsk, as Jørgensen (1989) explains. It can involve the perspective 
of people who are already insiders or members of particular situations and settings, 
performed by establishing and maintaining relationships within the field of study, or 
use direct observation along with other methods of gathering information (Jørgensen 
1989: 13-14). 
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The experiential data for this study was primarily gathered through direct observation 
but also, increasingly so over time, through the establishment of relationships with 
actors in the field. For the observations and interactions, field notes were kept in form 
of a research diary to record ‗events‘ whilst an intern at the Islami Bank and in other 
environments. 
 
In order to gauge the network of practice that the Islami Bank is embedded in, the 
author engaged in a mapping exercise to establish its institutional footprint (Roche, 
1998) utilising a snow-balling method to delineate the perimeters. Wasserman and 
Faust (1994: 33-34) explain that,  
―when the boundary is unknown, special sampling techniques such as 
snowball sampling… can be used to define actor set boundaries… A 
snowball network sample begins when the actors in a set of sampled 
respondents report on actors to whom they have ties of a specified kind. All 
the nominated actors constitute the ‗first order‘ zone of the network. The 
researcher then will sample all actors in this zone and gather all the additional 
actors (those nominated by the actors in the first-order zone who are not 
among the original respondents or those in this zone). These additional 
actors constitute the ‗second-order‘ zone. The snowballing proceeds through 
several zones… .‖ 
 
 
In a complex field such as the Bangladeshi development field in which the Islami 
Bank operates, as Chapter 6 will demonstrate, a first order ‗snowball‘ can provide 
insights into a complicated network, even if only a limited number of second, let 
alone third, order relationships can be traced. 
 
2.7.3 Documentary data 
According to Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) documentary data can include any of 
the following items: 
 Published sources about the field site 
 Mass media sources 
 Public documents inside the institution 
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 Semi-public documents (minutes, records of others‘ writing) 
 Semi-private documents  
 Private documents 
 
Included in the documentary data collected are published documents such as 
newsletters, annual reports, reports, small hand-outs within the organisation, posters 
and a range of grey literature (O‘Laughlin, 1998) from the Islami Bank and other 
organisations.  In addition, a number of relevant international and national 
Bangladeshi policy texts have been utilised - please see Appendix C for a listing of 
the key documents analysed during this research study. 
 
2.7.4 Data management  
The analysis of interviews will be complemented with the analysis of documents 
(organisational publications and policy texts) and field notes. For ease of data 
management, the NVivo software package has been used where appropriate. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter offered an overview of the methodological approach, the analytical 
strategies and categories that inform this investigation. 
 
To reiterate, the following research question is underpinning this research study: 
 
 How do discourses frame contemporary ‗Islamic‘ conceptualisations of 
development? 
 
This is underpinned by a number of sub-questions as outlined above which also 
suggest a number of the methods or analytical strategies needed to elucidate them: 
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 What is the breadth and depth of the assumptions embedded within the 
mainstream‘ Western‘ development and alternative Islamic discourses? 
 How much space is there for countering dominant development discourses? 
 How can the concept of hegemony help to understand the complexities of 
power relations that constitute the development field? 
 
The assembly of an analytical toolbox has provided a strategy to investigate and 
elucidate complex power relationships in the development field. It has not been 
driven by a concern for validity as such, despite the argument that any social science 
research, including qualitative research, ‗ought‘ to be valid and reliable (see Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985, for a discussion). This study is located at the interpretativist end of 
the spectrum and hence does not seek to make ‗truth‘ claims. In addition, it is 
important in this retroductive approach to transcend the validity argument (Lather 
1994: 39), so the main concern here is with credibility.  
 
The next chapter (and the subsequent one) offer a first glimpse of Foucauldian 
genealogical research about development which will then be contextualised by a 
case study in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
 A GENEALOGY OF THE MAINSTREAM DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE: 
UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
3 Introduction and purpose 
 
Based on the assertion that discourses are ‖historically variable ways of specifying 
knowledges and truths, whereby knowledges are socially constructed and produced 
by effects of power and spoken in terms of ‗truths‘ ‖ (Carabine 2001: 275), this 
chapter provides a genealogy of the mainstream development discourse. A number 
of scholars (Sachs 1992; Rist 1997; Tucker 1999; Giri et al. 2004; Teamey 2005; 
Cornwall and Eade 2010 etc.) have made such attempts, all of which differ from each 
other and the one offered here, since they are re-constructed as seen through the 
eyes of these particular authors.  
 
Rooted in the Foucauldian genealogical methodology explained in Chapter 2, this 
chapter is concerned with describing the procedures, practices, apparatuses and 
institutions involved in the production of the mainstream development discourse.  
The resultant exploration and explanation of the predominant assumptions 
embedded within the discourses of mainstream development will serve as a critical 
tool to deconstruct truth claims made by mainstream development actors in the field. 
In conjunction with Chapter 4 which carries out a similar exercise for alternative 
Islamic thought pertaining to development, it provides a contextualised 
understanding of the historical dimension of the discourses that underpin the 
development policy-making process.   
 
The main building block for this genealogy is a review of the key concepts and 
theories that have been formulated in the development studies discipline, which in 
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turn emerged out of a concern voiced by newly independent nations and their former 
masters in the decolonisation period following World War II. 
 
3.1 Defining the term ‘development’ 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary provides a long list of meanings for ‗development‘ 
related to the biological, cultural, economic, technological, health and social fields: 
A gradual unfolding, a bringing into fuller view; a fuller disclosure or working out 
of the details of anything, as a plan, a scheme, the plot of a novel. Also quasi-
concr. that in which the fuller unfolding is embodied or (Oxford English 
Dictionary website: http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/51434) 
 
Reflecting the dictionary definition, the prominent early development economist Walt 
Rostow (1960) identifies economic stages that, in his view, any society passes 
through in the form of a sequential model similar to biological stages or evolution:   
It is possible to identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying 
within one of five categories:  the traditional society, the preconditions for take-
off, the take-off, the drive to maturity and the age of mass-consumption.  
(Rostow 1960: 164)  
 
It is striking that nearly all meanings of development are either directly or indirectly 
related to the idea of natural evolutionary progress or growth. Although when applied 
to the social world, some argue that development is not a natural process, it has 
been accorded such a status in the mythology of Western belief (Tucker, 1999:2). 
This mythological status might be to do with the fact that within the social sciences 
‗development‘ has been a difficult term to define, although some argue that its main 
thrust is clearly perceivable: 
― ‗Economic development‘ or ‗development‘ is a term that economists, politicians, 
and others have used frequently in the 20th century. The concept, however, has 
been in existence in the West for centuries. Modernization, Westernization, and 
especially Industrialization are other terms people have used when discussing 
economic development. Although no one is sure when the concept originated, 
most people agree that development is closely bound up with the evolution of 
capitalism and the demise of feudalism.‖ (Conteras, 1999, University of Iowa 
Centre for International Finance and Development website) 
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The advent of the term ‗development‘ within the socio-economic field is also difficult 
to pinpoint. But as has been argued, it is closely related to the evolution of capitalism 
(Nkurunziza 2007).  For post-development scholars, as discussed in Chapter 1, the 
advent of ‗development‘ is seen as an ‗irruption event‘ in Foucauldian vein, 
pinpointed in the inaugural address of former US president Harry Truman in 1949 
(Escobar 1995, Korff & Schrader 2004).   
  
However, to pinpoint the ‗invention‘ of the concern for development in Truman‘s 
speech as either a post-colonial or cold war era related phenomenon would be to 
ignore the long-established interconnectedness of the northern and the southern 
hemispheres, both economically but also politically. For example, both Mercantilism 
with its concern for foreign trade and colonialisation dominated Western European 
economic policy and discourse from the 16th to the late-18th century, whilst David 
Ricardo developed the notion of international trade and the competitive advantage in 
the 19th century (originally published in his 1817 book ‗On the Principles of Political 
Economy and Taxation‘). Hence, it has been argued that the evolution of colonial 
economics had underpinned the concern for development for a considerable time 
(Larrain 1989).  
 
However, the explicit use of the term ‗development‘ in the academic or policy 
literature is more recent than the concern in itself, as demonstrated, for example, by 
the establishment of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
now part of the World Bank Group, in 1944 and many other development initiatives 
from then onwards, shaping the second half of the 20th century as the ‗era of 
development' (Thomas, 2000). 
 
Yet the term ‗development‘ has frequently been used to mean different things. 
Historically (see Roll, 1992), development has been regarded as primarily an 
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economic process leading to a considerable rise in a country‘s productivity. This is 
accompanied by significant changes in the socio-economic conditions of production. 
The difference between growth and development, it could be argued, is based on the 
quality of change. As Dowd (1967: 149) elaborates: ―Growth is a quantitative 
process, involving principally the extension of an already existing structure of 
production, while development suggests qualitative change, the creation of new 
economic and non-economic structures.‖ ‗Economic development‘ is more narrowly 
defined as, for example, by Kuznets (1959) as the application of modern science and 
technology to industry, resulting in a sustained and rapid rise in real product per 
capita, usually associated with a high rate of population growth (Kuznets 1959).  
 
In Development Studies, the field of study within social science that concerns itself 
directly with ‗development‘, the term has also escaped a universally agreed 
definition, although there have been dominant, at times hegemonic formations. Slim 
(1996: 68) reflects this after the considerable turmoil in development policy during the 
1980s and 90s: ―The prevailing consensus prizes uniformity and only really allows for 
one road towards a single and over-prescribed model of development.‖ However 
various paradigms have appeared to be dominant over time, only to spurn a new, 
different outlook on the phenomenon. Some of the key paradigms will be discussed 
in the following and subsequent sections. 
 
3.2 Assembling the archive:  a short history of development theory and 
practice 
 
More than indicative of the definitional complexity of the term development, Pieterse 
(2001) describes the field of development as a conglomerate consisting of theory, 
context, explanation, epistemology, methodology, representation, imagination and a 
future vision.  This multi-layered construct is influenced by philosophies, theories, 
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policy directions and plans for action that change and evolve over time. The purpose 
of this section is to bring this evolution - the continuities and discontinuities in the 
Foucauldian genealogical sense - to light. 
 
A review of economic history (see Roll 1992) illustrates that development theory has 
been a very dynamic field. Pieterse (2001: 1-3) argues that development as a field is 
‗in flux, with rapid turnover of alternatives … (an) organized intervention in collective 
affairs according to a standard of improvement‘. Alternately, Rist (1997:11) claims 
that despite appearances, the foremost development texts, guiding policies and 
practices have ‗followed the same thread over time‘, despite claims of originality or 
theoretical superiority.  Post-development theorists argue (see for example, Sachs 
1992 or Escobar 1995) that development theories are merely adaptations of the 
same old story. ‗Development‘ is therefore a ‗buzzword‘ or ‗fuzzword‘ that 
incorporates general agreement on what it denotes, but endless disagreement on 
what it might mean in practice (Cornwall, 2010: 2).   
 
Rist (1997) contends that there is a certain ‗ubiquitousness‘ in the term development; 
in that it exists everywhere and nowhere at the same time.  It is everywhere, because 
it has infused so many diverse contexts, ‗when all is said and done, every modern 
human activity can be undertaken in the name of development‘ (Rist 1997: 11) and 
yet it is nowhere, because it eludes objective definition through its subjectivity.  
Wallerstein (1994: 3), one of the critics of development, and an advocate of the 
concept of underdevelopment, which will later be clarified, argues: 
There is perhaps no social objective that can find as nearly unanimous 
acceptance today as that of economic development.  I doubt that there has 
been a single government anywhere in the last 30 years that has not asserted it 
was pursuing this objective, at least for its own country.  Everywhere in the 
world today, what divides left and right, however defined, is not whether or not 
to develop, but which policies are presumed to offer most hope that this 
objective will be achieved.  We are told that socialism is the road to 
development.  We are told that a break with tradition is the road to 
development.  We are told that a revitalized tradition is the road to 
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development.  We are told that delinking is the road to development.  We are 
told that an increased opening to the world market (export-import growth) is the 
road to development.  Above all, we are told that development is possible, if 
only we do the right thing.  (Wallerstein 1994: 3) 
 
This implies that development is not ‗value-free‘, although it is often constructed as 
benign.  It is associated with a range of values and visions about the ideal type 
society, economy and political system. For example, Amartya Sen in his seminal 
work ‗Development as Freedom‘, for example, defines development as ‗crucial 
instrumental freedoms‘ such as ‗economic opportunities, political freedoms, social 
facilities, transparency guarantees and protective security‘ (Sen, 1999: xii)     
 
However, historically one of the key issues in the formulation of development theory 
and policy prescriptions has been not only the ambiguity, complexity and changing 
nature of the term development itself, but also the lack of functioning ideal types that 
could be generalised from. As the economic historian Gerschenkron argues: ―... the 
development [needed] in a backward country may, by the very virtue of its 
backwardness, tend to differ fundamentally from that of an advanced country‖ (1962: 
12). Nevertheless, a range of different models for how desired economic, social 
and/or political change or development is to be achieved have been formulated, 
especially in the 19th and 20th centuries. In particular within what the author is terming 
the mainstream development discourses, a number of assumptions about the most 
appropriate approach to development are made (Sachs 1992). 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the values and assumptions embedded within 
mainstream development discourses will be brought to the forefront vis-à-vis a 
Foucauldian genealogy in the next section. This process is inherently complex as  
development thinking draws from a range of theories from economics, sociology, 
anthropology, political science and geography etc. that make up the applied field of 
study referred to as development studies. In addition, each development model is 
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embedded in historical and political contexts, underpinned by a range of values and 
norms.   
 
In assembling the archive for the genealogy in the following section, of particular 
interest to this dissertation is how development and, conversely, poverty have been 
conceptualised through history. It has to be noted that as described in the previous 
chapter which set out the methodology for a Foucauldian genealogy, this archive is 
at best indicative as there is a huge body of literature in various social science 
disciplines that deals with ‗development‘. 
 
3.3 Key ideas in mainstream development theory 
Whilst there was a growing body of literature that had its starting point in Adam 
Smith‘s ‗Wealth of Nations (first published in 1776), it was only in the mid- 20th 
century that international development theory emerged as a separate body of ideas.  
The origins of this trend have been attributed to a range of phenomena, from the 
need for reconstruction in the immediate aftermath of World War II, to the 
transformation from decolonisation to globalisation and to the beginning of the Cold 
War.  
 
The concern of development was primarily economic, with a focus on reconstruction 
and state-building through economic growth. At the root of the problem analysis 
carried out by especially American development scholars in aftermath of 
decolonisation was what was regarded as ‗backwardness‘ and policy prescriptions 
therefore focused on modernisation. Modernisation theory (issues around 
modernisation will be discussed in greater depth in section 3.4.2 below) held that 
social and cultural transformation would facilitate economic growth (Leys, 1996).  
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Development economists of the time, such as Arthur Lewis, made normative 
statements that development and progress can only be facilitated through the 
modernisation and transformation of the ‗backward‘ and ‗traditional‘ economic, 
political and social structures of a country to one that has a ‗modern‘ economy and 
society. Economic development as part of the modernisation process was expected 
to improve the political and social well-being of of a country‘s people (O'Sullivan & 
Sheffrin, 2003: 471). Modernisation was perceived as a universal process that had 
already taken place in Western Europe and Northern America, requiring only a spark 
to accelerate this otherwise inevitable process in the southern hemisphere. As Shills 
(1965) pointed out at the time, modernisation was equated with Westernisation.   
 
However, not only have there been a variety of criticisms, other modernisation 
theorists have prescribed a less sociologically inspired, more ‗economistic‘ formula of 
market-led development. This was founded on the classical assumption, derived 
from Smith‘s ‗The Wealth of Nations‘ (1998), that the market provides the most 
efficient mechanism for resource allocation. Through the market, in pursuit of their 
own interests, individuals create wealth from which society in general benefits 
(Smith, 1998). Liberals and neo-liberals, hence, regarded a system of free enterprise 
and trade based on a market economy as the necessary prerequisites for economic 
growth and development. The leading development economist Rostow (1960) 
identified stages of development in the history of Western Europe and the USA in the 
last 200 years and proposed similar internal economic, social and political changes 
for less developed countries - which practically led to an emulation of Anglo-
American economic liberalism. Hence, according to Rostow the simple formula of de-
colonisation combined with the premises of the classical economic school would lead 
to a ‗take-off‘ stage and subsequently to sustainable development. For Rostow 
(1960), the main emphasis was on the transition from tradition to modernity, 
asserting in the classical tradition that the market mechanism alone, after backward 
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structures had been removed, would be sufficient to propel development (Cyper & 
Dietz, 1997). 
 
But the over-simplicity of the formula and the apparent lack of universal success led 
liberal economist Rosenstein-Rodan (1964), to call for a ―... prescription for ‗balanced 
growth‘ - a co-ordinated plan of investments by the government in strategic sectors of 
the economy. This view firmly established the intellectual rationale for planning in the 
development literature …‖ (Chowdhury, 1993). Such a co-ordinated intervention, also 
referred to as the ‗big push‘, either through the government or foreign aid, was meant 
to trigger a ‗natural‘ process of economic growth and development (Cypher & Dietz, 
1997). Industrialisation was to be export oriented to attain, through international 
trade, capital for development and change. The trust in technological change as part 
of the modernisation quest was further underlined by the American economist Robert 
Solow, who proposed an exogenous (or neoclassical) growth model (Cypher & Dietz, 
1997). Unlike in the previous orthodoxy of the Harrod-Domar model, in Solow‘s 
model the saving rate is only held to determine the level of income but not the rate of 
growth (Cypher & Dietz, 1997). In his study, Solow (1957) demonstrated that 
technological change accounted for almost 90 percent of U.S. economic growth in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The study also highlighted the role of 
intervention in the growth process, either through state investment or foreign aid 
(Cyper & Dietz, 1997).  
 
By the late 1960s, the critics of modernisation or Westernisation approaches were 
advancing dependency theory as a way of explaining the evolving relationship 
between the West/North and the Southern hemisphere, especially after the recently 
de-colonised so-called ‗Third World‘ proved unable to catch up with the industrialised 
Northern hemisphere. Dependency (dependencia) theory began in Latin America by 
claiming that societies outside of the ‗developed‘ core actually experience 
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‗underdevelopment‘.  Dependency discourses are concerned with social injustice 
created by the core through power manipulations in the periphery (Hunt 1989).  
Derived from a Marxist analysis, dependency theorists rejected the claim of 
modernisation theory claim that all nations will inevitably follow a Western capitalist 
development model, although they did not reject modernisation in itself. Wallerstein‘s 
(1974), world-systems idea that, which advanced a ‗periphery-focused‘ theory of 
imperialism, provided for dependency theorists a new understanding of the 
phenomenon of underdevelopment (Leys, 1996). They postulated that the ‗Third 
World‘ was not able to compete on the world market due to the advantage of the 
alreday industrialised countries. Due to the ‗Third World‘s‘ dual reliance on the import 
of expensive manufactured goods and exports of undervalued raw materials, 
resources for development were actually draining from the periphery to the core 
(Frank, 1971; Amin, 1976). This ‗unequal exchange‘, Dependency theorists argued, 
caused the ‗development of underdevelopment‘ (Prebisch 1971). Only isolation from 
the world market through a policy of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) would, 
it was claimed, allow the underdeveloped countries to achieve economic growth. 
 
But dependency theory has been criticised for its almost too simplistic approach to a 
complex problem (Larrain, 1989) and a number of examples such as the rapid 
economic growth and development in South East Asia‘s Newly Industrialised 
Countries (NIC), which did not practise ISI, undermined the credibility of the 
Dependencia school. 
This period also saw an amassing of debt in the developing world, following the 1973 
oil crisis, with OPEC funds deposited in western banks providing a ready source of 
funds for loans. The debt crisis continued to be an advocacy concern and culminated 
in 1996 in the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) iniative initiated by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The HIPC initiative provides debt 
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relief and low-interest loans to cancel or reduce external debt repayments to 
sustainable levels, with developing country debt continuing to be a considerable 
advocacy concern (see, for example, Jubilee Debt Campaign).   
In the late 1970s and early 80s, the World Bank and IMF adopted the neo-liberal 
ideas promoted by economists such as Milton Friedman, who were strongly against 
state intervention in micro-economic processes, although advocated monetarism to 
focus on macro-economic stability. As a result, the debates within the development 
field moved from discussions of the nature and degree of state intervention, to 
whether or not state intervention was in fact desirable at all. Within the International 
Development field the new prevailing paradigm was referred to as the Washington 
Consensus, reflecting to the role played by Washington-based International 
institutions and the US government in setting the agenda (Martin 2000).  The 
Washington Consensus was developed by the economist John Williamson, with the 
aim of providing the ‗lowest common denominator of policy advice‘ (Williamson 2000: 
251), particularly in relation to economic reform.   Williamson (1990) explains: 
The economic policies that Washington urges on the rest of the world may be 
summarized as prudent macro-economic policies, outward orientation and free 
market capitalism. (Williamson 1990: 18)   
Many argued that the Washington Consensus became an ideological position 
leading to an ‗overprescribed model of development‘ (e.g. Slim 1996: 68).  
However, the new development strategy was implemented in the form of structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs), arguing that less restricted markets were more 
efficient in achieving development objectives than the state apparatus (Toye, 2003). 
The 1980s therefore witnessed the forceful rolling out of SAPs focusing on 
deregulation of markets including financial and labour, trade liberalisation and 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises, coupled with fiscal and monetary austerity 
and exchange rate adjustments (Pieper and Taylor, 1998). By the mid-1990s it 
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became clear that whilst SAPs had stimulated export growth, the overall positive 
effects on growth and wealth distribution were negligible, whilst some vulnerable 
segments of the population in affected countries had suffered disproportionally from 
the free-market policies and the shrinking of the state (see Mosley, Harrigan and 
Toye 1995). 
Due to the growing inequality and poverty (both issues will be discussed in greater 
detail in section 3.4.5), modifications led to ‗adjustment with a human face‘, based on 
a critical report with the same name by UNICEF (Stewart, 1987), laying out ideas for 
how to mitigate the negative impacts of SAPs. In response, the World Bank‘s World 
Development Report 1990, aptly titled ‗Poverty‘, proposed a two-part strategy of 
combining labour-intensive growth through economic openness and investment in 
infrastructure, with the provision of basic services in health and education to poor 
people. 
Moreover, already from the 1970s onwards, there was a growing dissatisfaction with 
mainstream development, which was criticised for not sufficiently addressing issues 
of mass poverty and sustainability. This led to innovations in thinking which included 
increasing the participation of grassroots movements in development decision-
making, as well as creating a role for civil society and non-governmental 
organisations in the implementation process (Brohman 1996).  Such alternative 
development discourses, whilst not questioning the need for development or the 
inherent value of modernisation (Pieterse 2001), focused on the inequalities 
associated with economic development and highlighted the issue of equitable re-
distribution. This led to a new ‗emerging consensus‘ of development priorities that 
included ‗well-being, livelihoods, capability, equity and sustainability‘ (Chambers 
1997: 9).   
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The influence of this shift in thinking and change of priorities in development ushered 
in a new development paradigm, often called the post-Washington Consensus. In 
1990, the UNDP launched the concept of Human Development formulated by the 
Pakistani economist Mahbub ul-Haq.  Human Development was formulated to 
address the shortcomings of development policy, which had previously been based 
almost entirely on economic growth theories. The focus of development policy then 
moved from exclusive prioritisation of economic growth, back to a needs driven 
agenda that had first found voice in the 1970s. Development came to be defined as 
‗the enlargement of people‘s choices and human capacity… as if people, basic 
needs, health, literacy, education and housing matter‘ (Pieterse 2001: 94).  This 
discourse was underpinned by the idea that growth, and therefore development, can 
only be achieved through investment in people, which in turn increases equity and 
produces growth in human capital.   
 
This new movement culminated in a shift in the work of the UN Development 
Programme, which from the early 1990s onwards began publishing an annual 
‗Human Development Report‘ (HDR) that focuses on aspects of human-centred 
development such as health, education, gender equality, life span and nutritional 
statistics.  The HDR (2001) sums up the aspirations of human development 
discourses: 
Human development is about much more than the rise or fall of national incomes.  
It is about creating an environment in which people can develop their full potential 
and lead productive, creative lives in accord with their needs and interests.  
People are the real wealth of nations.  Development is thus about expanding the 
choices people have to lead lives that they value.  And it is thus about much more 
than economic growth, which is only a means – if a very important one – of 
enlarging people‘s choices. (UNDP 2001: 9) 
Amartya Sen (1999) was working at the same time on a way to understand issues of 
poverty and inequality in a more differentiated way from the orthodoxy of money 
income indicators. Sen, alongside Nussbaum (2000), coined the capabilities 
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approach which views development as empowerment, the freedom to live a valued 
life. 
Thus the neo-liberal growth paradigm was increasingly challenged and development 
discourse began to increasingly focus on human development, poverty and inequality 
(see section 3.4.3 for a brief discussion of poverty and inequality). Structural 
Adjustment Programs were being largely replaced by national Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSP), which were asked to draw on input from the respective 
developing nation itself, although the content of economic policies did not necessarily 
change. This dichotomy, although oversimplified, is also indicated by the origin of 
some of the key figures such as ul-Haque and Sen, who hailed from the Indian sub-
continent, but had been trained in the UK and US.  
The so-called new architecture of development and aid was underpinned, amongst 
other things, by the concept of sustainable livelihoods, which focused on how poor 
people's options and constraints can best be understood and addressed (see World 
Development Report 1990). The objective of sustainable livelihood approaches is to 
enhance the overall level and sustainability of livelihoods and to provide social 
protection to vulnerable groups (Farrington, 2001). However, similarly to previous 
initiatives, sustainable livelihoods are underpinned by an evolutionary concept of 
development and modernisation that can be kick-started through interventions at 
various levels 
Some theorists proposed in the late 1990s that development theory had reached an 
impasse (Schurmann, 1993). Francis Fukuyama (1992) declared the ‗end of history‘ 
with the end of Cold War, and asserted that capitalism was the prevailing mode of 
social organisation. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, other scholars such as 
Escobar (1995) claimed that development had not worked and that humanity had 
entered a post-development era. Development discourse meanwhile was focusing on 
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issues of poverty, substituting the modernisation approach for an emphasis on good 
governance and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This in turn led to a 
‗flattening out‘ of the development discourse and many of the concepts associated 
with it (Eade, 2010: 2). As Cornwall and Brock, writing in 2005, argue, ―the last ten 
years have witnessed a remarkable apparent confluence of positions in the 
international development arena. Barely any development actor could take serious 
issues with the way the objectives of development are currently framed‖ (2005: 
1043).  
In the absence of anyserious challenging discourses, development had become 
established as benign and quasi-value free. In addition, some previously discredited 
neo-liberal ideas came back to the forefront, such as the concept that ‗growth is 
good‘ for the poor (Dollar and Kraay 2001), which sought to align the new concern for 
inequality with the neo-liberal ‗trickle down‘ economics of the 1980s and 90s. Since 
the ups and downs of the 1980s, neo-liberal discourses have, arguably, moved again 
from the periphery to the centre of development policy and have maintained 
dominant, albeit in different form.   
Despite Fukuyama‘s (1992) proclamation of the end of history with the victory of 
Western capitalism and the exhaustive debate on the end of development, a new 
focus on ‗human security‘ arose primarily out of  the War on Terrorism – see for 
example the 2011 World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development; 
World Bank, 2011). Whether foreign aid and foreign policy will be increasingly 
merged and used to tackle, for example, Islamic fundamentalism in fragile states, 
similar to the way communism was countered in a bi-polar world (Moss et al, 2005) 
remains to be seen.  
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The next sections will seek to weave together from the key narratives or discursive 
formations in Foucault‘s sense an exploratory genealogy of mainstream development 
to show the continuity and discontinuities of the discourse. 
 
 
3.4 Continuities and key assumptions of development theory and 
practice 
As has been demonstrated through the brief history of development theory in the 
previous section, there are a number of recurring themes or continuities in the 
Foucauldian sense. These are assumptions about the approach to or the essence of 
development (Sachs 1992). Because of the way they constantly feature on the 
development agenda, of particular interest to this thesis are economic growth, 
modernisation, and the issue of poverty, which will be discussed in more detail here. 
They are Foucauldian continuities in the mainstream development discourse. 
 
3.4.1 Economic growth 
As the preceding section has highlighted, economic growth has historically been 
seen a central component of the development discourse. This has been underpinned 
by the experience of Western economic development and the process of 
industrialisation. In the post-colonialisation period, Keynesian economics played a 
dominant role in the interventionist approach towards ‗Third World‘ development. 
This prescriptive approach emphasised that national development planning should  
occur in close consultation with foreign donors (Brohman 1996). Neo-liberal 
economic models also focussed on modernisation as the key to growth and 
development (see, for example Dollar and Kraay 2001). 
 
In these discourses, growth has been reduced to the concept of economic growth. 
We can see the biological notion of growth as being evolutionary from weaker to 
stronger being applied to the economic arena. Sociologist Nisbet (1969) contends 
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that in Rostow‘s early ‗stages of growth‘ model, change was necessarily regarded as 
natural, directional, immanent, continuous and proceeding from a uniform cause.  
Rist (1997) asserts that by associating concepts of development with scientific 
discourse, the economic growth metaphor of biological change gained legitimacy.  
Brohman (1996) explains that because these models saw growth as a linear process, 
there was no allowance for decline or reversal.  The economic focus of these models 
of development has ‗undoubtedly been the most pervasive influence on development 
thinking, and has tended to ‗economise‘ not only development but life itself‘ (Escobar 
1987:115).   
 
Growth theory has been pervasive and far-reaching and has, moreover, moved 
beyond the parameters of economics like modernisation theory (see below). The 
1991 Human Development Report (HDR), equates, for example, conditionally, 
human development with economic growth:  ―Just as economic growth is necessary 
for human development, human development is critical to economic growth‖ (UNDP 
1991: 2). The premise that growth and development are interdependent is also 
reflected in Dorfman‘s (1991) review of the economics of development, in which he 
upholds the futility of trying to differentiate between economic growth and 
development, as the two are so closely linked.  
 
Underpinning a number of critiques of development, from dependency theory to 
alternative and post-development thought, is criticism of both the Keynesian and the 
neo-liberal focus on growth. Post-development scholars such as Sachs (1992) and 
Escobar (1995, 1999, 2000 and 2004) have argued that the fixation with economic 
growth has forced societies in the Southern hemisphere to create an ‗economised‘ 
perspective on all aspects of life. Therefore this conceptualisation of ‗development‘, 
has broader socio-political implications.  As Apter notes:  
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―… the concept of development represents a great variety of specific theories 
and approaches.  But most of all, it is a hosting metaphor containing crucial 
connecting assumptions between growth and democracy …. with it should go 
concepts like modernization and modernism (Apter 1987: 7).  
 
In short, throughout the wide range of theoretical approaches, the notion of 
development as growth is intricately and inextricably linked through the concept of 
modernisation, which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
3.4.2 Modernisation  
The second of the three key assumptions embedded within discourses of 
mainstream development is modernisation.  Overlapping with growth theory, much of 
the theory of modernisation is either implicitly or explicitly evolutionary (Brohman 
1996: 21).   In this logic, ‗development‘ is a series of stages to be progressed 
through, as Lewis or Rostow argued, in order to attain the goal of modernisation.   
 
It was Hoselitz (1960) who first drew attention to the non-economic ‗sociological‘ 
factors of development, arguing that value transformation - from traditional to modern 
- was at the heart of process of change. As Nisbet (1980) outlines, the concept of 
modernisation is intimately linked to the idea of progress, which states that advances 
in technology, science, and social organization will improve the human condition. The 
underlying assumption is that all that is needed is for people to apply their reason 
and skills and these changes for the better will inevitably happen. The role of the 
development advisor is therefore to identify obstacles in the way of the march of 
progress.  
 
It is clear that economic considerations are central to modernisation theory, 
underpinned by the idea that economic transformation leads to positive socio-political 
consequences, and its collar, that socio-political changes are necessary for 
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economic transformation to occur.  Non-economic factors therefore should evolve in 
a manner consistent with the principles of economic growth (Escobar 1995; Brohman 
1996). Even alternative development approaches that have focused on participation, 
gender or environment through a focus on needs (Munck 1999) have done so 
without questioning the very notion of modernisation.   
 
It was only with the relative lack of success of economic growth models that the 
theory broadened to incorporate social and cultural considerations. As a result, 
development theory became more interdisciplinary, enabling it to have wider more far 
reaching effects.  In discourse terms, modernisation thereby reached the status of a 
hegemonic formation.   
 
Such a formation is, in Gramsci‘s sense, a cultural hegemony (Fontana 1993).  This 
perspective is backed by King (1995), who describes the attributes of ‗modern‘ as 
temporal instead of spatial.  To be modernised is to establish an identity in 
comparison to those who are not.  As King (1995) notes:   
 
―Modern is measured not only diachronically, in relation to the past of one‘s own 
(always Western, Northern) society, but synchronically, in relation to the present of 
someone else‘s (always Eastern, Southern) society‖. (King 1995: 115)   
 
The link between modernity and the ‗West‘, argues King (1995: 109), is partly due to ‗its 
linguistic origin in English and the subsequent linguistic imperialism of colonial and 
international English‘. Pieterse (2001: 20) takes this argument further by stating that 
modernisation is the ‗theoretical corollary‘ of American globalism, in an era of de-
colonisation and a bi- and post-bipolar world. He identifies the ‗American way of life‘ as 
the epitome of modernity‘ (Pieterse 2001:21).   This link can be traced conceptually back 
to Max Weber‘s (2002) proposition that Protestant Christianity played a fundamental role 
 - 93 - 
in the capitalist transformation of Western Europe, due to a culture that was receptive to 
change of societal norms and values from traditional to modern. Similarly, non-Protestant 
Christian religions are held by modernisation theory to be an obstacle to socio-economic 
change. 
 
Modernisation as political and economic theory has been a feature of the post-colonial era 
as has been discussed above. However, it is not a monolith as Latour (1993) argues:  
Modernity comes in as many versions as there are thinkers or journalists, yet all 
its definitions point, in one way or another, to the passage of time.  The 
adjective ‗modern‘ designated a new regime, an acceleration, a rupture, a 
revolution in time.  When the word ‗modern‘, ‗modernization‘, or ‗modernity‘ 
appears, we are defining, by contrast, an archaic and stable past.  (Latour 
1993: 10) 
 
Yet the implications of modernisation theory remain, as described by Apter (1987: 
16), as a ‗project of ‗modernization‘ of ‗traditional societies‘ through the establishment 
of networks and institutions similar to those of ‗advanced industrial societies‘ such as 
Western Europe or Northern America.  Brohman (1996: 15) argues that modernism 
is in fact a ‗grand design‘ to create a modern society consisting of uniform economic 
and social patterns and standard cultural and psychological attitudes. This ‗typicality‘ 
operates as a Foucauldian bio-power process, in which self-disciplining makes this 
type of modernity the desired goal.  
 
However, development efforts focused on modernisation and economic growth have 
increasingly been challenged by the need to directly address the issue of poverty, 
which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
3.4.3 Conceptualising, defining and measuring poverty  
Development discourse, it could be argued, derives its legitimacy from the presence 
of the phenomenon of poverty (Nkurunziza, 2007). The elimination of poverty, argues 
Stewart et al (2007: 217), is the overriding aim of those concerned with development. 
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In the international development literature, the identificatin of poverty as a concern 
can be pinpointed in the very first World Development Report (1948), although the 
phenomenon has been a domestic policy and moral concern for centuries if not 
millennia. Poverty has very strongly underpinned the international development 
agenda since the mid 1960s and 70s, as the ineffectiveness of both the Keynesian 
and neo-liberal modernisation projects became apparent. The fight against poverty is 
today the principal theme that underpins development policy making in form of the 
Millennium Development Goals and Poverty Reduction Strategies (Laderchi et al 
2003). 
3.4.4 Who wants to know about poverty? 
The discourse around poverty conceptualisations and measurements is complex and 
driven by the nature of the entity that poses the question (Chambers 2006). Whilst 
the elimination of poverty is a key concern of all those interested in the development 
of poor countries (Laderchi et al 2003), there is vast difference in opinion as to the 
prescribed solution, as reflected in the changing and competing paradigms within 
development discourse over the last 50 years, evolving from the quest for 
modernisation, to a concern about underdevelopment, to a drive for growth in a free 
market. Lately development theory and policy have acknowledged the need to 
address socio-political and not just economic inequalities, a theme even endorsed by 
the World Bank through its ‗Voices of the Poor‘ study (Narayan et al 2000), and also 
placed increasing emphasis on good governance as a prerequisite for economic 
development, culminating in the ‗Washington Consensus‘ (Slim, 1996). 
  
3.4.5 The meaning of poverty 
Considerable conceptual differences exist in how poverty is understood, yet primarily 
a dividing line is drawn between income and non-income approaches. At a 
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methodological level, the main distinguishing factor between different definitions of 
poverty is whether the definition is based on an external analyst‘s perspective, 
referred to as conventional understanding, or the perspective of the poor themselves, 
referred to as participatory understanding (Nkurunziza 2007). Hence, it is not just 
important who asks the question about poverty, but also who answers (Chambers 
2006). The key questions are then, as Chambers (2002) argues, whose reality 
counts, the externally constructed mostly ‗economistic‘ understanding of poverty, or 
that of the poor themselves. Subsequently development policy may be different in its 
strategic objectives. 
 
The most commonly used definition and conceptualisation of poverty is based on the 
lack of money (Stewart et al 2007). This understanding of poverty essentially means 
the lack of a minimum amount of money required to afford basic necessities and 
sustain human life and poverty is defined as material deprivation (Wratten 1995). The 
conventional definition of poverty uses an externally determined measure, based on 
income, expenditure, consumption or other social indicators, as a proxy for poverty. 
The monetary approach, hence, regards a person or a household as poor depending 
on whether they can afford to purchase a basket of basic goods, usually food 
(sometimes pegged at a certain level of calorific intake), clothing and shelter. It is on 
the basis of this measure that individuals and households are classified as either 
poor or not, depending on whether they fall below or above a set threshold referred 
to as the poverty line, commonly pegged at US$1 a day in purchasing power parity 
(PPP) terms. 
 
Poverty is then defined as a shortfall from the poverty line, usually in consumption 
terms, rather than income, which is often under-reported, concealed and can 
temporarily fluctuate. However, this approach has a range of shortcomings, 
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particularly its failure to capture the multi-dimensionality of poverty (Alkire 2002). The 
monetary approach, which focuses in effect entirely on the economic achievement of 
individuals or households, ignores any social capital created, for example, through 
networks and social interactions. It is, nevertheless, the policy-makers‘ preferred 
poverty indicator as it allows for easy international and national comparison, 
particularly in estimating the depth and severity of poverty (Hulme & McKay 2005).  
 
Thus, the Millennium Declaration of the General Assembly of the United Nations 
aims to halve poverty by 2015, utilising the $1 a-day poverty line. Whilst the $1-a-day 
formula lends itself to easy international comparison and has perhaps helped 
advocacy work in the Northern hemisphere, it reveals very little about the axes of 
social difference that may exacerbate the effects of being below the poverty line in 
the Southern hemisphere. However, the Millennium Development Goals provide 
some redress, specifically with a gendered understanding of differences in 
educational attainment (i.e. MDG 2 + 3 with their emphasis on education for girls and 
women‘s empowerment) and access to appropriate primary healthcare (e.g. MDG 5 
on maternal health). 
 
On the other hand, Amartya Sen‘s (1999) capabilities approach argues that poverty 
is not determined by a lack of money, but by the inability of individuals to live valued 
lives. Indicators such as ill health and lack of education deprive people of the 
possibility to realise their full human potential. Sen‘s notion of ‗development as 
freedom‘ rejects monetary income as a measure of well-being and instead focuses 
on indicators of freedom to live a valued life (Laderchi et al 2006). In this approach, 
money is regarded as a means to enhance capabilities, as opposed to being the end.  
This approach emphasizes the poverty of inadequate access to basic infrastructure 
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and services, such as clean water, sanitation, education, electricity and health 
services (Nkurunziza 2007: 24). 
 
Whilst Sen‘s approach is very useful in terms of unpacking varies axes of social 
difference and inequality of access to services, it provides very little guidance on 
what should constitute a poverty line in capability terms. However, in its essence the 
capabilities approach has been used by the UNDP in its Human Development Index 
(HDI), using the indicators of life expectancy at birth, adult illiteracy and under-five 
mortality as poverty proxies, providing a deeper understanding of the social 
inequalities that may fuel the severity of poverty for some.   
 
Moreover, the concept of social exclusion, originally conceptualised in the developed 
world to describe marginalisation and deprivation in poor inner city areas, has more 
recently been applied to the international development context (Laderchi et al 2003). 
By referring to poverty of power, social exclusion represents a key determining factor 
of material deprivation as indicated by access to education or livelihood 
opportunities. Social exclusion leads to ‗voicelessness‘ and powerlessness. This, in 
turn, excludes the poor from the benefits of belonging to a wider community, such as 
the receipt of entitlements and getting fair access to services or markets (Laderchi et 
al 2003).  
 
In the context of development policy formulation in low-income countries, social 
exclusion is a useful concept as it is not focused on individuals but on the structures 
that create inequalities and exclude some and not others. Although more difficult 
compare internationally, it enables differentiated policy-making due to an 
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understanding of the social axes of difference that often, in a very localised manner, 
cause social exclusion (Stewart et al 2007). 
  
As an alternative to the previous externally-determined poverty concepts, 
participatory approaches put local perceptions of poverty centre stage (Chambers 
2006) and unpack its many dimensions, including the importance of non-material 
aspects of wellbeing, including conditioning factors such as various axes of social 
difference (e.g. underlying power structures, wealth distribution and gender 
inequalities). Participatory approaches arose out of widespread recognition of the 
importance of context and poor people‘s ability to understand and analyse their own 
reality and the need to empower them to shape their own development (Chambers 
2002).  
 
It can be argued that this approach makes it possible to focus and target poor 
people‘s priorities as they are the real poverty experts, although this requires a high 
degree of methodological robustness to stand up to scrutiny in quantitatively driven 
policy making circles and also to unpack deeply rooted perceptions of inequity 
without superimposing Northern values in the analysis process. In reviewing 
Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs) in a number of African countries, Booth et 
al (1998) warn of ‗selectivity‘ in identifying what is regarded as policy relevant. 
Arguably, while a qualitative understanding of poverty derived through participatory 
methods may not be ‗precise‘ and does not enable comparisons on a global scale, as 
do indicators such as GDP per capita or even the HDI, it does provide insights into 
structural inequality (Norton 2000). 
 
A relatively new perspective on poverty is expressed in the concepts of ill-being and 
well-being which were initially explored by Narayan and Chambers (2000) as part of 
a World Bank funded study to listen to the ‗Voices of the Poor‘. Though not entirely 
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without controversy, well-being is of particular importance to add to our 
understanding beyond the resource dimension of poverty, because marked 
disparities exist in both income-rich and income-poor countries, as illustrated in the 
UNDP Human Development Report 2001, with major indicators of objective well-
being showing little or no improvement beyond middle income levels: 
People cannot become literate twice or, at present, live longer. And in some 
respects there can be deterioration: mobility can decline in megalopolis and 
stress levels, suicide and mental illness levels appear often to grow. Input 
and output levels are not reliable proxies for describing or valuing the 
contents of a life. (Gasper, 2004: 10) 
 
There is, arguably, no objective way of defining poverty, since a large element of 
construction can be found in all the different conceptualisations, either from the 
outside, or by a combination of outsiders and the poor themselves (Stewart et al 
2007: 235). However conceptualised, defined and measured, poverty provides the 
strongest moral mandate for development (Stewart et al 2007). Poverty reduction, 
particularly in form of the PRSP process coupled with the MDGs, has assumed 
primacy in the development agenda and through its undeniable moral mandate it 
―has become the medium through which diverse understandings of development are 
translated into targets, instruments and plans‖ (Brock & Cornwall, 2005:1049). But 
nevertheless, the materialistic determinism (Clarke 2007) that underpins most 
understandings of development, from modernisation to asset-based sustainable 
livelihoods, hints at the continued dominance of monetary or materialistically-
determined conceptualisations and measurements of poverty as the object of 
development. Moreover, as Stewart et al (2007: 217) point out: ―…, the monetary 
approach remains the approach most commonly adopted in the measurement of 
poverty‖. 
 
So far, these sections have provided an overview of the history of the development 
discourse and focused on three key assumptions embedded in it: economic growth, 
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modernisation, and the monetary determination of poverty.  These assumptions are 
distinct, yet interlinked within mainstream development discourses.  
 
3.5 Key discursive turns in the mainstream development field 
The previous section has sought to describe the ebbing and flowing of the 
development discourse by way of assembling an archive from which the overall 
narrative has been constructed. For reasons of the positionality of an author, the 
construction of this narrative may vary. The following genealogy reflects this but also 
is geared towards answering the question that underlies this doctoral study, namely 
to identify assumptions that drive the relationship between the mainstream and 
alternative discourses at the antagonistic frontier in the selected policy-making 
context. 
 
From the outset, it is apparent that although the term development is ubiquitous, it 
has meant different things to different people. It has been constructed as value-free, 
benign and universal, but as the modernisation approach demonstrated, this claim of 
universality was derived from the experience of industrialisation in the Northern 
hemisphere. 
 
The diagram below (Figure 2: A genealogy of the mainstream development 
discourse) seeks to provide a graphical illustration of the archive assembled and 
analysed in the previous sections. It illustrates that the development discourse was 
dominated by a concern for growth that was to be facilitated through the 
modernisation of not just the economy,but also of society and political systems. 
The neo-liberal assumption of market forces as the most efficient resource allocation 
mechanism was temporarily challenged by state-led economic management and by 
the structuralist concern for underdevelopment in the aftermath of decolonisation, 
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only to reclaim primacy again through the Washington Consensus. Whilst 
considerable policy concessions were made under the post-Washington Consensus, 
the focus on poverty and inequality has neither succeeded in replacing the overall 
agreed desirability of development, nor the concept of progress or modernisation in 
accordance with a particular Euro-centric model. 
 
Most important for this genealogy is the continuity of the issue of growth (to be 
facilitated through classical and later neo-classical economic approaches) and the 
ubiquitous concepts of progress and modernisation that, as the previous archive of 
the development discourse has demonstrated, have been constantly repackaged and 
recycled in various policy prescriptions. Even in the current development orthodoxy 
Figure 2: A genealogy of the mainstream development discourse 
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of more partnership-based strategies built around the MDGs and PRSPs, neo-liberal 
elements, such as deregulation, free trade, decentralisation and governance reform, 
still feature strongly. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a genealogy of the mainstream development discourse has been 
offered, focusing on an analysis of three assumptions, which make up the 
cornerstones of what is regarded as acceptable development knowledge in the 
Foucauldian sense: economic growth, modernisation and a materialistically-
determined understanding of poverty.  These constitute hegemonic formations, which 
still appear to be dominant in the development field.  
 
Although the development field has, arguably, been in flux, due to the three key 
assumptions identified an underlying logic can be detected. This logic or 
‗development common sense‘ centres, despite some deviation, on a neo-liberal 
orthodoxy. A renewed neo-liberal rally cry, after the demise of Friedman‘s 
monetarism of the 70s and 80s, was led by Fukuyama‘s (1992) claim that we have 
come to the end of history, based upon his understanding of the hegemonic strength 
of the neo-liberal economic order through the means of globalisation. In various 
forms, this formation still remains hegemonic. 
 
Neverthelss, in spite of the continued hegemony of this formation, there are a 
number of alternative discourses that have surfaced from within the development 
field to challenge the mainstream development discourses. In the next chapter, a 
particular alternative approach is discussed, namely the Islamic development 
discourse.   
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CHAPTER 4: 
A GENEALOGY OF THE ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE: UNDERLYING 
ASSUMPTIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS3 
 
4 Introduction and purpose 
 
Following on from Chapter 3, this chapter is concerned with analysing the 
procedures, practices, apparatuses and institutions involved in the production of the 
Islamic development discourse in order to identify what its main assumptions are and 
whether Islam espouses developmental models distinct from the range of ‗Western‘ 
mainstream approaches identified. 
 
This analysis will be offered in the form of a Foucauldian genealogy, as outlined in 
Chapter 2, the foundation for which is an archive of the key concepts and theories 
that have been formulated in the fields of Islamic social theory and Islamic 
economics, including some contemporary institutional models and practices akin to 
development.  
 
4.1 Diversity of Islamic discourses 
From the outset it should be noted that Islam is a highly diverse world religion 
(Gregorian, 2003), hence there are likely to be a number of competing and parallel 
discourses to be found. As the lowest common denominator for all Muslim 
denominations or sects, we can assert that Islam is a monotheistic religion founded 
by the Prophet Muhammad. Islam is an Arabic word that means submission, and 
implies the total surrender of one's self to God, known in Arabic as Allah (Rahman, 
                                                 
3 Parts of this Chapter are derived from a literature review compiled by the author as part of 
his work as a research associate with the Religion and Development Research Programme at 
the University of Birmingham. Available online: 
http://www.religionsanddevelopment.org/files/resourcesmodule/@random454f80f60b3f4/1229
939956_working_paper_20___web_file.pdf  
 
A more recent version was presented as a paper entitled ―A Genealogy of the Islamic 
Development Discourse: Underlying Assumptions and Policy Implications from a 
Development Studies Perspective‖  at the 8th International Islamic Economics and Finance 
Conference in Doha, Qatar, 19-21 December 2011 
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1987). Historically Islam spread from the Arabian peninsula and today it is present as 
a majority religion in many countries from West Africa to South East Asia, although 
there are also sizeable Muslim minorities in Northern America and Western Europe. 
Only about 20 per cent of Muslims live in Arab countries (Indonesia is the most 
populous Muslim country) and only approximately 10 per cent speak Arabic as their 
mother tongue.  
 
This diversity of course underlines the complexities of dealing with Islam or labelling 
something as ‗Islamic‘. In many ways, it is impossible to reduce Islam to a single 
discourse and it would almost be appropriate to refer to it in the plural as ‗Islams‘. 
However, for the purpose of analytical clarity this study takes the position that,  
 
―… in order for a concept to be called ‗Islamic‘ it must be argued from an 
Islamic theological basis, i.e. the Koran and the Sunna. If the system‘s design 
cannot be deduced from these two primary sources of Islamic law directly, it 
must nevertheless at least correspond to their contents and must be linked to 
them epistemologically.‖ (Nienhaus, 1982 a: 83)  
 
In this context,  an initial look both at the English language academic literature and 
the materials produced by Islamic development organisations (both nationally and 
internationally) pertaining to Islamic development ideas gives an impression of a 
relative paucity of materials pertaining to what could be regarded as a development 
discourse. However, it can be assumed that since most Muslim thinking and writing 
is written for a domestic or regional non-English-speaking audience, more literature 
on development is likely to be available in Arabic, Urdu or Malay. Interestingly, 
however, as has been noted by Yousri (2011), most Islamic economics literature has 
been produced in English. It is of course possible that English has become the lingua 
franca for the Muslim world instead of Arabic, but nevertheless this discourse 
represents a hegemonic formation in the form of an English speaking and often 
‗Western‘-educated elite.  
 
The apparent paucity of material may be due to the methods of study of Islam within  
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the social science disciplines, which, as noted above, have often been reductionist in 
the way that terms like ‗development‘ and ‗progress‘ are defined. As Said (1979) 
suggests in his post-colonial analysis, understanding of Islam is still influenced by an 
orientalist fear of the ‗other‘. Since the 18th and 19th centuries, the study of Islam from 
a Western perspective has been heavily influenced by the rivalry for power between 
the West and the Muslim world, as well as the needs of colonial administrators 
(Chapra, 1992). In the 20th century, however, a new paradigm emerged that sought 
to dissociate the field from this historical baggage, with both Western and Muslim 
scholars seeking to regain the lost intellectual territory. Inevitably the assembling of 
the archive is shaped by these dynamics. 
 
Notoriously ‗orientalism‘, which is the study of Near and Far Eastern societies and 
cultures, languages and peoples, was geared to the conquest of the orient (Said, 
1979). The term orientalism, understood to refer to the study of the East by 
Westerners, was shaped by the attitudes typical of the era of European imperialism 
in the 18th and 19th centuries. Edward Said (1979) is famous for his work 
‗Orientalism‘, which highlighted the relationship between power and knowledge, and 
argued that the use of the term ‗orient‘ was used as the opposite of ‗occident‘, 
infused it with negative connotations and cast as an inversion of Western culture. 
 
Today Western academia refers to Islamic Studies as a new field of study within the 
religious studies spectrum (Kraemer, 2000), although this is an ambiguous term. In a 
non-Muslim context, it generally refers to the multi-disciplinary study of Muslim 
history, religion and culture. In spite of their non-religious approach, some non-
Muslim scholars have written works that are widely read by Muslims for their spiritual 
insights. Before Said‘s challenge, such non-Muslim scholars were called ‗orientalists‘, 
but today they are referred to as ‗Islamicists‘. Western academics who deal with 
Islamic issues come from a diverse range of disciplines and approaches, ranging 
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from sympathetic liberals like John Esposito or conservatives and neo-conservatives 
like Bernhard Lewis or Daniel Pipes. One of the main scholastic approaches in 
Islamic Studies is to avoid constructing Islam as a distinct homogeneous and 
timeless entity that is essentially informed only by its normative texts (the Qur‘an and 
the Ahadith), in the way orientalists used to (Kraemer, 2000).  
 
In a Muslim context, in contrast, Islamic Studies can be an umbrella term for virtually 
all the social science disciplines, since Islam sees itself as offering guidance on all 
human affairs, particularly with respect to methods of deriving such guidance from 
the revealed sources. This particularly refers to traditional Islamic theology and 
Islamic jurisprudence. By some, it is also taken to be all-encompassing vis-a-vis the 
Islamisation of knowledge, which attempts to assimilate fields generally considered 
to be secular in the West, such as science and economics. As this Islamisation 
process is based on religious commandments and the moral underpinnings of 
Islamic revelation, the vast majority of writings in this scholarly tradition are of a 
normative nature, lacking the type of critical or self-reflexive analysis to which today‘s 
Western academic and popular audiences have become accustomed. Moreover, the 
Islamic sciences have traditionally been inter-disciplinary. For example, some of the 
classical scholars such as Ibn Sina (known as Avicenna in the West) were at the 
cutting edge of a number of natural and social science disciplines, although this 
appears unusual today, given the disciplinary boundaries that have evolved in 
contemporary academia (Shakir, 2005).  
 
Of late there has been a renaissance of interest in the Muslim world which extends to 
issues pertaining to poverty and development, which are at the heart of this thesis. 
Some of this interest continues the orientalist tradition and extends, post 9/11, into 
the realm of the ‗war‘ against what is defined as Islamic fundamentalism and 
terrorism (see, for example, Burr and Collins, 2006). In addition, Islamic revivalism 
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and the emergence of what is referred to as political Islam (Esposito, 1998), which is 
associated with prolific writers from the Indian sub-continent (like Abdul al-‘Ala 
Mawdudi, died 1972) and the Middle East (like Sayyid Qutb, died 1962). A slightly 
deeper look reveals that a vast and growing body of literature exists, particularly in 
the realm of Islamic finance, which is seen as a prime vehicle for equitable economic 
development, although the main academic interpreters remain few (see Zaman, 
2008). Nevertheless, much of the Western academic literature either looks at the 
Muslim world as if it were a coherent entity in terms of culture and the degree to 
which Islamic teachings permeate practices and institutions, or engages at a level of 
specificity that may not be helpful to the assembling of a general archive to reflect the 
overall theories, models and practices pertaining to Islamic approaches to 
development.  
 
However, to consider whether an Islamic development discourse exists, we need to 
delve into the essence of the religion of Islam, which will be dealt with in the next 
section. 
 
4.2 Aims and objectives of Islam 
At the core of this doctoral study lies the question of whether Islam espouses 
particular developmental models, what assumption it makes about the ideal-type of 
social, political and economic organisation and how this frames development policy-
making. Whilst this study does not intend to deal with theological matters, it is 
relevant and important to briefly assess Islam from a ‗religious‘ perspective in order 
to understand what underpins the Islamic social theories that are discussed at a later 
stage. 
 
Theological works focusing on Islam both from within (e.g Ibn Taymiyyah 1997, 
Ghazali, 1999) and from a comparative religious perspective (Gregorian 2003, Cragg 
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1986) primarily and often extensively deal with the five pillars of Islam, namely the 
testimony of faith (Shahada), the obligatory five daily prayers (Salah), fasting during 
the month of Ramadan (Sawm), obligatory alms (Zakat) and pilgrimage to Makkah 
(Hajj). Apart from the giving of alms, which will be discussed in section 4.10 in more 
detail, all other core acts of the Islamic religion emphasise worship and a relationship 
with the transcendental, rather than the worldly. 
 
However, this thesis adopts Asad‘s (1993) genealogical understanding of religion as 
a discourse that is driven by time and place and in turn also shapes time and place 
(see discussion in Chapter 1). Whilst there are stepping stones that propose a ‗path‘ 
for religious adherents to the transcendental, however defined or perceived, the way 
this path is understood and implemented is discursive. Most of these stepping stones 
are clearly ‗spiritual‘ in nature, such as prayer, fasting or other religious rites, but they 
also have a ‗worldly‘ dimension in as far as Islam is claimed to postulate a social, 
economic or even political order (Chapra, 1992) that, if realised, will facilitate the 
attainment of the transcendental (later sections dealing with Islamic social theory will 
elaborate on this). Islamic scholars have traditionally referred to Islam as Deen, an 
Arabic word translated as ‗religion‘, ‗way‘ or ‗path‘. But many Muslims reject the 
understanding of Deen as ‗religion‘, seeing religion as a human-made or ideological 
concept, rather than divinely inspired (see for instance Maududi, 1960). Instead they 
employ the un-translated Arabic term to illustrate something above and beyond the 
commonly held conceptualisation of religion. In this type of usage, the term Deen 
implies something more approximating ‗faith‘ or ‗way‘ or ‗path‘, as mentioned above, 
which is more all-encompassing and does not have an exact translation in English. 
Rather, it can only be truly grasped through an understanding and application of 
Islamic principles. The argument made in referring to Islam as Deen underlines the 
claim made by most Islamic scholars, groups and sects that Islam is not only a 
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‗religion‘ as the English word signifies, is a complete way of life. A key Islamic 
political thinker, Abu Ala Maududi, underlines this:  
 
"There are several meanings of Deen. One meaning is honour, government, 
empire, monarchy and rulership. The second meaning is quite opposite to it, 
i.e. subordination, obedience, slavery, servitude and subjection. The third 
meaning is to account, to give judgment, and dispense reward and 
punishment of actions. The word Deen has been used in the Qur'an in all 
these three meanings." (Maududi, 1960:x).  
 
Maududi‘s motivation as the leader of an Islamic political movement, the Jamaat-e-
Islam in the Indian subcontinent, might of course be underpinned by the need to 
secure his legitimacy through invoking Islam, but even non-Muslim scholars have 
echoed his views about the multi-dimensionality of Islam. Nienhaus, a prominent 
German economist, for example, argues that: 
 
―Islam is a religion which concerns itself with much more than the after-life; it 
is a complete worldview, and as such it endeavours to provide an answer to 
all questions of human existence. For every worldview, consistency and 
coherence are of paramount importance. In the past, Islamic jurists used to 
ensure that Islam met these criteria. The dramatic social and economic 
transformation of the Islamic world in the twentieth century means, however, 
that their traditional body of knowledge is no longer sufficient to fully 
understand contemporary developments and changes.‖ Nienhaus (2000: 86)   
  
The degree to which is Islam is theorised, understood and lived as a Deen varies 
enormously and the following sections will explain some of these differences to help 
contextualise any Islamic approach to development.  
4.3 Defining the term ‘development’ in Islam 
Interestingly, the term ‗development‘ does not feature in the traditional Islamic 
discourses that primarily deal with jurisprudential issues (in Arabic Fiqh) or matters of 
belief (Aqeedah). This is not to say that a concern for progress and civilisational 
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advancement has not been expressed by early Islamic scholars such as Abu Yusuf 
(731-798 CE), Al-Marwardi (974-1058), Al-Ghazali (1055-1111), Ibn Taymiyyah 
(1263-1328) and Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) (Chapra 2008 b). Ibn Khaldun in particular 
uses the term ‗Imaarah, which could be translated as ‗civilisation building‘ or even 
development (Chapra, 2008 b: 17). 
 
However, in the contemporary context the Arabic term Tanmiyah (   ﺓﻱﻡﻥﺕ) (Al-Mawrid 
Dictionary, 1968) is used by modern-day Middle Eastern development finance 
institutions such as the Islamic Development Bank. This Arabic term, however, does 
not appear in the English language literature that deals with relavant issues, such as 
Islamic economics, which uses the term ‗development‘. 
 
This calls for a deeper and wider approach to understanding the genealogy of the 
term, which is in use today but does not appear to be rooted in the historical Islamic 
discourses on societal or economic organisation. This apparent discontinuity raises 
some interesting questions in Foucauldian terms, which will be further explored in the 
following sections. The tension that it causes provides is further expounded by 
Elmissiri:  
―Concepts such as ‗infinite progress‘ (which are central in Western modernity) 
are deemed by them [the proponents of the new Islamic discourse, the author] 
as hostile to the very idea of boundaries and therefore to the idea of man and 
nature, and, eventually, to the idea of God. Such concepts are atheistic, not only 
in the religious, but also in the epistemological human sense. Thus, the bearers 
of the new [Islamic] discourse persistently search for new theories of 
development and new concepts of progress. They argue that Islamic theories of 
development should be radically different from the generalist Western theories 
promoted by ‗international‘ organizations, for such theories have largely proven 
to fail, and have led to an environmental crisis and the impoverishment of the 
masses.‖ (Elmissiri, 1997, cf. www.muslimphilosophy.com) 
 
Elmissiri‘s claim lies at the heart of this doctoral thesis, which seeks to identify 
whether and how the ‗mainstream‘ international development discourse frames 
contemporary ‗Islamic‘ conceptualisations of poverty and development policies. In 
doing so, the author will examine a range of historical Islamic schools of thought and 
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practice that deal with social theory. Due to the historicity of some of these schools, 
the review might appear to be excessively wide-sweeping but, as will be 
demonstrated, the historical schools of thought build a foundation for today‘s Islamic 
development thinking and practice. The following sections will hence explore old and 
new Islamic discourses around progress, modernity and development. 
 
4.4 Key concepts of Islamic development thinking and practice  
The following sections outline Islamic theological and philosophical thinking and its 
implications for social ordering and examine challenges that led to the economic and 
cultural atrophy of Islamic civilisation, a perceived backwardness that became 
increasingly clear with European technological and economic development and 
imperialism from the 18th century onwards.  
 
Traditionally the Islamic sciences were not accustomed to dealing with a broad range 
of social science issues, since it was held that the only legitimate sources of 
knowledge about the structure of society, economy and governance were the Qur‘an 
and the Prophet Muhammad‘s Sunnah (Rahman, 1987). Hence, the schools of 
jurisprudence were seen as having the sole responsibility, through their established 
methodologies, for deriving guidance from revelation (Usool and Usool ul-fiqh) to 
shape societal norms and conventions. This held true for as long as Muslim lands 
were not deeply exposed to other doctrines and philosophies. However, expansion 
into Spain (ruled by Muslims as Al Andalus between 711 and 1492 CE) opened up 
new intellectual avenues, primarily through the re-discovery of Greek texts setting out 
Platonian and Aristotelian ideas, which were later translated into Latin and nurtured 
the European Renaissance (Leaman, 2002). At the heart of the epistemological 
debate between philosophy and theology at the time were therefore arguments about 
faith versus reason that had a major impact on the intellectual development of both 
the orient and the occident. During this period, differences between theological 
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schools emerged that continue to influence Islamic thinking and divisions today. 
These are briefly described in the following section. 
 
4.5 Development of early Islamic theological and philosophical thought 
A number of new schools of Muslim theological and philosophical thought, including 
the Ash`ariyyah, Mu`tazilityyah and Maturidiyyah, emerged between the 8th and 10th 
centuries (Shaw 1997). The new schools, collectively referred to as Kalam, based 
their ideas on seeking theological principles through dialectic reasoning, thus looking 
beyond what was already established through revelation (Craig, 1979). The 
Mu`tazilityyah in particular, were responsible for incorporating Greek philosophical 
thought into Islamic theology (Shaw 1997). This approach was manifested in their 
belief that knowledge of God can be acquired through reason as well as revelation. 
Ash'ariyyah theology was a reaction against this emphasis on rationalism on the part 
of the Mu'tazilityyah. Their teachings originally sought to preserve the doctrine of 
divine omnipotence, but gradually led towards a more deterministic outlook. Maturidi 
theology took the position that understanding of God's existence could be derived 
through human reason alone. The Maturidiyyah held that, although the human being 
has free will, God is still all-powerful and in control of all things (Shaw 1997). A bitter 
battle ensued between the traditionalists, who had been involved in the development 
of existing Islamic jurisprudence based on evidence from the Qur‘an and the Sunnah, 
and the emerging Islamic philosophers who utilised different methodologies. 
 
These divergent ontological perspectives continue to underpin Islamic philosophy 
and social theory to this day (Craig, 1979), and are of particular relevance to the 
concept of human agency in relation to progress and development. A key example 
would be the highly influential medieval Muslim theologian Abu Hāmed Mohammad 
Al-Ghazali (1058 – 1111), who proposed that causal events and interactions were 
the result of the will of God (Watt, 1963). Ghazali‘s premise of divine intervention in 
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the natural world may have been one of the contributing factors to the decline of 
scientific inquiry in Muslim lands (Watt, 1963). Whilst later Islamic civilizations, like 
the Ottomans, utilised technology, it was the Christian West that adopted the works 
of early Islamic philosophy and as a result, took the lead in philosophy, research and 
discovery.  
 
4.6 The origins of Islamic social theories pertaining to development 
The foundations for political, social and economic organisation under an Islamic 
system were laid during the time of the Prophet (Watt 1953 & 1956, Mubarakpuri 
1996) and an effective Islamic state was established under the early caliphs (Lewis, 
2003). Progress, however, appears to primarily have been measured primarily in 
transcendental terms, centred on the pillars of Islam. Hence, traditionally, Islamic 
scholars have held the opinion that the realisation of the transcendental goals of 
Islam necessitates an Islamic state or caliphate (Choueiri, 1997), which then 
becomes Dar-us-Salam (‗the land of peace‘). 
 
Because of this close link between the fulfilment of religious and material purposes, 
Muslim pursuit of knowledge, including theology and philosophy coupled with 
science, mathematics, medicine etc., excelled and Islamic civilisations were thriving. 
The Islamic empire perhaps reached its zenith, the so-called ‗Golden Age‘, after 
considerable military and economic expansion from the 8th to 13th century, a period 
which serves as a reference point for later Muslims (Ayoob, 2008: 2-10).   This phase 
brought with it economic prosperity and considerable development of educational 
and public welfare infrastructure (Lewis, 2003). In fact Benthall and Bellion-Jordan 
(2003) attribute the first welfare state to early Islamic civilization, during which state-
owned or publicly endowed institutions provided a degree of healthcare, education 
and a social safety net. 
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Beginning with the sacking of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258, however, the Islamic 
caliphate experienced a range of military, economic and cultural challenges that led 
to its decline and, when the last Ottoman sultan abdicated in 1924, ultimate demise. 
European expansion led Muslim scholars and statesmen to question prevailing 
thought, and they in turn influenced emerging social and political movements. The 
emerging discourse centred on responsive change, and not on progress, tapping into 
revival as a dominant and recurrent theme in Islam (Haddad et al, 1991: 3). 
Reflecting the considerable theological or jurisprudential diversity that exists in Islam, 
a range of Islamic movements in the 19th and 20th centuries have pursued the 
objective of Islamic revival or awakening (Arabic,  Sahwa)  to either stem the tide 
against the decline of or to re-establish Islamic rule. However, in modern times there 
has been considerable disagreement as to the aims and objectives of change 
(Haddad et al, 1991) and the methodology (Manhaj) that is suggested for achieving 
the aim of (re-)establishing Islam, ranging from fundamentalist to modernist 
approaches. Some of the key approaches underpinning contemporary Islamic 
development practice that are relevant to this doctoral study will be discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
4.6.1 Backwardness and retardation: the ‘underdevelopment’ of the Muslim 
World?  
Perhaps in contrast to Nisbet‘s (1980) claim about modernisation being closely linked 
to the idea of progress, Islamic approaches to development were primarily a 
response to external challenges and sought to re-establish, re-invent or re-align the 
historical construct of the ‗Golden Age‘. Haddad et al‘s (1991) extensive review of 
literature underlines this common theme:   
―Revivalist literature written during the second half of the nineteenth century 
to present time reflects the history of the encounter with the west. […] 
Revivalist ideas are not generated in a vacuum but are the response to 
external and internal stimuli, in this case to the realization of general societal 
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decay as well as the perceived challenge and experience of oppression by 
western powers‖. (Haddad et al, 1991: 3-4) 
 
In the 18th and 19th centuries, the rampant colonisation of Muslim spheres of 
influence and the Islamic world, which allowed European nations to dominate the 
globe economically, forced Islamic countries to question the underlying reasons for 
the relative backwardness of Islamic civilisation. One of the responses within the 
leading Islamic entity, the Ottoman Empire, were the Tanzimat reforms at the 
beginning of the 19th century, which focused primarily on administrative, military and 
technological measures (Choueiri, 1997).  
 
On a theoretical level, the divergence in economic performance prompted many 
observers to question the compatibility of Islam with the process of capitalist 
economic growth (Cummings et al, 1980).  Rodinson (1974), however, rebuts this as 
cultural reductionism in the ilk of Max Weber and others, who have tried to explain 
the politics and society of the Middle East by reference to some unchanging entity 
called 'Islam', typically characterised as instinctively hostile to capitalism.  Moreover, 
Wilson (1997: 115) points out that there ‗did not appear to be any conflict between 
Islam and material prosperity‘. On the other hand, the relationship of Islam with 
socialism, although only ‗tested‘ from the 1950s onwards, has also been uneasy, 
mainly due to the atheistic nature of the latter, although there is perhaps some 
overlap in the normative guidance for how humans should conduct themselves 
ethically within the economic arena, despite the permissibility of private ownership of 
the means of production in Islam. Islamic revivalism sought to overcome this 
dichotomy by (re-)constructing and invoking the sacred past, whilst Islamic reformism 
pursued a path that sought to address the relative ‗underdevelopment‘ of the Muslim 
world in terms of building economic and military power (Kuran, 1997; Choueiri, 
1997).  
 
However the continuing encroachment of the West led to further questioning as to  
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whether European progress was not only socio-economic in nature, but was based 
on an intellectual advance. ‗Retardation‘ entered the vocabulary of Muslim 
intellectuals (Choueiri, 1997).  
 
This claim of retardation appears to have a significant theoretical and ontological 
parallel in the theory of underdevelopment in mainstream development theory (see 
Chapter 3 section 3.3). Whilst there was no underpinning theory of imperialism or 
structuralism at the time, Muslim scholars were agreed upon the structural causes of 
retardation. Its causes were either deemed to be external Western corrupting 
influences, an internal lack of modernisation, or even, as Kuran (1997) claims that 
the economic and educational institutions of Islam were poorly suited to address the 
challenges of societies on the brink of early capitalism. The perception of retardation 
was exacerbated by attempts to counter the intellectual lead of the West, as Lewis 
(2002) posits: 
―For those known nowadays as Islamists or fundamentalists, the failures and 
shortcomings of modern Islamic lands afflict those lands because they 
adopted alien notions and practices. They fell away from authentic Islam and 
thus lost their former greatness. Those known as modernists or reformers 
take the opposite view, seeing the cause of this loss not in the abandonment 
but in the retention of old ways, and especially in the inflexibility and ubiquity 
of the Islamic clergy, who, they say, are responsible for the persistence of 
beliefs and practices that might have been creative and progressive a 
thousand years ago but are neither today. The modernists' usual tactic is not 
to denounce religion as such, still less Islam in particular, but to level their 
criticism against fanaticism. It is to fanaticism—and more particularly to 
fanatical religious authorities—that they attribute the stifling of the once great 
Islamic scientific movement and, more generally, of the freedom of thought 
and expression.‖ (Lewis, 2002:44) 
 
This all changed when Napoleon‘s army attacked the Muslim heartlands in 1798 and 
occupied Ottoman Egypt for three years. This brought the ideas of Enlightenment 
Europe and its technology to the Egyptian people (Rogan, 2009). The foundations of 
the European Enlightenment rejected the authority of religion in society, which was 
completely foreign to the Muslim population. Al-Jabarti, an Islamic theologian who 
lived in Egypt at the time, wrote disapprovingly of the French, calling them 
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―materialists, who deny all God‘s attributes‖ (c.f. Rogan, 2009: 62). However, the 
exposure of Egyptians to European ways would influence Muhammad Ali, the 
governor of Egypt, to look at the European example as a basis for modernising 
Egypt, setting a precedent for the rest of the Ottoman Empire, which in turn began to 
send officials to study in Europe. Some of the later sultans were even educated in or 
by Europeans. This created conditions for the ―gradual formation of a group of 
reformers with a certain knowledge of the modern world and a conviction that the 
empire must belong to it or perish‖ (Hourani, 1983: 43). 
However, the modernising approach has been not deemed a success, as Lewis 
(2002) argues: 
―Muslim modernizers—by reform or revolution—concentrated their efforts in 
three main areas: military, economic, and political. The results achieved were, 
to say the least, disappointing. The quest for victory by updated armies 
brought a series of humiliating defeats. The quest for prosperity through 
development brought in some countries impoverished and corrupt economies 
in recurring need of external aid, in others an unhealthy dependence on a 
single resource—oil. […] Worst of all are the political results: the long quest 
for freedom has left a string of shabby tyrannies, ranging from traditional 
autocracies to dictatorships that are modern only in their apparatus of 
repression and indoctrination.‖ (Lewis, 2002: 43) 
 
The next section will investigate the intellectual heritage that both Islamic and 
Western developmental approaches have created and also how traditionally Muslim 
societies have responded. 
 
4.7 Foundations of contemporary Islamic social theory: 
fundamentalism, modernism and traditionalism 
Even before the 1924 downfall of the Ottoman Empire and its regional equivalents, 
like the Indian Moghul Empire (which formally ended in 1857) and the West African 
Sokoto Caliphate (which was conquered by the British in 1903), Muslims have not 
only debated how Islam can be re-established but also how the Prophet Muhammad 
had established a state entity in the first place. This process is often broadly equated 
with political Islam or Islamism (Ayoob, 2008).   
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The concept of Islamism is dual and contested, not just because its supporters 
believe their views merely reflect Islam as a Deen that encompasses worship and all 
human affairs including politics rather than a narrowly defined Euro-centric 
understanding of it as a religion ofrfaith, but also because it posits a political role for 
Islam which is contested by some Muslim theologans. Esposito notes this dichotomy,  
pointing out that Islam is both and neither, althoughthe contrary idea that Islam is, or 
can be, he argues, apolitical is also a misrepresentation of Islamic philosophy 
(Esposito, 1997). Moreover, because of the absence of institutionalisation of religion 
and a clerical hierarchy, at least in the majority Sunni stream (Aly, 2007), parallels 
with the separation of church (mosque) and state are not appropriate. The 
relationship between Islam and political ideology is highly complex (Ayoob, 2008) 
and has given rise to a wide range of approaches within the Islamic revivalist 
spectrum, ―challenging the perception of a monolithic ‗Islamic fundamentalism‘ ‖ 
(Esposito, 1997: 3).  
 
Despite these complexities and the danger of oversimplification, a three-fold typology 
for Islamic revival has commonly been proposed (Husain, 1995, Choueiri, 1997, 
Esposito 1997): fundamentalism, traditionalism and modernism. Husain (1995) even 
proposes a fourth category, that of pragmatism, although he concedes that the aim of 
the latter is not essentially ‗Islamic‘ revival and nor are its proponents often 
considered to be inspired by Islam (Husain, 1995: 12) – in keeping with the definition 
of ‗Islamic‘ offered in the preceding section, the pragmatist approach will hence be 
ignored. 
 
The ideas of some of the most influential Islamic revivalist thinkers are outlined 
below. 
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4.7.1 Fundamentalist revivers 
The basis for an Islamic state was an issue that had long been considered by 
scholars of jurisprudence. They had not, however, seen a need to reconsider the 
issues for centuries at a time. Only when the Islamic caliphate was overrun by the 
Mongols had the scholar Ibn Taymiyah (1263-1328 CE) challenged existing 
methodologies and stressed the importance of Ijtihad (religious reasoning) in 
adapting to new circumstances. Interestingly, Ibn Taymiyah is seen by some as a 
reformer whilst others declared him an apostate (Philips, 1996: 111). Either way his 
writing had considerable influence on the development of both fundamentalist and 
modernist doctrines in the 18th and 19th centuries.  
 
One key response, which is seen as a type of revivalism (Choueiri, 1997), was to 
turn back to the ‗original‘ Islam, believed to have been propagated by the Prophet 
Muhammad and practised by the early generations of Muslims, the pious forefathers 
(Salaf-Us-Saliheen). Thus the influence of Ibn Taymiyah can be seen most clearly in 
the writings of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahab (1703-1792). The insistence on 
Tawhid, the unity of God, turned Wahabism into a religious reform movement (Aly, 
2007) at the time when the ruling Ottomans had fallen into political, military, and 
economic decline along with the religious authorities. The emergence of Wahabism 
is considered to have initiated Islamic revivalism, due to its insistence on the ‗sacred 
past‘. Initially it thrived on the Arabian peninsula, which was relatively isolated from 
the challenge of European political and industrial reforms that underpinned colonial 
expansion and put pressure on the Ottoman empire. Wahabism rejects the Taqlid 
(blind following) of the four major Sunni schools of Islamic law. Instead they prefer 
Ijtihad (legal reasoning) on the basis of a often literal interpretation of how the Salaf 
have understood the Qur‘an and the Ahadeeth, the reports of the sayings and 
actions of the Prophet. 
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Sayyed Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini (1902 – 1989) was the most influential 
philosopher and Marja (religious authority) in Shi‘ite Islam. He was a driving force 
behind the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which ousted the last Shah of Iran, Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi. Khomeini became Supreme Leader of Iran, and a powerful symbolic 
political figure. He was an innovative Islamic political theorist, whose most notable 
development was his theory of the ‗guardianship of the religious scholar‘ (Dabashi, 
2006). This theory was modified and incorporated into the 1979 Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. In his written work concerning governance entitled ‗Islamic 
Government: the Guardianship of the Religious Scholars‘ (‗Hokumat-e-Islami: 
Velayat-e-Faqih‘, Algar, 1981: 54), Khomeini based his political theory on the 
premise that the Shari‘ah contained the most superior form of guidance and should 
therefore govern all human affairs. It was essential then that the governing body of 
the country should have a sound knowledge of the Shari‘ah. The implication was that 
the country's ultimate ruler would have to be the religious scholar (Faqih) who 
surpassed all others in terms of knowledge of Islamic law and justice (known as a 
Marja), as well as having administrative ability. Hereditary monarchies and elected 
lay representatives were considered un-Islamic (Algar, 1981).   
 
Khomeini‘s ideas were clearly framed by both Islamic theology and post-colonial 
revivalist concerns. For fundamentalist revivalists, purity of theology is a primary 
concern. This is measured either by adherence to the path of the earliest Muslims 
(the ‗Salaf‘) or for the Shi‘a, directly guided by a Marja. Their vision of Islam is 
centred on the establishment of an Islamic state and on the comprehensive and 
rigorous application of the Shari‘ah (Husain, 1995). 
 
4.7.2 Traditionalist revivers 
Fundamentalists and traditionalists are often conflated because of their religious and 
social conservatism and condemnation of ‗Western‘ influences (Husain, 1995: 80), 
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but both theologically and ideologically, they have very little in common. A defining 
characteristic of traditional revivalists is their education and training in Islamic 
institutions such as Madrassahs and Dar-ul-Looms. A strong emphasis is placed on 
traditional learning and the preservation of beliefs, customs and traditions practised 
in the classical period of Islam as well as those of subsequent Islamic periods. 
―Traditionalists believe that Islam is not merely a set of abstract and utopian 
principles, but a comprehensive and living belief system that interacts with the 
historical and cultural traditions of devout Muslims‖ (Husain, 1995: 81).   The 
traditionalist strategy hence lies in the preservation of Islamic culture and tradition 
and incorporates local articulations such as Sufism, folk Islam, rejection of Ijtihad 
(legal reasoning) and strict adherence to Taqleed (strict following of one of the 
schools of jurisprudence) (Husain, 1995). Binder summarises the traditionalist 
position thus: ―To alter the decision that has been accepted for ages would be to 
deny the eternal immutability of God‘s law and to admit that earlier jurists erred would 
be to destroy the idea of the continuity of the divine guidance of the Muslim 
community‖ (Binder, 1963: 74).  
 
Deobandism is one such a traditionalist Sunni Islamic revivalist movement, which 
was founded in 1866 in Northern India by Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi. The 
Madrassah-e-Deoband continues to be an influential institution for training religious 
leaders on the sub-continent.  Deobandis follow the Hanafi school of thought, take a 
traditionalist approach to Islamic sciences and advocate a strict adherence to the 
Sunnah, particularly in respect to dress code and social custom. They advocate an 
emphasis on the Shariah and do not accept the criticisms of Islam made by the 
Kalam.  
 
Growing out of the Deobandi movement is the Tablighi Jamaat which originated in 
the Indian subcontinent in the 1920s. It is a significant apolitical movement that 
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promotes a grassroots missionary approach (Metcalf, 2004) and has millions of 
activists worldwide (Masud, 2000). This highlights the fact that an important part of 
the traditional revival is a disdain for political activism (Metcalf, 1982). Its leaders 
have generally remained apolitical and aloof from social movements other than 
traditional welfare institutions dealing with Awqaf (endowments) and the collection 
and distribution of Zakat (obligatory alms) (Husain, 1995: 84).  
 
4.7.3 Modernist revivers 
Modern Islamic philosophy has revived some of the trends of medieval Islamic 
philosophy, in particular the tensions between Mu'tazilite and Ash‘arite views on the 
place of rationality in forming ethical and legal codes (Leaman, 2002). But in the 19th 
century, another approach emerged that sought to incorporate European insights in 
order to modernise Islam. This modernist movement, which arguably began with  the 
Egyptian reformer Jamal al-Deen al-Afghani (1838 -1897), advocated free political, 
scientific and religious thought and set the agenda for a revival of rationalism 
(Leaman, 2002).  
In the 1820s, the Egyptian Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi spent five years studying in Paris 
(Cole, 2003). On his return he wrote about his experiences in Europe and translated 
numerous European works for a wider Arabic audience (Elmissiri, 1997). He admired 
Europe‘s technological and scientific innovation and political philosophy (Rogan, 
2009:86-88). He found much common ground between ‗the principles of Islamic law‘ 
and the principles of ‗natural law‘ and argued that the Shari‘ah should be adapted to 
meet the challenges of different circumstances (Hourani, 1983: 88). 
Al-Afghani‘s student Muhammad ‗Abduh (1849-1905) was trained in the traditional  
setting of Al-Azhar University in Cairo, but was exiled to Paris, where he publicly 
called for reform in the Muslim world, particularly Egypt. He published his primary 
philosophical treatise, ‗The Theology of Unity‘ (Risālat at-Tawhīd) in 1897, which 
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was, interestingly, primarily addressed to Western-educated people, both Muslims 
and non-Muslims. ‗Abduh rejected the closure of Ijtihad (jurisprudential reasoning) 
and the practice of Taqlid (blind following), arguing that that morality and law must be 
adapted to modern conditions for the common good (Maslahah). Reason, ‗Abduh 
held, enables humans to know good from evil, although understanding one‘s 
obligation to do what is right can only be known through God's revelation ('Abduh 
1966). This theory breaks with traditional jurisprudential approaches to assert that 
the Islam practiced by the righteous forefathers (Salaf-us-Saleh) was rational and 
practical, thereby promoting the idea of modernist Salafism. ‗Abduh therefore 
regarded Islam as anchored but adaptable, and considered it to be hampered by the 
rigid structures imposed by later generations.  
 
These most formative proponents of the modernist revivalist discourse were followed 
by another generation that was committed to modernity but did not see it uncritically 
as ‗Westernisation‘. The bearers of the new Islamic discourse had their intellectual 
formative years in the period of decolonisation of the Muslim world. ―This was the 
time when Western modernity had already entered the stage of crisis, and when 
many Western thinkers had begun to realize the dimension of this crisis and 
impasse. The bearers of the new Islamic discourse realized, from the very beginning, 
the darker aspects of Western modernity‖ (Elmissiri, 1997). Their modernisation 
approach was then guided by the effort to Islamise knowledge from within and 
Islamic economics were a prime example of this effort (Kuran, 1995). This is not to 
say that there were no substantive critiques of modernity.  
 
Contemporary Islamic thinkers such as Ziauddin Sadar (1977, 1987, 1999) challenge 
 the hegemony of the ‗West and point out the Euro-centric nature of the development 
project‘. Sardar (1987) in particular has proposed a range of alternative development 
models, although most are based on adaptations of existing approaches. 
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The Indian thinker and poet Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) promoted Islamic revival  
based on the ideals of social justice. He upheld traditional Islamic values such as the 
prohibition of usury, and criticised traditionalists for their abstract approach to Islam 
that had, in his view, little relevance for modern life (Husain, 1995: 105). He argued 
that dogma, nationalism and racism, all of which are roundly rejected in Islam, were 
causing disunity amongst the global Muslim community or Ummah. Iqbal admired Al-
Afghani‘s contributions (Husain, 1995: 105), and in his work ‗The Reconstruction of 
Religious Thought in Islam‘, advocated strongly for the political and spiritual revival of 
Islamic civilisations across the world, (Munnarwar, 1971). 
 
However, it is Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979) who is credited with creating 
modern Islamist political thought in the 20th century (Esposito 1997). He established 
Jamaat-e-Islami in India, and explained that the concepts of Khilafa (caliphate) and 
Shura (consultation) have to underlie a modern Islamic political system, coining the 
phrase an Islamic ‗theo-democracy‘ (Ahmad, 1978). Maududi argued that secular 
Western democracy, by giving Hakimiya (sovereignty) to the people, is not 
compatible with Islam where Allah is the only sovereign (Ahmad, 1978). The Shar‘iah 
and not man-made law should, in his view, govern all aspects of social, political and 
economic life.  
 
Whilst many of these characteristics might make Maududi appear to be a 
fundamentalist revivalist (Husain 1995), his political theory was actually modernist in 
that the Jamat-e-Islami accepted the principle of and contested democratic elections 
(Ayoob, 2008:66-73). The Jamaat-e-Islami vision upheld the implementation of 
Islamic law and rejected Western concepts such as capitalism and socialism. Initially, 
it was against the Pakistan movement to divide British India on the grounds of unity 
or Jama'ah, but changed its position in 1947 to support the establishment of an 
Islamic state in Pakistan (Ayoob, 2008:66). 
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Maududi preached a return to the past, but his teachings were underscored byan 
approach that Islamised ‗Western‘ social theory (Choueiri, 1997), particularly in the 
realms of politics and economics. Maududi‘s concept of a ‗theo-democracy‘ has been 
heavily criticised both from within Islam and outside it. Singled out for particular 
criticism was his argument that any Islamic polity must accept the supremacy of 
Islamic law over all aspects of political and religious life (Ahmad, 1976). His critics 
claimed that this was incompatible with democratic concepts such as the sovereignty 
of the people. However, Esposito and Voll (1996) argue that Islamic democracy does 
in principle rest upon concepts of consultation (Shura) and consensus (Ijma'), which 
are ultimately core democratic processes. 
 
It has also been asserted by some Muslim intellectuals that Islam embraces 
democratic values. This view is many times met with doubt and suspicion both from 
within and from the outside, as can be seen in the reponses to Islamic movements 
such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah. Esposito and 
Voll (1996), in their work ‗Islam and Democracy‘, question attempts to concretely 
define democracy, and assert that the very concept changes its meaning in different 
times and places. They argue that there can be many differing independent models 
of democratic government operating at the same time, and that these do not 
necessarily correspond to Western liberal ideals. They suggest that democracies do 
not have to follow a single model and can be successful within a liberal or socialist  
political system or religious system (Esposito and Voll 1996).  
 
Hassan El-Banna (1906 – 1949), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (Al Ikhwan al 
Muslimeen), modified ‗Abduh‘s theory of Salafism, calling for a return to ‗original‘ 
Islam. According to El-Banna, contemporary Islam had lost its strength and social 
impact because Muslims had adopted Western values and culture (Husain 1995: 53). 
The Muslim Brotherhood has become one of the most influential multi-national 
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political movements in the Islamic world. In many Arab countries it forms the largest 
political opposition group, with a groundswell of popular support for its vision to instil 
the Qur'an and Sunnah as the "sole reference point for ... ordering the life of the 
Muslim family, individual, community ... and state" (see the Muslim Brotherhood 
website4) and ultimately to re-establish a Caliphate or unified Muslim state. The 
Brotherhood is strongly opposed to Western colonialism and was instrumental in 
overthrowing the pro-western monarchies in Egypt and other Muslim nations during 
the early 20th century.  
 
Influenced by both El-Banna and Maududi, and regarded by Ayoob (2008: 66) as the 
most seminal of the Islamist ‗ideologues‘, is Sayyid Qutb. Qutb (1906-1966) was the 
key thinker behind the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 60s (Husain, 
1995). His extensive Qur‘anic commentary, ‗In the Shade of the Qur'an‘ (Fi zilal al-
Qur'an), contributed significantly to modern understanding of Jihad and the Ummah. 
He is perhaps best known for his work on the social and political role of Islam, 
particularly through his books ‗Social Justice‘ and ‗Milestones‘ (Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq). He 
wrote ‗Milestones‘ in 1964, calling for the restoration of Islam though re-
establishment of the Shari‘ah (Islamic law) by "physical power and Jihaad for 
abolishing the organizations and authorities of the Jahili system" (Qutb, 2003: 55). 
Qutb's political thought evolved considerably, largely in response to the increasing 
persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood by General Gamal Abdel Nasser. His later 
writings became the foundation for a school of thought referred to as ‗Qutbism‘, 
which is radically anti-secular and anti-Western. Qutb proposed a revolutionary 
strategy in which an Islamic vanguard should take control of the state and Islamise it 
from the top-down (Husain, 1995: 15). Although Qutb's political theory always 
centred on Islam as a complete system of morality, justice and governance, it is a 
matter of debate as to whether this revolutionary strategy and Islamic dictatorship 
                                                 
4 see for further details http://www.ikhwanweb.com/Article.asp?ID=813&LevelID=2&SectionID=116 
[accessed 21/08/08] 
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complies with the spirit of the Shari‘ah (Ayoob 2008). It appears rather to be born out 
of political necessity and survival under Nasser‘s military dictatorship, as Qutb was a 
vocal opponent of Arab nationalism and the Nasserite regime with its practices of 
arbitrary arrest and torture, to which he himself was subjected. As a result, he was 
eventually executed for allegedly plotting to overthrow the state.  
 
Within the Shi‘ite stream, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (1935-1980) was a prominent 
Iraqi modernist Shi‘a scholar, who developed detailed critiques of Marxism and 
presented ideas of an alternative Islamic form of government (Al-Sadr 1987). He 
disagreed with Khomeini‘s concept of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardian Jurist) and is 
credited with developing an Islamic-democratic system, referred to as Wilayat Al-
Umma (Governance of the People), overseen, but not ruled by, a body of Muslim 
scholars to ensure that all laws correspond with Islamic teachings. His most 
influential writing was called Iqtisaduna (‗Our Economics‘), one of the most important 
works to date on Islamic economics (Wilson, 1998). This work was a critique of both 
socialism and capitalism and it counter-constructed an Islamic economic paradigm 
His lasting contribution was in the field of Islamic banking, where his work still 
underpins the principles of modern Islamic banks in the Middle East (Wilson, 1998). 
 
4.8 Key characteristics of Islamic revivalism and its relationship to 
developmental thinking 
As demonstrated in the previous section, the challenges created by external military, 
economic and social influences led to range of responses by Muslim intellectuals. 
Encapsulated in the concept of Islamic revivalism, these ranged from searching for 
the ‗sacred past‘ to adapting to or adopting modernity. Based on the broad analytical 
categories provided by Husain (1995), table 1, overleaf, summarises the 
characteristics of the various revivialist approaches discussed and adapts them to 
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Table 1: Typology of Islamic revivalist thought pertaining to development, 
adapted from Husain (1995: 152-7) 
MAJOR 
CHARACTERISTIC 
 
Fundamentalists 
 
Traditionalists 
 
Modernists 
NORMATIVE BASIS Consider true Islam‘s immutability and 
perfection to transcend time and space.  
Very particular about 
placing all adopted 
popular and beneficial 
non-Islamic/foreign 
concepts, practices and 
institutions within an 
Islamic framework 
GOVERNANCE & 
LAW 
Islamic state governed by strict 
adherence to the letter and spirit of the 
Shari‘ah 
Revised Islamic legal 
system to cope with 
contemporary issues 
Sovereignty rests entirely with God Place popular sovereignty 
second to God‘s 
sovereignty  
 
PRINCIPAL 
REASONING ABOUT 
THE MUSLIM 
WORLD‘S DECLINE 
Colonialism and neo-colonialism. Disunity of the Muslim Ummah. 
Failure to adhere to the letter and spirit 
of Islam 
Too rigid and dogmatic 
adherence to Islamic 
teachings, lack of 
Islamised knowledge 
DEGREE OF 
FATALISM AND 
ACTIVISM 
Very fatalistic, but 
extremely active 
religio-political 
crusaders for 
Islamic 
fundamentalism 
Very fatalistic; 
often passive, 
apolitical, 
contemplative, 
and mystical 
scholars, 
teachers, and 
preachers of 
traditional Islamic 
doctrine and 
practice 
Minimally fatalistic, 
extremely dynamic 
reformers and 
modernisers of Islamic 
societies. Perceptive and 
astute politicians imbued 
with the vestiges of the 
spirit of Islam  
OPENESS 
TOWARDS CHANGE 
Strong opposition 
towards Taqleed 
and vigorous 
advocacy for 
Ijtihad through 
scholars on the 
basis of classical 
methodologies 
Firm adherence to 
Taqleed and 
support for 
customs and 
traditions. Total 
rejection of Ijtihad. 
Against Taqleed and all 
traditions that they 
consider to inhibit the 
progress of Muslim 
societies. Strong 
advocacy of Ijtihad for all 
knowledgeable Muslims 
POSITION ON 
PROGRESS 
Re-embracing the 
principles and 
practices of the 
pious forefathers  
Searching for the 
sacred past whilst 
conserving culture 
and customs 
Embracing and Islamising 
modernity 
POSITION ON 
POVERTY AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
Zakat and Awqaf 
as transnational 
welfare institutions 
for wealth re-
distribution in 
search for the 
transcendental 
Zakat and Awqaf 
as local welfare 
institutions for 
wealth re-
distribution in 
search for the 
transcendental 
Social activism and 
modern welfare 
institutions as instruments 
of social change 
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include concerns such as positions on fatalism, change, progress, poverty and 
development. In doing so this genealogical research provides a typology for the 
Islamic revivalist endeavour that particularly draws out the implications for Islamic 
development thinking.  
 
Whilst this typology of Islamic revivalists is simplified, it can, nevertheless, be useful 
as a tool through which a certain order can be brought to an otherwise confusing 
multiplicity of opposing positions. It can also help to determine analytical categories 
through which Islamic development thinking can be further investigated. This 
typology is instrumental to this study and will be used to aid the analysis of Islamic 
movements in Bangladesh in Chapter 5 and the approach taken by the Islamic 
development actor in the case study in Chapter 6. 
 
This typology also reflects the spectrum of ‗political technology‘ which is used as an 
instrument of bio-power (Foucault 1980, 1991) by framing the parameters of the 
different development discourses in Islam, as will be set out in the following sections. 
 
4.9 Assembling the archive:  a short history of Islamic thought 
pertaining to development  
Despite the considerable body of literature on Islamic social theory, there is no 
specific tradition or discipline that deals with what could be classified as 
‗development‘, although individual authors deal with the topic. The concern for 
change, as the previous sections have demonstrated, is primarily located in the 
concept of Islamic revival, which takes a range of forms. At the same time, the issues 
of economic growth, and, to some degree, poverty are extensively dealt with in the 
Islamic economics literature, although the term ‗development‘ does not feature 
prominently.  
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In order to further explore the foundations and re-construct an Islamic development 
discourse, this archive needs to venture into a range of related discourses. The 
following sub-sections discuss Islamic understandings of poverty and concepts of 
social justice and development, firstly with reference to Islamic scripture and then by 
reviewing selected sources drawn from a growing body of literature on Islam and 
socio-economic change. Ideas about poverty, redistribution of wealth and economic 
growth are explored. 
 
4.9.1 Common scriptural themes around poverty reduction 
The Qur‘an deals quite extensively with the topic of poverty, primarily from a moral 
perspective. In one of the earliest revelations, Surah Al-Mudathir (Chapter 74 ‗The 
Clothed One‘), a scene from the Day of Judgement exhorts believers to care for the 
needy, as those condemned to hell admit: ―We were not of those who prayed and we 
did not feed the poor‖ (Verses 43-44). In the Qur‘an, worship is regularly mentioned 
in connection with being charitable (Al-Qardawi, 1999), to such an extent that giving 
charity has been called ‗financial worship‘ (Benthall, 1999). Many of the early Makkan 
revelations deal with poverty reduction, through both charitable donations and the 
transfer of wealth, and also through advocacy on behalf of the poor: ―He used not to 
believe in Allah, nor did he urge the feeding of the poor‖ (69: 30-34). Exegetes of the 
Qur‘an interpret such verses in the light of an overall command to have solidarity with 
and mercy upon fellow human beings, beyond the act of securing their needs (Al-
Qardawi, 1999). The right of the poor to receive support and the duty of the rich to 
give are also expressed in a number of verses. In the Medina period of revelation, 
they became a mandatory act in the form of obligatory Zakat. 
 
After establishing the moral boundaries, the Qur‘an and Ahadith make a number of 
economic policy recommendations, the specificity of which has been debated. Wilson 
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(1997: 117) points out that over 1,400 of the 6,226 verses of the Qur‘an refer to 
economic issues, many of them in a highly specific manner, particularly in relation to 
trade, finance and inheritance, whilst Qureshi (1980: 563) argues that ―[b]eyond a 
few matters pertaining to inheritance and the prohibition of usury, the Koran does not 
concern itself with specific economic and political schemes.‖ This shows that there is 
not just debate, but also a considerable variety of interpretations about the purpose 
of the Qur‘an and how it is to be understood. As the typology of Islamic revivalism 
has indicated, a frame for interpretation already exists, which in Foucault‘s sense 
acts as an instrument of bio-power. Depending on where the interpreter is located 
within the orders of discourse, his or her interpretation might vary considerably.   
 
Neverthelss, the theme of a balance between poverty and wealth is clearly present in 
a number of sayings of the Prophet:  
(Narrated 'Aisha:) The Prophet used to seek refuge with Allah (by 
saying), "O Allah! I seek refuge with You from the affliction of the Fire and 
from the punishment in the Fire, and seek refuge with You from the 
affliction of the grave, and I seek refuge with You from the affliction of 
wealth, and I seek refuge with You from the affliction of poverty, and seek 
refuge with You from the affliction of Al-Masih Ad-Dajjal [the false 
Messiah]." (Sahih Bukhari Volume 8, Book 75, Number 387) 
 
(Abdullah ibn Umar reported that), as Allah's Messenger was sitting on 
the pulpit and talking about charity and abstention from begging, he said: 
―The upper hand is better than the lower one, the upper being the one 
which bestows and the lower one which begs.‖ (Sahih Muslim Book 5, 
Number 2253) 
 
Whilst begging is not recommended in the primary sources of Islam, even though the 
poor have a right to a share in the wealth of the rich, the tribulations of poverty are 
seen as severe, to such an extent that they may become a threat to an individual‘s 
belief. Other ahadith prescribe a solution in gainful work, with the Islamic authorities 
responsible for creating such opportunities if they are not available:  
 
―(Narrated Anas ibn Malik): A man of the Ansar came to the Prophet and 
begged from him. He (the Prophet) asked: Have you nothing in your 
house? He replied: Yes, a piece of cloth, a part of which we wear and a 
part of which we spread (on the ground), and a wooden bowl from which 
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we drink water.  He said: Bring them to me. He then brought these 
articles to him and he (the Prophet) took them in his hands and asked: 
Who will buy these? A man said: I shall buy them for one dirham. He said 
twice or thrice: Who will offer more than one dirham? A man said: I shall 
buy them for two dirhams.  He gave these to him and took the two 
dirhams and, giving them to the Ansari, he said: Buy food with one of 
them and hand it to your family, and buy an axe and bring it to me. He 
then brought it to him. The Apostle of Allah fixed a handle on it with his 
own hands and said: Go, gather firewood and sell it, and do not let me 
see you for a fortnight. The man went away and gathered firewood and 
sold it. When he had earned ten dirhams, he came to him and bought a 
garment with some of them and food with the others.  The Apostle of 
Allah then said: This is better for you than that begging should come as a 
spot on your face on the Day of Judgment. Begging is right only for three 
people: one who is in grinding poverty, one who is seriously in debt, or 
one who is responsible for compensation and finds it difficult to pay.― 
(Sunnan Abu Dawood, Book 9, Number 1637) 
 
The purpose of this section was to briefly introduce the scriptural discourse on 
poverty in Islam. There are many Qur‘anic verses and sayings of the Prophet 
Muhammad which establish a moral discourse around the issue of poverty and 
stress wealth transfer and re-distribution as a way of poverty alleviation, as 
well as favouring work over begging. The main vehicle utilised for wealth 
distribution is Zakat which will be discussed in the following section. 
 
4.10 Vehicles for redistributive justice: Zakat, Sadaqah and Waqf5  
The redistribution of wealth in the form of charitable giving is central to the Islamic 
faith and an obligation upon every believer, its importance highlighted by the term 
‗financial worship‘ used by Benthall (1999) in his exposition of Islamic charity. The 
basic mechanism for this is Zakat, which is held by the majority Sunnis to be a 
mandatory act of worship since the time when the Islamic state was established by 
the Prophet Muhammad in 622 CE. Many Qur‘anic verses revealed in Medina deal 
with the topic (Al-Qardawi, 1999). The word Zakat is mentioned in the Qur‘an thirty 
times in different contexts. It is derived in Arabic from the verb Zaka which means to 
                                                 
5 Parts of this section have been published in the author‘s Chapter (with Abdulfatah S. 
Mohamed) entitled: ‗Saudi Arabian NGOs in Somalia: ‗Wahabi‘ Da‘wah or Humanitarian Aid‘ 
in Clarke, G. and Jennings, M.,eds  (2008) Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based 
Organisations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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‗grow‘ and ‗become better‘; Zakat consequently means ‗purification of wealth‘ (Al-
Qardawi, 1999, p. xliii). This points to the dual purpose of Zakat as a religious 
purification for the rich whilst also providing some succour for the poor, needy and 
other groups.  
 
As noted above, in Islamic doctrine, Zakat is one of the ‗five pillars‘ for Sunni Muslims 
(Cragg, 1986). The majority of Muslim scholars hold that it must be given by every 
Muslim at the end of each year and is calculated at a rate of 2.5 per cent of any 
disposable wealth above a minimum amount called Nisab. There has, however,  
beenconsiderable debate, historically amongst Islamic jurists and contemporarily in 
Islamic economics as to the precise way of levying, collecting and distributing Zakat 
(Nienhaus, 2010), particularly in a world that is economically more complex than 
during early Islamic times. 
 
Beneficiaries of this obligatory charity are detailed in the Qur‘an, ―Zakah expenditures 
are only for the poor and the needy, and for those employed to collect [Zakah] and 
for bringing hearts together and for freeing captives and for those in debt and in the 
way of Allah and for the traveller - an obligation imposed by God and God is Knowing 
and Wise― (Qur‘an Surah 9, verse 60). In modern public finance terms this can be 
translated into the following expenditure headings (Kroessin 2008 a): 
 
- poverty reduction [absolute and relative],  
- administrative overheads for civil servants dealing with public welfare 
- peace-building and community cohesion 
- promotion of freedom, human rights and civil liberties 
- personal insolvency settlements  
- security and defence6 
- homeless, refugees and migrants. 
                                                 
6 Al-Qardawi mentions that ―in the way of Allah‖ is regarded by the majority of Islamic jurists as referring 
to jihad (Arabic for ‗struggle‘), although he argues that a contemporary interpretation could include state 
expenditure on defence (coupled with revenue from land tax, kharaj), or even financing the 
establishment of an Islamic state. He refers to cultural, educational and informational jihad, including 
da‘wah (Al-Qardawi, 1999, p. 427-28), which would suggest that jihad is not understood as a purely 
military struggle. 
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There is however, no consensus on poverty reduction as a priority over other 
categories. Kuran states: 
―[T]he Qur‘an says nothing specific about the division of resources among 
these categories. In principle, therefore some narrow segment of society 
could claim the majority of all Zakat funds. Another potential source of 
disagreement lay in the criteria for assigning people to one category or 
another. A disbursement rule that seems to have emerged under the fourth 
caliph Ali prohibited the use of one year‘s Zakat revenues in some 
subsequent year. Subsequently, at the end of the second Islamic century, the 
view emerged that each year‘s Zakat fund must be divided equally among the 
eight designated categories of expenditure.‖ (Kuran, 2003: 278) 
 
In the associated literature, which centres primarily around Islamic economics (see 
Zaman 2008), the doctrine of Zakat appears to be central to various Islamic 
approaches to poverty alleviation, reduction and/or elimination, a quasi poor tax 
(Nienhaus, 2010). Some believe (for example Iqbal and Khan, 1983) that there is 
significantly increased scope for the collection of Zakat in contemporary Islamic 
states, opening up scope for it to make a significant contribution to poverty alleviation 
that may be more effective than the redistribution and welfare systems used in 
modern states. Others (for example Kuran, 1995) are much more sceptical. They 
point both at historic and contemporary practice in Muslim countries (see Kuran 
2004, although this is beyond the scope of this study) but also, importantly at the 
underlying doctrine of Zakat. They argue that the problem lies not just in a number of 
simplifications and assumptions that Islamic economists have made around poverty 
(see section 4.10.2 for a discussion of the poverty narrative in Islam), but also in 
ascribing to Zakat a role that might not be the one that was ‗divinely intended‘. There 
is a range of interpretations about the role Zakat, ranging from the Shi‘a perspective, 
which does not hold it to be obligatory in the same way as Sunni Muslims do, to 
some Muslim scholars (Mattson 2003, Kuran 2003) who contend that the application 
of Zakat historically has not been uniform, has rarely been systematic and is  
sometimes even contentious within Muslim countries. In this context, Kuran states: 
―In view of this historical record, the current diversity in implementation is hardly 
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surprising. Nor is it puzzling that the contemporary literature on Zakat is riddled with 
inconsistencies and ambiguities‖ (Kuran, 2003: 276). On a more reconciliatory note, 
it could also be argued that ‗income and wealth distribution in this world are not 
important issues as believers are promised so much more in the hereafter‘ (Wilson, 
1997: 173)  
 
In addition to Zakat or Ushr, which is levied on agricultural produce, voluntary 
charity, in Arabic Sadaqah (meaning ‗ to give away‘ and ‗realising one‘s faith by 
action‘), is also strongly encouraged, based on many sayings of the Prophet 
Muhammad, for example ―Charity (Sadaqah) is due upon a person on every day that 
the sun rises‖ (Bukhari Volume 3, Book 49, Number 870). It is regarded as an act of 
individual devotion, in which charity is given directly to a destitute beneficiary (Al-
Qardawi, 1999). 
 
Other Islamic teachings stress particular seasons for giving, like the month of 
Ramadan, during which Muslims are expected to feed the destitute whilst fasting 
themselves. A special contribution called Zakat al-fitr also has to be made at the end 
of the fasting month, being sufficient food to feed one person in need or its monetary 
equivalent. Similarly, during the Hajj period, Muslims, whether performing pilgrimage 
or not, are expected to sacrifice a cow, goat or camel to feed the needy. Almsgiving 
therefore takes a central role in Islamic doctrine, as Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 
(2003: 15) underline: ―Islam is the only one of the three Abrahamic religions that 
explicitly urges the believer not only to be generous but also to persuade others to be 
charitable (Qur‘an, Surah 1077)‖.  
 
A further means of charity is the establishment of a ‗pious foundation‘ (Waqf, plural 
Awqaf) by endowment (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, 2003). The legitimacy of Waqf 
is derived in Islamic law from the Prophet‘s statement: ―When a person dies, his 
                                                 
7 Surah al-Ma'un (A Small Kindness):‖Have you seen the one who denies the Recompense? For that is 
the one who drives away the orphan, and does not encourage the feeding of the poor… .‖ 
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works come to an end, except for three: charity that continues to yield benefit, 
knowledge that continues to be useful, and a pious child that prays on one‘s behalf.‖8 
Waqf can be likened to the legal construct of a trust in perpetuity, since the Arabic 
means ‗tying up‘. Use of funds generated by a waqf can be utilised for all aspects of 
charity work, including construction of mosques, shelters, orphanages, refugee 
camps and hospitals, historically evidenced by many endowments remaining active 
today in Turkey and the Middle East (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, 2003).  
 
Projects established and funded through Zakat, Sadaqah or Waqf were made 
available to the needy in the wider population, although Zakat was restricted to those 
specified by the Qur‘an, as discussed above. This led to the establishment of a 
rudimentary welfare state (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, 2003). However, it has been 
argued that it was primarily the establishment of Waqf through private individuals 
which increasingly provided poor relief (Kuran, 2003), although some endowments 
were clearly motivated by the elites‘ desire to enhance their prestige and political 
influence (Shefer 2003). Either way, the redistribution of wealth, however organised, 
motivated and effective it is in practice, appears to be a cornerstone of the Islamic 
social policy discourse. Moreover, within the Islamic discourse on charity, the poor 
and needy are singled out, particularly through the articulation of the practices of 
Zakat and Waqf. Hence the next section offers a brief discussion of poverty 
definitions in Islam. 
 
4.10.1 Defining poverty in an Islamic context 
 
There is no unanimously agreed definition of poverty in Islam and various schools of 
jurisprudence have offered diverging bases for poverty conceptualisations and 
indicators.  
                                                 
8 Al Baïhaki, Shu`ab al-Iman, Hadith No. 3447, Vol. 3, p. 247. 
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As Kuran argues: 
 
―The jurists who shaped Islamic law during Islam‘s initial few centuries 
touched, of course, on such questions as to how poverty should be defined, 
who qualifies as needy, and the extent of a poor person‘s Zakat entitlement. 
But their answers did not create a consensus capable of channelling Zakat 
resources towards the poor.― (Kuran, 2003: 283) 
 
Interestingly, the Qur‘an mentions two categories of poverty: the ‗poor‗ (Fakir) and 
the ‗needy‘ (Miskin). There is considerable debate amongst Islamic jurists about the 
nature of the difference, whilst the orientalist Schacht, for example, held the opinion 
that the difference is arbitrary (Al-Qardawi 1999).  Whether and how much of the 
Zakat should be allocated to the first two groups mentioned in the Qur‘an is also 
debated:  
―That there were significant consequences resulting from favouring one of the 
definitions over the other becomes obvious when we see how jurists decided 
the amount of charity that the poor were to be given. In general, those who 
defined poverty as need did not place a momentary limit on this amount, 
since needs vary among individuals. On the other hand, jurists who defined 
poverty in absolute financial terms generally allowed no more than a specified 
amount of Zakat to be given to one individual. The majority of Sunni schools – 
the Malikis, the Shafi‘is, and Hanbalis – took the former position while the 
Hanafis took the later position.‖ (Mattson, 2003: 33) 
 
The Hanafi school of jurisprudence defines the poor person as one whose wealth is 
below the Nisab (i.e. the level at which Zakat becomes obligatory) or is consumed 
satisfying one‘s basic needs like shelter and clothing. The needy person does not 
have any wealth or property. This in many ways reminds one of the concept of a 
poverty line, a monetary definition of poverty that is commonly used in the 
mainstream development discourse (compare Chapter 3). However, the other three 
jurisprudential schools argue that the poor are those who are insufficiently endowed 
with means to satisfy their basic needs fully, whilst the needy completely lack the 
means to achieve their basic needs, which remain unfulfilled (Qardawi 1999: 345).  
Mattson (2003) also argues that the legal reasoning of the early jurists led to a 
practice where poverty was defined through status or conversely the loss of status 
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through external shocks, as is the case in important categories in the Islamic 
discourse of widows and orphans. The Islamic legal discourse had, Mattson 
contends, implications for addressing structural poverty, in which those who were 
born ‗poor‘ did not necessarily receive the same attention as those who fell into 
poverty:  
―Consequently the way in which Muslim jurists define need is significant not 
only for what this discourse tells us about distribution of charity but also what 
it tells us about possible limits to their vision of changing the world around 
them.‖ (Mattson 2003: 48) 
Other less legalistic and broader conceptualisations of poverty have focused on well-
being and the concept of the overall purpose of the Islamic Shari‘ah. In Islamic 
tradition, the Shari‘ah is seen as something that nurtures and protects humanity, a 
concept explored, for example, in the works of the 11th century Islamic philosopher 
Al-Ghazali (Watt, 1963). Well-being of humans is based on the fulfilment of 
necessities, needs, and comforts. The purpose of the law is to establish the best 
equilibrium between worldly affairs and the hereafter. A constant awareness of God 
and the Shari‘ah is held to be essential for believers, who have to educate 
themselves in the basic tenets of the latter and apply this knowledge for the benefit of 
society, including the economic order (Wilson, 1997). Rabbani (n.d.) expounds the 
purpose of the Shari‘ah as follows: 
―To ensure the establishment of religion, God Most High has made belief and 
worship obligatory. To ensure its preservation, the rulings relating to the 
obligation of learning and conveying the religion were legislated. To ensure the 
preservation of human life, God Most High legislated for marriage, healthy 
eating and living, and forbade the taking of life and laid down punishments for 
doing so. God has permitted that sound intellect and knowledge be promoted, 
and forbidden that which corrupts or weakens it, such as alcohol and drugs. He 
has also imposed preventative punishments in order that people stay away 
from them, because a sound intellect is the basis of the moral responsibility 
that humans were given.  Marriage was legislated for the preservation of 
lineage, and sex outside marriage was forbidden. Punitive laws were put in 
place in order to ensure the preservation of lineage and the continuation of 
human life. God has made it obligatory to support oneself and those one is 
responsible for, and placed laws to regulate the commerce and transactions 
between people, in order to ensure fair dealing, economic justice, and to 
prevent oppression and dispute. Needs and comforts are things people seek in 
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order to ensure a good life, and avoid hardship, even though they are not 
essential. The spirit of the Shari‘a with regard to needs and comforts is 
summed up in the Qur'an, ‗He has not placed any hardship for you in religion," 
(22:87) and "God does not seek to place a burden on you, but that He purify 
you and perfect His grace upon you, that you may give thanks‘ (5:6).‖ 
 
 
In this traditional Islamic definition, the objective of the Shari‘ah is the welfare of 
humanity, or more narrowly defined, the community of believers. Human needs 
define the foundations for good individual and social lives and are classified into 
three levels in a hierarchy, namely (1) necessities (Dharuriyyat); (2) convenience 
(Hajiat); and (3) refinements (Kamaliat) (Alhabshi, n.d. b). Necessities consist of all 
activities and things that are essential to preserve the five needs listed above at the 
barest minimum for an acceptable level of living. It is to be understood that, at this 
level, a person has enough to live on, although not necessarily in comfort. It has 
been suggested that necessities should include the ability to adhere to the way of 
God and perform the five pillars of Islam (belief, prayer, fasting, Zakat and 
pilgrimage, although for the latter the Shari‘ah stipulates an explicit exception if one 
does not have the means to undertake the Hajj); protection of life (we might include 
here access to health services); means of securing food, clothing, shelter, education 
and the right to earn a living, and to set up a family, etc. Much like other definitions, 
this implies that all the five foundations or needs must be fulfilled; that one need does 
not have priority over another, and if only one of the needs is unfulfilled, then a 
person is considered poor (Qardawi 1999).  
 
This Maqasid al Shari‘ah approach (Arabic: the purposes of the Shari‘ah), 
conceptualises and defines poverty in a broader socio-economic sense. Needs are 
defined as religion (Deen), life (Nafs), the mind (‗Aql), progeny (Nasl), and property 
(Maal) (Alhabshi, n.d. a). The Maqasid al-Shari'ah concept has been derived from 
the Qur'an and the Sunnah or inferred from these by a number of scholars (Chapra, 
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2008). Continuing along this line, the influential Islamic economist Chapra maintains 
that Islam emphasises all the ingredients of human-wellbeing, including the human 
self, faith, intellect, posterity, as well as wealth, for society to flourish (Chapra, 2008). 
For the Muslim world to focus on economic development  in the short term may, 
according to Chapra (2008), result in relatively higher rates of growth but in the long 
run will lead to a rise in inequities, family disintegration, juvenile delinquency, crime 
and social unrest. 
 
Chapra‘s (2008) views echo those of many Islamic economists and development 
thinkers who argue that well-being in Islam is based on human needs that cannot be 
reflected in monetary terms alone. This is based on a narrative that is counter-
constructed in Said‘s (1979) sense, as a response to the constructed ‗other‘ narrative 
of Western materialism (see section 4.11). How the central pillar of Zakat is linked to 
any operationalisation of the Maqasid approach to poverty alleviation, or vice versa, 
also remains largely un-addressed. 
 
Interestingly, the Maqasid al Shari‘ah approach also underlines the protection of 
religion, which in turn, it has been argued, entails the protection of the community of 
the believers as a socio-political entity (Chapra 2008 a), whilst maintenance of life 
suggests the inclusion of food, shelter and medical care. This clearly is important in 
terms of how poverty is understood in Islamic discourse. It is interesting to note that 
basic needs as discussed above are, in this conceptualisation, not exclusively 
material and hence lending itself to a comparison with the concept of poverty as a 
multi-dimensional issue (Alkire, 2009).  
 
In discourse analytical terms, however, one would be hard-pressed to construct this 
as a case of intertextuality, since there is no indication that various texts and their 
interpreters have engaged in an exchange of ideas. The Maqasid approach not only 
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underlines the Islamic understanding of poverty as a phenomenon that is multi-
dimensional, but also essentially transcends the physical world with a concern for 
well-being in the ‗hereafter‘. 
 
Problematically, Islamic economists and development thinkers have neither referred 
to the multi-dimensionality of poverty nor have they developed comparable poverty 
indicators to measure it. In fact, whilst acknowledging the centrality of Zakat as an 
important religious category, the contemporary Islamic discourse hinges on it without 
discussing it in a substantive manner outside the realm of Islamic jurisprudence.  
 
As has been pointed out by the range of Muslim and non-Muslim commentators 
selected in this section, poverty alleviation, including and beyond the material 
dimension of human existence, plays a central role in Islam. Therefore, it is to be 
expected that a more or less continuous discourse exists that underpins this 
contention, which will be explored in the following section.  
 
4.10.2 The Islamic poverty narrative 
The issue of poverty clearly seems to be central to Islamic teachings, particularly due 
to the juxtaposition of poverty and disbelief in Islamic moral and theological doctrine, 
as illustrated in one of the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad quoted above. This is 
also underlined by the role of the ‗poor‘ as one of the key recipients of Zakat, one of 
the five pillars of the religion, been expounded in the previous sections. A historical 
snapshot offered by both traditional and modern Islamic historians such as Nawawi 
(died 1278), Ibn Kathir (died 1373) or Mubarakpuri (b. 1942) (1996) and Western 
historians of Islam such as (Watt 1953 & 1956) Lewis (2003) or Bonner (2005) 
underlines the centrality of the theme of poverty. Mubarakpuri (1996) points out that 
even after the Prophet Muhammad‘s emergence as a statesman and political leader 
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his focus remained transcendental and did not result in his accumulating wealth. 
These historical accounts lead us to believe that the Prophet was poor, whilst some 
of his companions were amongst the richest merchants of Makkah and Medina. 
However, his mass appeal appears to have been to the poor and oppressed 
(Mubarakpuri, 1996). Bonner underlines that, ―[p]overty was clearly of considerable, if 
not central, importance for early Islam itself‖ (Bonner, 2005: 392). Nor does the 
Prophet‘s political mission seem to have focused on empire-building or dynastic rule: 
many Islamic institutions evolved under later leaders and the greatest territorial gain 
was made under the second caliph, ‗Umar Ibn Al Khattab (584-644 CE), when the 
Islamic state expanded to Persia and North Africa (Madelung, 1997).  
 
The poverty narrative, therefore, appears to have been strong from the onset and in 
addition early Islam made a range of socio-economic propositions that added to, or 
underscored, its appeal to the impoverished masses (Farooq, 2008).  However, 
despite the high moral position of wealth re-distribution and the practical relevance of 
poverty alleviation in early Islam, ―poverty as a challenge requiring a systematic 
solution is not as prominent a theme or issue in general in subsequent Islamic 
discourses‖ (Farooq, 2008: 42). This is interesting, especially in the light of the 
argument that ―an ‗economy of poverty‘ prevailed in early Islamic theory and practice‖ 
(Bonner (2005: 392). It would appear that later Islamic discourses have romanticised 
the early prophetic traditions and to great degree the examples of the caliphates of 
Umar ibn al Katab and Umar Ibn Abdul Aziz when poverty was claimed to have been 
eradicated, evidenced by the claim that no recepients for Zakah could be found in 
Muslim heartlands (Farooq, 2008). A closer, more critical historical look at the 
poverty narrative (see for example Cahen 1968; Sabra 2000, Lapidus 2002) 
emphasises that Islamic historical sources are scant and focus primarily on elites, 
that is, the rulers and scholars of Islamic societies (Sabra 2000). The claim of the 
eradication of poverty under the early caliphs Umar ibn al Khatab and Umar Ibn 
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Abdul Aziz also needs both substantiation and contextualisation: the centre of the 
Islamic rule, the city of Medina, had a limited population yet was awash with war 
booty from the recent conquest, as a large proportion of its citizenry had enrolled into 
military service. The rule of these caliphs, hence, was in a period of rapid expansion 
of the Islamic state and the inability to find eligible recipients for Zakat, the only 
poverty indicator used in these historical accounts, leads to a distorted picture of the 
effectiveness of early Islamic poverty reduction strategies that relied heavily on 
distribution of wealth acquired through military campaigns (Farooq, 2008).  
 
This historical narrative, arguably based on the spontaneous and unsustainable 
redistribution of wealth during historic times, appears to have fed the current Islamic 
discourse on poverty reduction. However, without deeper social historical analysis 
that is notably absent from the discourse, as Farooq (2008) contends, contemporary 
Islamic theoretical attempts to derive a systematic poverty reduction strategy remain 
a victim of this romaniticised and oversimplified narrative. Farooq further claims that 
―the field of Islamic economics has not quite picked up and focused on the challenge 
of poverty. Indeed, if the contemporary literature is any indication, poverty as an 
independent theme seems to have been ignored‖ (Farooq, 2008: 43). This claim will 
be more closely investigated in the next section. 
  
4.11 Islamic economic and development thought 
Within the Islamic discourse, Islamic economics is readily identified as the body of 
knowledge that spans across the concerns for the alleviation, reduction and/or 
elimination of poverty and development. Islamic economics is conceptualised as a 
moral economy. Zaman (2008, cf. Shafi (1979)) demonstrates this position: 
―Economic progress is desirable for man and the earning of a halal livelihood 
is required after the religious requirements. At the same time it is equally self-
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evident that in Islam the fundamental problem of man is not economic, and 
economic progress is not a goal or objective of life for humans.‖  
 
Whilst as Zaman and Asutay (2009) argue, in Islam the subject matter of economics 
should be seen as a means to an end and not an end in itself, it can also be argued 
that Islamic economics has itself taken on the status as un-debatable expert 
knowledge and hence, vis-à-vis Foucault‘s concept of bio-power (Foucault 1980, 
1991), is ‗political technology‘. In this sense it frames the parameters of the 
development discourse in Islam and offers pre-agreed solutions, such as Zakah, 
Awqaf and the prohibition of Riba, that define what is acceptable. 
 
The very emergence of Islamic economics has been explained and even advocated 
due to Islam‘s challenge against injustice, exploitation, inequality and deprivation. 
The basis for this advocacy is presented with reference particularly to the Islamic 
prohibition of interest in financial transactions and the institution of Zakat (Farooq, 
2008). However, as the previous section has demonstrated, some of the rhetoric and 
Islamic social history can only be brought into harmony with considerable difficulty 
and this disharmony between ethics and practice presents something of a 
discontinuity in the Islamic discourse in the Foucauldian sense. As Farooq points out,  
―…  the field of Islamic economics has not quite picked up and focused on 
challenge of poverty. Indeed if the contemporary literature is an indication, 
poverty as an independent theme seems to have been ignored. For example, 
as much as the issue of development and growth are mentioned in the 
pertinent Islamic literature, focused attention to or studies of poverty is rather 
absent.‖ (Farooq, 2008: 43) 
 
For example, a number of key bibliographies including ‗Muslim Economic Thinking: A 
Survey of Contemporary Literature‘ (1980) with 700 entries and the 221-page 
‗Islamic Economics: Annotated Sources‘ (1983) have not a single reference to 
‗poverty‘ (c.f. Farooq, 2008: 43). This gap has been addressed to some degree in 
later volumes such as ‗Islamic Economic Institutions and the Elimination of Poverty‘ 
(2002), which was published, like the previous works, by the UK-based Islamic 
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Foundation, but they do not represent a paradigm shift away from the rhetoric around 
and assumptions made about Zakat. This gap in the literature underlines the 
discontinuity in dealing with the theme of poverty within the Islamic discourse. 
 
To investigate this discontinuity, some light ought to be shed on the advent of Islamic 
economics and its key proponents. Islamic economics is in many ways a new 
discipline. This is primarily because, whilst Muslim scholars of the past did 
differentiate between religious (Ibadat) and worldly (Mu‘amalat) affairs, the realm of 
social sciences was dominated by Islamic jurists (Nienhaus, 2000). The latter 
adjudicated on the permissibility of human actions within the historical context of the 
practice established by the example of the Prophet Muhammad, rather than 
exploring new avenues for social or economic change. This is to be particularly 
appreciated in the context of the intellectual battle of the proponents of Taqleed 
versus those of Ijtihad, which would have appeared to be have been won by the 
traditionalist and jurists, despite many examples, such as the medieval Islamic 
scholar Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), who is considered by some to be the father of 
economics and of the social sciences in general (see Boulakia, 1971). In his most 
famous work, al-Muqaddima, Ibn khaldun sets out a historiography of the world 
known to him and analyses advancement and decline in human civilisation ('Umran).  
The central point around which his observations are built and to which his researches 
are directed is the study of the causation of political, social and economical decline 
(see Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1999). 
After a long hiatus, the mid-20th century saw a rapid growth of literature that deals 
explicitly with economics from an Islamic perspective (see also Zaman, 2008). 
Although some in the past (see Nienhaus 1982 a) have argued that there is no such 
thing as ―Islamic economics or an Islamic economic order since, in the final analysis, 
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aspects have only been taken over and combined which are by no means specifically 
Islamic but could just as well have originated in other cultural regions‖ (Nienhaus, 
1982 a: 81), it has now to be regarded as established that it is not necessary for an 
‗Islamic‘ system to create completely new realisations for certain types of orders. 
However, it is essential that the rationale on an Islamic economic system has a 
convincing Islamic content, comparable to the way it is agreed that Catholic social 
teachings are essentially ‗Christian‘ (Nienhaus 1982 a). 
 
The desire for an Islamisation of deeply secular disciplines like economics became a 
priority during post-colonial struggles in the Muslim world (Chapra, 1985). Nienhaus 
(2000) underlines the utopian character of the early works: 
 
―In the early years of Islamic economics, from its origins in the 1950s until the 
1970s, much study was devoted to the construction of ‗ideal worlds‘. That 
these models were superior to the imperfect reality of Western socialist and 
capitalist systems, not to mention the real existing systems of the Islamic 
world, is neither surprising nor methodologically relevant.‖ (Nienhaus, 2000: 
96)  
 
Kuran (1997), moreover, views the birth of Islamic economics as a means of creating 
a distinct identity for Muslims in the absence of any tangible political entities, with 
Islamic economics being regarded by the proponents of Islamic political movements, 
such as Maududi, as only the first step in an Islamic revival that will ultimately lead to 
the (re-) establishment of an Islamic state (Khalifat). 
 
Islamic economics in practice is adiverse body of work, even though,  
―[t]he proponents of Islamic economics tend to create the impression that only 
one Islamic economic system exists and that this is uniform, final and closed. 
In point of fact, the reverse is true. Islamic economists, in both theory and 
practice, comprise a wide variety of positions on important questions such as 
the permissibility of certain banking transactions, the ideal social security 
system and the type and levels of taxation in the Islamic state. […] Thus the 
term ‗Islamic economics‘ represents a broad spectrum of differing positions.‖ 
(Nienhaus, 2000: 86-87) 
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Nienhaus, a leading analyst of Islamic economics and finance, goes further and 
offers some help to categorise the diversity in Islamic economic thought: 
- Utopian approach: based on a systematisation of Islamic economic ethics into 
an ‗Islamic system‘ without developing theoretical economic models 
- Recitative approach: based on orthodox legal thought, collating references 
from Qur‘an and Sunnah relating to economic life, that could constitute an 
Islamic economic ethic 
- Adaptive approach: ‗modernistic‘ interpretation of Islamic sources and 
adaptation to ‗Western‘ economic theory  
- Pragmatic approach: based on mainstream theoretical economic models and 
not backed by a comprehensive and consistent ‗Islamic‘ worldview 
(Nienhaus: 1982 a: 87-88) 
 
This four-fold typology9 is helpful, especially as it echoes the typology offered for the 
analysis of Islamic revivalism (compare section 4.8). The utopian approach here 
corresponds to the fundamentalist methods that seek to establish a utopia based on 
the sacred past, whilst the recitative harks back to the approach of traditionalists in 
their quest to preserve traditional customs and ethics, and the adaptive to the 
modernists‘ objective of adapting Islamic values to contemporary challenges. As with 
the typology for revivalism, it is important to recognise that these are not so much 
distinct categories, as to some degree fluid positions on a broad and 
multidimensional spectrum. In practice, there is in the Islamic economic discourse a 
particular overlap between the utopian and the adaptive approaches. Both typologies 
also hint at the difference in epistemology that has underscored Islamic philosophy 
from the outset (see section 4.5), with the adaptive/modernist approach harking back 
to the Mutazilite position that allows for a less rigid interpretation of Islamic law. 
                                                 
9 The pragmatic approach is not factored into the author‘s reconstruction of the Islamic 
discourse since, as has been argued, it is not essentially ‗Islamic‘ but only instrumentalises 
certain aspects of Islam in furtherance of other objectives. 
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As sketched out above, the utopian/fundamentalist - adaptive/modernist Islamic 
revivalism was led by thinkers in the Indian sub-continent, including Abdul ‗Ala 
Maududi, and in the Arab world by Hassan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb – the founding 
fathers of the Muslim Brotherhood, who contrasted Islam with the dominant politico-
economic systems of capitalism and communism. The idea of Islamic economics 
was especially popularised by Maududi (1970), the founder of the Pakistani Jamaat-
e-Islami movement, who regarded himself as a staunch defender of Islamic culture 
against the corrupting influence of the West. This set the tone for later developments, 
as Islamic economics came to be seen as a means of establishing Islamic authority 
in an area where Western, particularly UK and US influences, were dominant (Kuran, 
1995).  Chapra argues accordingly: 
―Muslim countries have […] tried to pursue so far the development strategies 
provided by Western development economics. Development economics, 
however, does not have a separate identity of its own. It has been conceived 
within the secular and this-worldly perspective of both the market-system and 
socialism. Their problems have, however, been aggravated and when 
Muslims tried to implement Western development strategies, they moved 
further and farther away from the realisation of maqasid.‖ (Chapra 1993: 9) 
 
In counter-constructing knowledge against perceived Western intellectual 
domination, many Islamic economists stress that, according to Islamic theology, 
humankind is seen as a trustee of all worldly God-given resources. Ahmad (1978: 
14), for example, identifies two key principles, ―first, the optimal utilisation of 
resources that God has endowed to man and his physical environment, and, 
secondly, their equitable use and distribution and promotion of all human 
relationships on the basis of Rights and Justice.‖  
 
Therefore most Islamic thinkers on economics insist that Islamic theology espouses 
a distinct strategy for development (e.g. Ahmad, 1976, 1978, 1994; Chapra 1993, 
2000, 2008; Iqbal, 2002; Nomani and Rahnema, 1994; Qureshi, 1980; Ragab, 1980). 
This development strategy, according to Ahmad (1994), is comprehensive in 
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character and includes moral, spiritual and material dimensions, with development 
being a goal and value-oriented activity devoted to the optimization of human well-
being in all these areas. Zaman and Asutay (2009) follow this argument further and 
describe development as a multidimensional activity: 
―As efforts would have to be made simultaneously in a number of directions, 
the methodology of isolating one key factor and almost exclusive 
concentration on that would not work. It should be noted here that the mistake 
of neo-classical economics has been this isolated analysis of economic 
activity by exogenizing other dimensions of real life. However, as opposed to 
such an exogenized world-view, Islam seeks to establish a balance between 
different factors and forces, and as such all of them would have to be 
harnessed and mobilized, Hence, Islamic political economy represents an 
interactive and intersected paradigm in which all these forces that determine 
real life are endogenized in a multidimensional integrated model.‖ (Zaman & 
Asutay, 2009: 81) 
 
Upon closer examination of the main body of this literature - particularly in the light of 
the above typology - it is evident that the understanding of development embodied in 
it is primarily based on Keynesian or neo-liberal economic models focusing on 
macro-economic stability and economic growth (Farooq, 2008). The nature of the 
literature produced is thus primarily ‗adaptive‘, with ―a serious and even imitative bias 
towards conventional economics‖ (Farooq, 2008: 44). Whilst the pioneering efforts by 
the likes of Maududi clearly set a more utopian agenda, the second generation of 
pioneering Islamic economists such as Khurshid Ahmed, Umer Chapra or Monzer 
Kahf , who have dominated the field for over 40 years, have aimed to bridge the gap 
between utopia and adaptivism in Islamic economics. Due to the increasing role that 
the adaptive approach has played, the demands on the second and particularly the 
third generation of Islamic economists, such as Munnawar Iqbal or Habib Ahmed, 
has primarily centred on applying conventional economic knowledge in an Islamic 
setting. As Farooq (2008) pointed out, this coupled with the time and place of the 
training of these Islamic economists, has led to a covert dominance of American 
1980s neo-liberal economic thought in contemporary Islamic economics, which 
concerns itself still with ‗Islamic‘ articulations of taxation, savings, investments, 
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markets and trade liberalisation (see for example Chapra 1993, Iqbal & Khan 1983, 
Iqbal 2005). As a result, in this literature, development is primarily defined as 
economic growth. 
 
The mainstream adaptive Islamic economic literature, however, still remains 
underscored by some of the early utopian approaches, which express themselves in 
a number of dimensions: 
 
- As a counter-construction to Western materialism, with its perceived primary 
focus on improving the material welfare of human beings, Islamic economists 
argue about the importance of spiritual and moral considerations as 
determinants of human welfare, which has found expression in for example 
the Maqasid approach (Chapra 1993, 2008).  
 
- The individual social-reformist approach emphasises normative aspects of 
Islam regarding the enjoinment of the good and abjuring evil. In the economic 
arena, this implies a particular set of ethics. ‗Homo Islamicus‘ avoids waste 
and ostentation, promotes generosity, discourages harmful externalities, 
works hard and also exchanges using fair prices (Kuran, 1986; Chapra, 
1992). Homo Islamicus is allowed to acquire property, but is banned from 
speculating, gambling, hoarding and destructive competition.  
 
- The systemic-reformist approach emphasises the need for holistic change. 
Ahmed, a leading Pakistani Islamic economist and Jamaat-e-Islami politician, 
underlines that ―the primary norm in an Islamic society is the elimination of 
crime, the establishment of morality and the protection of private property, not 
economic progress‖ (cf Qureshi, 1980: 571). Hence for the utopian 
modernistic Islamic economists, an Islamic conceptualization of processes 
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related to development mainly focuses on creating a just and moral social 
and economic system, free from all kinds of exploitation (Molla et al 1988).  
 
As Nienhaus (1982 a, 2000) has pointed out, the primarily utopian nature of most 
Islamic economic thinking still remains dominant and there has been very little 
progress in terms of translating the normative nature of Islamic ethics pertaining to 
economic activity into a coherent Islamic economic model. The utopian view 
continues to thrive within a broader Islamic historical narrative that regards Islamic 
economics as a means of re-creating what is referred to the Golden Age of Islam, as 
discussed previously, and has led to the attempted institutionalisation of an Islamic 
economic system in Pakistan, Sudan and Iran. Across the wide spectrum of Islamic 
economists, however, all these attempts are regarded as failing, for a range of 
reasons that reflect the shortcomings of the above approaches (Nienhaus, 2000).  
 
It has also been noted by, for example, Chapra (1992) that the ‗political factor‘ is one 
of the most important reasons responsible for the failure of Muslim countries to 
implement an Islamic strategy for development with justice.  Whilst it is to be 
expected that Islamic development approaches are underpinned or complicated by 
real politik in the Muslim world, the key issue is that a coherent and consistent 
Islamic development model remains absent.  
 
Any attempts to formulate an Islamic development model, such as Zaman and 
Asutay‘s (2009) relatively recent one, have remained rudimentary and primarily focus 
on religious dimensions, such as Tawheed (the oneness of God) and Ihsan 
(excellence), which are extrapolated and projected into the socio-economic sphere 
without actually addressing or resolving the question as to where the concern for 
‗development‘ originates within an Islamic ontological and epistemological 
framework. 
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The discourse, moreover, has since the late 1980s and early 1990s begun to focus 
on Islamic finance, which has become an area of incredible growth not only as an 
academic concern but also as an industry, even in the non-Muslim world. Because 
the micro-economically focused demands of Islamic banking and finance are not as 
epistemologically, methodologically or theoretically challenging as the development 
of an Islamic macro economic theory and model, they have opened up a field in 
which adaptive and pragmatic Islamic economists can thrive.  
 
This is not to argue that the theological basis for Islamic finance is weak, in fact the 
opposite is the case due to the strict prohibition of unethical business practices in the 
Qur‘an and the Sunnah. For example the Qur‘an states: 
 
―O ye who believe! Observe your duty to God and give up what 
remaineth (due to you) from usury, if you are (in truth) believers.‖ (Surah 
2, verse 278) 
 
Thus it is the very nature of money that Islamic economics views differently from 
mainstream economics. According to Harper‘s interpretation, the Qur‘an emphasises 
that 
―Money is seen not as the property of individuals, nor of the state, but as 
belonging to the community at large. Idle funds are subject to swingeing taxes 
for the benefit of the poor, so that people are encouraged to put their money 
to work by investing it in productive ventures‖ (Harper, 1994). 
 
The underlying ethical principle behind Islamic finance is therefore arguably the 
elimination of exploitation within the socio-economic sphere, in particular by not 
guaranteeing a usurious return on loans given, regardless of whether the finance has 
actually yielded a monetary benefit for the borrower (Al-Jahri, 2003). The main 
principle of Islamic finance is to ensure Shari‘ah compliance through the absence of 
what could be seen as usury. The Arabic term used is Riba (meaning ‗growth‘), 
which is explicitly forbidden in the Qur‘an, although there is considerable debate 
between those who argue it is best understood as usury (Kuran, 1995) due to the 
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practices predominant in pre-Islamic Arabia or actually refers to any interest (Ahmad, 
1976, 1978; Chapra 1993, 2000; Iqbal, 2002). In principle, therefore, the majority of 
Islamic finance is constructed around various ways of sharing equity or profits, credit 
purchase and/or leasing (Al-Jahri 2003). The principle is that an Islamic bank cannot 
only be a financier but must also be a partner in business, jointly sharing profits and 
absorbing losses with the entrepreneur. The system essentially involves sharing of 
risk between the owner of capital and an entrepreneur, as well as sharing the result 
of collective efforts. The main Islamic financing arrangements are either deferred 
sales contracts (Murabaha), profit sharing investments (Mudaraba) or business 
partnerships (Musharaka) (Zaman, 2008), although in a more philanthropic form, 
interest-free loans, called Qardh-ul-Hassana in Arabic, are also given. The technical 
terminology of Islamic banking and finance is ‗political technology‘, used as 
instruments of bio-power (Foucault 1980, 1991) that constitute what is acceptable, or 
in this case Halal (allowed), despite considerable disagreement within the Islamic 
economics sector about the application of Islamic financing principles (see El Gamal, 
2006) 
 
A number of Islamic economists have argued that Islamic modes of finance have the 
ability to provide capital for the poor without putting an inequitable burden on them 
(e.g. Iqbal, 2002). In the rural finance and development context, Islamic micro-credit 
is being utilised by Islamic development agencies such as the Islami Bank, which 
acts as a single telling case study in Chapter 6. Such services usually consist of the 
full range of Islamic financing methods, but the most commonly used transaction is 
based on the Murabaha principle (Yusef, 2004), in which the micro-finance agency 
purchases goods at the request of the borrower and then sells them to the latter for a 
mark-up fee to cover administration costs.  
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After three decades of practice, a lot of criticism has also been levelled against 
Islamic financiers and banks alike. The different Islamic financing modes are seen in 
different lights by Muslim and non-Muslim observers, Islamic economists of various 
ilk and industry-insiders, ranging from a smoke screen or legal trickery (see El 
Diwany, 2003) to the ideal form of equitable finance (see Tag el Din, 2002). 
Particularly the practice of Murahaba-labelled mark-up finance, which arguably 
imitates the economic function of interest in all but name (Nienhaus, 2000: 91), has 
been heavily criticised.  The critics from within are often drawn from the ranks of the 
fundamentalists/utopians, whose Islamic philosophical and epistemological position 
leads them to believe that the adaptive/modernist approach is flawed. They argue 
that contemporary Islamic financial products merely aim to replicate in ‗Islamic‘ form 
the functions of contemporary financial instruments, markets and institutions (El 
Diwany, 2003), and therefore, arguably fail to serve the objectives of Islamic law (El 
Gamal, 2006). 
 
Moreover, despite the global boom in Islamic finance, ―what has become apparent is 
that most Muslims are less influenced in their economic behaviours by Islamic rules 
such as the prohibition of interest […] than had been assumed in earlier models of 
ideal systems‖ (Nienhaus, 2000: 96). This might also be due to the fact that the 
mark-up financing techniques are,  
―unlikely to promote development in the Islamic world. Because the difference 
between mark-up financing and interest-based transactions is legal rather 
than economic, this approach has little to offer in terms of macro-economics, 
i.e. efficiency and stability, or with respect to equity and development. 
Western observers and Islamic economists alike are critical of the often 
careless  use of the adjective ‗Islamic‘. For them, it should mean more than a 
interest-free in a legalistic sense. They point to the danger of conservative 
legal experts using Islamic labels to sanction capitalist banking practices, in 
which case Islamic economics and Islamic banking are no more than an 
ideological veneer for a dogmatic adherence to the status quo.‖ (Nienhaus, 
2000: 91) 
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Some Islamic economists have since concluded that Islamic economics has failed, 
either epistemologically, methodically or in its focus, and needs to be geared up to 
meet the challenge of poverty and development (Kahf, 2003; Farooq, 2008). 
Moreover, whilst Islamic economic thinking has been overshadowed by an 
unprecedented growth in Islamic financial institutions in the Middle East and 
especially the Gulf States, it is still being viewed with considerable suspicion in many 
other more secularly oriented Muslim countries due to the Islamic utopian nature of 
the project. The next section will set out the policy approaches favoured by 
contemporary transnational Islamic development actors and the tension that these 
might create. 
 
4.12 Contemporary Islamic development policy approaches and 
articulation of practice 
From the late 1950s to the 1970s, the Muslim world, particularly the Middle East, was 
gripped by political turmoil and military conflict that had a major impact on geo-
political stability amid the ensuing oil crisis. In particular, the struggle between ruling 
monarchies and revolutionary forces espousing secular pan-Arabism, led by Gemal 
Abdul Nasser, was regarded by the conservative Islamic forces, embodied by the 
Saudi leadership, both as a challenge to its claim of Islamic leadership, based on 
being the custodian of the holy sites in Makkah and Medina, and as an existential 
threat. By embracing pan-Islamism, Saudi King Faisal could counter the idea of pan-
Arab loyalty centred around Egypt with a larger transnational Islamic loyalty centred 
on Saudi Arabia (Al-Rasheed, 2002). Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan (2003) also 
emphasize the Saudi dynasty‘s fear of Gaddafi‘s rise to power in 1969.The ensuing 
competition for moral-spiritual authority and political leadership in the Islamic world 
between Arab socialism/nationalism and pan-Islamism led to the establishment of a 
number of pan-Islamic institutions and organisations.  
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Against this backdrop, initiatives around Islamic economic and political co-operation 
(Nienhaus, 1982 a) were driven forward and in turn drove the demand for a coherent 
‗Islamic‘ model of primarily economic development.  
 
4.12.1 Transnational Islamic development co-operation 
The Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), founded in 1960, which 
is not an Islamic organisation, but is nevertheless dominated by the large oil-
producing countries of the Muslim world, was seen during the oil crises of the 1970s 
as ―Allah coming to the assistance of His ‗chosen people‘ ― (Husain, 1995: 216). 
OPEC's influence over the oil market has been used for political purposes, 
particularly when Arab members threatened the use of the ‗oil weapon‘ in the conflict 
with Israel, although this backfired a later stage when petro-dollar loans followed by 
rising interest rates triggered the debt crisis in the developing world, many 
inhabitants of which are Muslims (El Gamal and Jaffe, 2009) 
 
The Muslim World League (MWL, or Rabita from Rabita al-Alam al-Islami) was set 
up in Makkah in Saudi Arabia in 1962 as a first attempt by Muslim religious and 
political leaders from 22 countries to create a representative body for Muslims. Sunni 
Saudi Arabia funds most of its work and has dominated its leadership. It has also 
been argued that the main role of the MWL was intended to counter the 
hegemonisation attempts of pan- Arab nationalism by providing a counter-hegemonic 
formation in the form of pan-Islamism (Husain, 1995: 211).   
 
The Muslim World League focuses primarily on religious education and propagation 
but also, through its welfare wing, on humanitarian or development issues. It has 
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eight different bodies with various functions ranging from welfare, and Qur‘an 
memorisation to Islamic jurisprudence10: 
 
This was then followed by an inter-governmental vehicle for pan-Islamic political 
leadership in the form of the ‗Organization of Islamic Conference‘ (OIC)11, which was 
set up in Rabat, Morocco in 1969 with Saudi King Faisal‘s strong encouragement 
and is now headquartered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. It currently includes 57 states in 
the Middle East; North, West and Southern Africa, Central and Southeast Asia, 
Europe, the Indian subcontinent (excluding India) and South America, most of which 
are majority Muslim countries or have large Muslim minorities. It is the second largest 
international organisation after the United Nations, to which it has a Permanent 
Delegation. Whilst the OIC was founded as a vehicle for Islamic unity and solidarity 
based on the concept of Ummah (community of believers), in practice it is weak and 
fragmented (Husain 1995: 212).  The incorporation of member countries which range 
from dictatorships and monarchies to fledgling democracies reflects the width and 
breadth of Islamic discourse and the range of positions that can be identified on this 
spectrum, including the revivalist typology discussed above, with its implications for 
how Islam should be understood and implemented. 
 
Subsequently, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB)12 was founded by the first 
conference of OIC Finance Ministers in 1973 as the primary multilateral development 
financing institution in the Muslim world. It is also located in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia 
and became operational in 1975. The purpose of the Bank is to foster the economic 
development and social progress of both member countries and Muslim communities 
in non-member countries through the implementation of Shari'ah compatible financial 
                                                 
10 See http://www.themwl.org/Home.aspx?l=en for further details 
11 See http://www.oic-oci.org/home.asp for further details 
12 See http://www.isdb.org for further details 
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practices such as loans, leasing, instalment sales and equity participation13. The IDB 
Group‘s Strategic Framework (see Box 1 below) outlines its ambitious plans: 
Box 1: ‘IDB Group Strategic Framework’  
Vision  
To be the leader in fostering socio-economic development in member countries and 
Muslim communities in non-member countries in conformity with Shariah.  
   
Mission  
The IDB Group is committed to alleviating poverty; promoting human development; 
science and technology; Islamic economics; banking and finance; and enhancing 
cooperation amongst member countries, in collaboration with our development 
partners.  
   
The core values, referred to with the acronym PRIDE, are as follows:  
 Performance excellence in all activities and in dealing with its clients and partners.  
 Responsiveness (responding to clients' needs with focused and forward-looking 
approach based on review of performance, reflection on improvement and resolve to 
offer the best)  
 Integrity (demonstrating a high level of sincerity, honesty and fairness)  
 Dedication in serving clients with dignity and determination supported by creativity 
and initiative.  
 Empowerment of staff and concerned entities with responsibility, authority and 
teamwork.  
   
Objectives 
In this regard, the following three major strategic objectives have been identified to 
drive forward the Group actions.  
 Promotion of Islamic financial industry and institutions  
 Poverty alleviation  
 Promotion of cooperation among member countries  
available online, http://www.isdb.org/irj/portal/anonymous?NavigationTarget=navurl:// 
ce439edcffd3e1f4524ecdf06c454a1e [accessed 02/03/11] 
 
Interestingly, the IDB‘s top objectives of promoting Islamic financial industry and 
institutions, trumps its secondary objective of poverty alleviation, despite the fact that 
alleviating poverty and promoting human development are listed first in the IDB‘s 
mission. This might be indicative of the way the internal discourse has been ordered 
or is being re-ordered, mirroring the changing orders of discourse within the field of 
Islamic economics, which, as noted above, is now clearly dominated by banking and 
finance.  Interesting also are the core values, which neatly make up the acronym 
                                                 
13 See 
http://www.isdb.org/irj/go/km/docs/documents/IDBDevelopments/Internet/English/IDB/CM/Ab
out%20IDB/Articles%20of%20Agreement/IDB_Articles-of-Agreement.pdf for further details, 
[accessed 02/03/11] 
 - 159 - 
‗pride‘, and are perhaps reminiscent of the main objective of Islamic revivalism, i.e. to 
re-establish the leadership of the Muslim world, or possibly are just a reflection of the 
political technology of ‗management-speak‘. 
 
In development financing terms, the IDB is also ineffective, or rather unequipped to 
―rectify the poles separating the rich Muslim states from the poor― (Husain, 1995: 
213). Its wider Islamic co-operation and development mission is undermined by 
national interests when rich donors try to attach conditionalities to loans, which are 
often rejected by the IDB and lead to more exclusive bi-lateral relationships to the 
detriment of trans-national Islamic co-operation (Husain, 1995 214) 
 
In Islamic discourse, the establishment of the IDB is one of the very few occasions, 
on which the term ‗development‘ was used as a signifier. Because of the near total 
absence of the term in the preceding Islamic discourse, it can be assumed that it was 
used primarily as a tool to link the IDB to the other regional development banks such 
as the African or Asian Development Banks, thereby gaining legitimacy and authority 
both globally and amongst the adaptively-minded economic and political elites in the 
Muslim world.  
 
The IDB is driven by its own charter, the ‗Articles of Agreement‘, which recognises 
the following key principles:  
 
- foster the well-being of the peoples of the Muslim countries and achieve 
harmonious and balanced development on the basis of Islamic principles and 
ideas 
- promote and strengthen co-operation among members in the economic, 
social and other fields 
- mobilise financial and other resources from within and outside member 
countries for the promotion of domestic savings and investment and a greater 
flow of investment funds into member countries (IDB, 1973: 2) 
 
The language of these key paragraphs in the IDB ‗Articles of Agreement‘ strikes a  
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clear chord with the mainstream development policy terminology of the time, 
particularly the idea of balanced growth, savings and investment, whilst the condition 
of Islamic ideas and principles appears to be referring to an adaptive approach in 
Islamic economic policy.  
 
The late 1970s and early 1980s saw a number of high-level pan-Islamic conferences 
on economic and political co-operation, including one in London in 1977 dealing with 
―The Muslim World and the Future Economic Order‖ sponsored by the Islamic 
Council of Europe (Nienhaus, 1982 a). This led to a further conference sponsored by 
the International Institute of Labour Studies of the ILO in Paris in 1980 on ―Islam and 
the New International Economic Order: The Social Dimension‖. A number of 
influential diaspora Muslim civil society organisations, religious leaders and 
representatives of some Muslim countries resolved to: 
- create a clearing house for economic information from the Muslim world 
- establish an Islamic institute for research and education to reduce 
technological dependence on the West 
- promote increase in food production 
- establish an Islamic reserve fund for investment and development financing  
 
But, as Nienhaus argues, the resolutions were not original and one could find similar 
positions expressed by the ‗Third World‘, especially the so-called Group of 77, albeit 
without the word ‗Islamic‘ (Nienhaus, 1982 a: 89). Attempts at Islamic economic co-
operation were characterised by a wider approach advocating collective self-reliance, 
reminiscent of the development policy prescriptions of the dependency movement 
(see Chapter 3.3.) or even by the European Economic Union model that early Islamic 
economists had sympathy for (Nienhaus, 1982a: 90).  
.  
Moreover, these attempts at formulating policy for economic co-operation must 
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primarily be understood in the light of the utopian endeavour that Islamic economics 
represents to a good degree against the backdrop of ‗real politik‘ in the Middle East 
and the wider Muslim world. The most utopian attempt is perhaps the Universal 
Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (see Box 2), which has considerable economic 
policy content: 
Box 2: Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights 
XV The Economic Order and the Rights Evolving Therefrom 
a) In their economic pursuits, all persons are entitled to the full benefits of nature and 
all its resources. These are blessings bestowed by God for the benefit of mankind as 
a whole. 
b) All human beings are entitled to earn their living according to the Law. 
c) Every person is entitled to own property individually or in association with others. 
State ownership of certain economic resources in the public interest is legitimate. 
d) The poor have the right to a prescribed share in the wealth of the rich, as fixed by 
Zakah, levied and collected in accordance with the Law. 
e) All means of production shall be utilised in the interest of the community (Ummah) 
as a whole, and may not be neglected or misused. 
f) In order to promote the development of a balanced economy and to protect society 
from exploitation, Islamic Law forbids monopolies, unreasonable restrictive trade 
practices, usury, the use of coercion in the making of contracts and the publication of 
misleading advertisements. 
g) All economic activities are permitted provided they are not detrimental to the 
interests of the community (Ummah) and do not violate Islamic laws and values. 
XVIII Right to Social Security 
Every person has the right to food, shelter, clothing, education and medical care 
consistent with the resources of the community. This obligation of the community 
extends in particular to all individuals who cannot take care of themselves due to 
some temporary or permanent disability. 
 
 Source: Islamic Council of Europe, 1980 
 
 
The prescriptions made in the Universal Islamic Declaration very obviously come 
from the major traditional textbooks of Islamic social theory and economics that have 
been previously discussed, although the reference to ‗means of production‘ is an 
instance of inter-textuality, being a concept borrowed from socialist discourses. 
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Moreover, the Universal Islamic Declaration, albeit formulated in 1980s by the now 
disbanded Islamic Council of Europe, still holds true for the state of Islamic economic 
policy, which continues to date to be an uneasy mix of utopian, recitative and 
adaptive approaches.   
 
This uneasiness is further underlined by the absence of any articulation of practice in 
the Muslim world that comes anywhere near to the translating the norms of Islamic 
social theory into a comprehensive, enforceable and enforced legal and policy 
framework. In the 1980s, Nienhaus argued that the empirical picture of experiences 
of Islamic economics in action in Pakistan, Sudan or Saudi Arabia raised 
considerable questions about its strength as a development paradigm, ―[t]o date 
Islamic economics has contributed precious little to an ‗Islamic economic policy‘ 
(Nienhaus, 1982 a: 98). 
 
The 1995 Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI)14 does not offer much 
more than the previous document, apart from the fact that it has been ratified by the 
member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). It is, however, 
no more than an overview of the Islamic perspective on human rights, including 
economic rights (see Box 3 below), acts as guidance only and affirms Shari'ah as the 
sole source of rights.  
Box 3: Excerpt from the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam 
ARTICLE 13 
Work is a right guaranteed by the State and Society for each person able to work. 
Everyone shall be free to choose the work that suits him best and which serves his 
interests and those of society. The employee shall have the right to safety and 
security as well as to all other social guarantees. He may neither be assigned work 
beyond his capacity nor be subjected to compulsion or exploited or harmed in any 
way. He shall be entitled - without any discrimination between males and females - to 
fair wages for his work without delay, as well as to the holidays allowances and 
promotions which he deserves. For his part, he shall be required to be dedicated and 
meticulous in his work. Should workers and employers disagree on any matter, the 
State shall intervene to settle the dispute and have the grievances redressed, the 
rights confirmed and justice enforced without bias. 
                                                 
14 available online http://www.oic-oci.org/english/article/human.htm  [accessed 01/03/11] 
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ARTICLE 14 
Everyone shall have the right to legitimate gains without monopolization, deceit or 
harm to oneself or to others. Usury (riba) is absolutely prohibited. 
 
ARTICLE 15 
(a) Everyone shall have the right to own property acquired in a legitimate way, and 
shall be entitled to the rights of ownership, without prejudice to oneself, others or to 
society in general. Expropriation is not permissible except for the requirements of 
public interest and upon payment of immediate and fair compensation. 
 
(b) Confiscation and seizure of property is prohibited except for a necessity dictated 
by law. 
Source: Organization of the Islamic Conference, 1995 
 
Again, the articulation of human rights practice in the Muslim world is at best 
contentious and, given the political reality, very few avenues exist to hold the duty 
bearer to account. 
 
Perhaps in continuation of the theme of responding to external pressure, the IDB 
(2006) formulated a new strategic plan (‗Vision 1440H: A Vision for Human Dignity‘) 
that sets out its future priorities:  
- internal reform 
- poverty alleviation 
- promotion of health 
- universal education 
- prosperity for people 
- women‘s empowerment  
- expansion of the Islamic finance industry 
- IDB member country economic integration 
- Improving the image of the Muslim world 
 
In this ‗Vision for Human Dignity‘, apart from the aim of promoting the expansion of 
the Islamic finance industry, the other strategic priorities sound embedded in the 
mainstream development discourse, even though the language used is Islamised, 
when for example the main document refers to women as ‗sisters‘ (IDB, 2006: 32). 
 - 164 - 
While the poverty focus appears to talk some of the more recent mainstream 
development terminology on board by making, for example, reference to ‗well-being‘ 
(IDB, 2006: 24), otherwise it is unclear how poverty is defined. References to hunger, 
malnutrition, illiteracy, disease etc make it appear that these are different from 
poverty. The main motive for the thrust of alleviating or eliminating poverty - it is not 
clear which is aimed for as the words are used interchangeably - also remains the 
regaining of dignity and esteem for the Muslim world (IDB, 2006: 24), which clearly 
harks back to a notion of revivalism.  
 
The claim that poverty alleviation strategies work best when they are integrated with 
national development strategies (IDB, 2006: 25) is also reminiscent of the adaptive 
approach that introduced neo-liberal orthodoxy, such as the trickle-down effect (see 
Chapter 3), into Islamic economic thought. This is then, not unsurprisingly, linked to 
the key elements of political technology in Islamic economic thinking such as the 
potential of the institutions of Zakat, Awqaf and Sadaqah to alleviate poverty, 
concluding with a rueful sentiment that ―their potential has not been fully tapped‖ 
(IDB, 2006: 25). 
 
Whether this ‗Vision 1440H‘15 can be made a reality remains to be seen but on 
evidence of the policy recommendations made in the document, it does not represent 
new Islamic development thinking. 
 
4.12.2 Muslim civil society and development 
Although, further statements have been produced by various conferences hosted by 
the OIC, the transnational discourse on development in Islam would have seemed to 
be at a quasi standstill, were it not for the work of a range of Islamic civil society 
                                                 
15 Written in the Islamic 1427 after Hijra, the emigration of the Prophet to Medina, which 
corresponding to 2006 of the Christian era means the target year would be 2019. 
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organisations that emerged in the Muslim world but also importantly in the west.  
Primarily due to the dispersion of Muslims across the globe, a number of 
international NGOs have sprung up, which are collecting Zakat and Sadaqah in 
Muslim (and increasingly non-Muslim) countries and are distributing it around the 
world. Since their beginnings in the 1980s, most modern Islam-inspired or Muslim-
run development organisations, such as Islamic Relief, the Aga Khan Foundation or 
the International Islamic Relief Organisation, have assembled budgets ranging from 
tens to hundreds of million dollars per annum. Their concerns encompass charitable, 
humanitarian, welfare and long term development work. With some notable 
exceptions, not much organizational literature exists that explains the extent to which 
Islamic theological principles are translated into the operations of modern non-
governmental organizations working towards poverty eradication (Krafess, 2005). 
However, some recent studies by Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan (2003), Benthall 
(2006) and Petersen (2011) provide further insights into the operational philosophy of 
such organisations. They shed light on the very small operational differences 
between Islamic and mainstream NGOs, primarily to be found in programmes for 
interest-free micro-finance, orphan care or food distribution on the occasion of 
Islamic festivals (Benthall, 1999). These Islamic organisations and their associated 
practices are underpinned by ‗Western‘ mainstream development thinking, with 
organisations such as the UK-based Islamic Relief having successfully 
‗developmentised Islam‘ (Petersen 2011). Their staff are equally comfortable talking 
about the MDGs and about Zakat. Their sources of funding have also considerably 
shifted towards a greater reliance on international donors rather than on the 
collection of traditional Islamic charity (Kroessin, 2009).  
 
The previous sections have described the evolution of the development discourse by 
way of assembling an archive from which the overall narrative is constructed. The 
next section will conclude the genealogical analysis and will provide a summary of 
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the key discursive elements of and the order of discourse within the Islamic 
development discourse. 
 
4.13 Key discursive turns in the Islamic development field 
This section provides a short history of Islamic thought pertaining to development. It 
has to be stressed that the Islamic moral narrative about poverty remains central and 
vibrant within the Islamic discourse vis-à-vis the central pillar of Zakat. Zakat is, by 
way of Foucauldian bio-power, the socially accepted way of addressing poverty, both 
discursively and in practice. There are, however, considerable disharmonies and 
discontinuities, particularly around the issue of poverty as a social reality in the early 
days of Islam and in the contemporary Muslim world and the failure to date of Islamic 
economics to formulate an epistemologically and methodologically coherent 
development paradigm. In spite of claims that Islamic economics offers an alternative 
development model underpinned by an alternative worldview and ethical foundation,  
most attempts to formulate Islamic development policy remain either utopian or 
flawed in as far as they adapt conventional economics rather than being distinctively 
‗Islamic‘. Despite these considerable shortcomings and the fact that Islamic 
economics remains ‗rhetoric‘, the Islamic discourse around poverty reduction and 
development remains vibrant in the policy literature of Islamic trans-national 
organisations such as IDB. This, however, is primarily done through an adaptation to 
and adoption of conventional concepts from the field of development studies. 
 
As with the genealogy of mainstream development in Chapter 3, this narrative is 
subjective, based on the author‘s assembly and reading of the archive. The resultant 
genealogy reflects this but also is geared towards answering the question that 
underlies this doctoral study, namely to identify assumptions that drive the 
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relationship between the mainstream and alternative discourses at the antagonistic 
frontier in the selected policy-making context. 
 
Figure 3: A genealogy of the Islamic development discourse‘ seeks to provide a 
graphical illustration of the archive assembled and analysed in the previous sections, 
identifying particularly the key discursive turns. In common with the mainstream 
discourse there is a strong concern for poverty.  
 
 
Figure 3: A genealogy of the Islamic development discourse 
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This concern, which is closely associated with economic and social development, 
has been continuously present in Islamic legal and social discourses from early Islam 
onwards. Through the doctrine of Zakat, a normative concern for the poor remains 
enshrined in Islamic discourse, although Islamic economic thought has by and large 
ignored the need for systematic study of the symptoms and causes of poverty.  
 
As opposed to the mainstream discourse, in the Islamic discourse the term 
development does not feature in any epistemologically clearly Islamic dimension. 
The term ‗development‘, and possibly a concern for it, is absent from both the early 
19th century literature on Islamic social teachings and the early post-colonial Islamic 
economic writings. 
 
It only appears in the late 1970s and then either as an organisational signifier as in 
the case of the Islamic Development Bank, or in economic terms shadowing the 
dominant neo-liberal paradigm of the time, the concerns of which gained entry into 
the Islamic economics discourse in an Islamised form.    
 
It appears, as reflected in Tripp‘s (2006) analysis that Muslim intellectuals were 
forced to think in new categories, as the example of the notion of development within 
Islamic thought, emerging with revivalist thought, demonstrates:  
―The changes that they [Muslim intellectuals] were experiencing demanded 
not simply a new vocabulary of description and analysis, but new ways of 
imagining the very world itself. In particular, the social world, in the sense of 
the variety of human relations, required new ways of thinking about 
boundaries in space, function and status, with all of this implied for identities 
and for human potential. In order to achieve this, those involved in the project 
drew upon a repertoire of seemingly analogous terms of reference from the 
rich tradition of Islamic jurisprudence and ethics. This constituted an alphabet 
of appropriation, providing a readily understood and ethically acceptable 
resource that could be used selectively to meet the challenges of the age. […] 
The terms deployed came with a dual legacy. There was the meaning 
conferred upon them in the works of jurisprudential scholarship and 
commentary over thirteen centuries. But there were also the meanings they 
took on when applied to forms of behaviour and organisation that had been 
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unimaginable to those whose definition of them had located them within a 
distinctively Islamic tradition over the centuries.‖  (Tripp, 2006: 194)      
 
The way the term ‗development‘ suddenly appears in the Islamic discourse in the mid 
twentieth century demonstrates this argument. Most important for the genealogy of 
development in Islamic thought, therefore, is the discontinuity of the very issue of 
development since it is absent in the foundational philosophical discourses which 
also do not deal with the related issue of progress in the materiall as opposed to the 
transcendental world. Only the realisation of ‗retardation‘ or ‗underdevelopment‘ in 
the late 19th century (here not used in reference to dependency theory) creates a 
concern for change, expressed in the notion of Islamic revival. Development as a 
term in the discourse of Islamic economics might therefore be regarded as an 
‗irruption‘ in the Foucauldian sense, although it only features irregularly and 
importantly, in genealogical terms, discontinuously in a discourse that still primarily 
speaks of growth. 
 
Islamic economics, the prime vehicle for Islamic revivalism, has considerably 
matured from its purely utopian roots but, apart from a tremendously growing global 
Islamic finance industry, it has not produced a coherent programme for development 
or poverty reduction. Whilst both terms remain dominant within the Islamic discourse, 
they are used primarily or even in some areas exclusively rhetorically rather than 
denoting a clearly Islamically inspired articulation of practice. To date the Islamic 
discourse, dominated by the adaptive Islamic economics approach (see figure 3), 
remains stagnant and circular, unable to break with its utopian foundations and 
adaptive methodology. 
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4.14 Conclusion  
This genealogy has attempted to provide an overview of the basic tenets of belief 
and practice in Islam that form the foundation for concepts relevant to the 
mainstream development discourse and themselves form an Islamic development 
discourse locked between utopia and pragmatism. It is clear that there is no single 
Islamic understanding of ‗development‘. Muslim social theorists, who might be 
broadly categorized as ‗traditional‘, ‗fundamentalist‘ or ‗modernist‘, all agree on the 
transcendental nature of Islam, which is focused on the ‗hereafter‘. This world is thus 
seen as a tool and extremely diverse opinions exist in the various Sunni and Shi‘a 
schools of thought as to how societies and economies ought to be constructed to be 
most conducive to realising the ultimate transcendental objective.  
 
A notion of underdevelopment or backwardness emerged in Muslim thought only in 
response to Western economic and political dominance and the rampant colonization 
of the Muslim world. Recent Muslim economic and political thought and practical 
responses mainly focus on the creation of a just and moral economic and social 
system, based on a holistic conception of human wellbeing that has both religious 
and material dimensions, although there is great debate within Islamic circles about 
how to achieve this and responses are often counter-constructed to a perception of 
what ‗Western‘ models look like and appear to be doing. The political technology of 
Islamic economics is expressed through a set of parameters such as Zakah, Awqaf 
and the prohibition of Riba, which frames the development discourse in Islam and 
offers pre-agreed solutions through issues that define what is acceptable.This 
vocabulary of Islamic economics has asserted a status as un-debatable expert 
knowledge and, hence, vis-à-vis Foucault‘s concept of bio-power (Foucault 1980, 
1991) discipline the development debate within Islam. 
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In particular Islamic economics seeks to demonstrate how Muslim countries and 
financial institutions can achieve economic growth and poverty reduction through 
Shar‘iah compliant policies and mechanisms. However, while Islamic economists 
advocate a religious rather than secular motivation for achieving economic 
development and insist that Islamic theology espouses a distinct strategy for 
development, their conceptualisations of economic growth and management are not 
dissimilar to those of mainstream economics, with the exception of their rejection of 
interest and advocated reliance on charitable giving to generate funds for poverty 
reduction. The contradictions inherent in the Islamic discourse, between its richness 
in social ethics and the historical and social reality in the Muslim world, remains the 
most striking characteristic of the Islamic development discourse, which will be 
further explored in the context of development policy in Bangladesh in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
CONTEXTUALISING THE DEVELOPMENT FIELD IN BANGLADESH: BETWEEN 
A PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC, THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS AND POLITICAL 
ISLAM 
 
5 Introduction and purpose 
 
 
In pursuit of the question as to how discourses ‗frame‘ meaning-making, this doctoral 
thesis has explored some theoretical debates and assumptions competing for 
influence and legitimacy in the mainstream and Islamic development fields. The 
focus has been on the ‗global‘ or macro structures, such as the overall topics and the 
schematic organisation of the relevant discourses as a whole, offered in the form of 
the genealogies of mainstream and Islamic discourses pertaining to development in 
Chapters 3 and 4. This chapter will explore, vis-à-vis critical policy analysis and 
critical discourse analysis (see the methodological discussion in Chapter 2), the 
'local' meso structures of the discourses in the development policy field in 
Bangladesh. 
 
This chapter will assist in locating and contextualising the players in the Bangladeshi 
development field, some of which will be discussed in more detail in the micro level 
case study in the following chapter. Importantly, the institutions and texts that make 
up the development field in Bangladesh will be identified in order to analyse their 
discursive relationship or possible antagonistic frontiers between discourses.   
 
5.1 The development field in Bangladesh 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a description of what constitutes the 
development field in Bangladesh by exploring a range of its components and actors. 
In doing so, this chapter situates and elucidates the development field in 
Bangladesh, providing the contextual backdrop for the case study in the following 
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chapter.  The methods of analysis applied to the development policies discussed in 
this chapter are driven by the framework for critical discourse/ policy analysis 
outlined in Chapter 2, the most relevant aspects of which will be recapped and 
further elaborated as part of this chapter.  
 
Based on the concept of field (see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, described in 
Chapter 2), this analysis approaches the development field as a metaphorical entity, 
a socially-framed location, where the development ‗game‘ is played according to 
certain rules.  
 
In seeking to estimate the boundaries and actors in the development field in 
Bangladesh, a ‗charcoal sketch‘ (Chouliaraki and Fairclough‘s (1999: 99) has been 
drawn, based on the key assumptions and discursive turns identified in Chapters 3 
and 4. The diagram (Fig 4) and will act as a guide, although not in a deterministic 
manner, for the exploration of the development field in Bangladesh.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: ‘Charcoal sketch’ of anticipated discursive relationships in the 
development field in Bangladesh  
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As the above charcoal sketch demonstrates, it is assumed that the development field 
in Bangladesh is constituted by a number of competing discourses, which is referred 
to as orders of discourse.  
 
In deciphering the rules of the field lies the access to understanding the power 
relationships between different actors across different but also within the same 
discourses. This order of discourse is of particular importance to this study since it 
investigates the struggle of mainstream and alternative discourses to achieve and 
maintain hegemony. The next section provides a brief historical contextualisation of 
the development field in Bangladesh, seeking to identify the actors and the rules of 
the field.  
 
5.2 A brief history of development in Bangladesh 
 
The territory that makes up today‘s Bangladesh was established with the partition of 
the British colony of India on religious grounds in 1947 into independent dominions, 
and then the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, divided into an 
Eastern and Western wing. The creation of Pakistan as an ‗Islamic Republic‘ is 
significant, as Ahmed (2001) claims: ―Pakistan is more than a country; it is also an 
idea, a cultural expression of identity.  It is architecture, language, dress and food.  It 
is a link in the chain that takes Muslims back to the past.‖  (Ahmed 2001: 127) 
 
The idea of creating a separate Muslim state in India was first articulated in 1930 by 
the Islamic thinker Muhammed Iqbal (see Chapter 4.7.3 for further details on Iqbal).  
He suggested that the four North-western provinces of India (Sindh, Balochistan, 
Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province) be joined into a Muslim state, but 
excluding Bengal to the east, one of the Muslim heartlands on the subcontinent.  
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Islam spread throughout Bengal from the 12th century onwards. It was first 
propagated by Arab Muslim merchants and Sufi missionaries, but military conquests 
also contributed to its spread through the region (Eaton, 1996). Independent sultans 
ruled the region until the 16th century, when the Mughal Empire began to dominate 
Bengal, and Dhaka became a Mughal provincial capital. The Mughal Empire later 
served as a justification for a union of Muslims in the subcontinent, driven by the 
concept of the Muslim Ummah or ‗nation‘, although this in itself has no reference to a 
territorial entity (Murden 2002).  Importantly, this sense of a ‗chain to the past‘ is all-
pervasive in Muslim thought throughout the sub-continent (Ahmed 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Map of political and religious formations at the partition of India 
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At the time of the partition of India (see Fig. 5) an Islamic republic was created that 
was neither a coherent geographic nor a political entity. Both Pakistani wings were 
separated not only by 1,600 km of Indian soil, but also by political and linguistic 
discrimination by the Urdu-speaking dominant West-Pakistani elite, as well as 
neglect, with an economic development focus on the Western over the Eastern 
Bengali wing (Jahan 2005: 29). This led to massive popular agitations in East 
Pakistan against the rulers in Islamabad, which led to the war for independence in 
1971 and the establishment of the Peoples‘ Republic of Bangladesh (Jahan 2005).  
 
After independence, the new state of Bangladesh faced many challenges including 
famine, floods and endemic poverty. These trials were exacerbated by political 
upheaval and military coups. In 1991, democracy was restored and there was period 
of relative peace followed by economic progress. Whilst Bangladesh is a 
predominantly agricultural country, today its export earnings are dominated by the 
garment industry, in addition to a large part of the economy being sustained by 
foreign currency earnings and remittances sent by expatriates. Islam is the majority 
religion in Bangladesh, with nearly 90% of people professing to adhere to the faith. 
There is also a sizable Hindu minority and a smaller number of Buddhists, Christians 
and Animists. (Source: CIA World Factbook). Islam is the state religion of 
Bangladesh, but legislation enshrines freedom of religion (Jahan, 2005). 
 
Bangladesh's most significant and complex foreign relationship is with India 
(Choudhury 1992). This relationship significantly influences domestic political 
discourse. Bangladesh‘s relationship with Pakistan is also complicated and the role 
of the Pakistani military in the ‗War of Liberation‘ continues to be an open wound. As 
White (1999: 311) notes, the relationships are not straightforward: ―The Bangladesh 
state is still engaged in the continual quest for self-definition:  Bengali but not Indian, 
Muslim but not Pakistani.‖  
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The triangular relationship between Bangladesh, Pakistan and India, which provided 
military support for Bangladesh‘s independence from Pakistan, constitutes a 
complexity that frames both domestic and regional politics. It also underpins the 
frailty of Bangladesh‘s political culture, which will be discussed in the next section.   
 
5.3 The Bangladeshi political rollercoaster: socialism, capitalism and 
political Islam 
Bangladesh is an interesting example that, in line with the argument proffered in the 
previous chapters dealing with the genealogies of the mainstream and Islamic 
development discourses, illustrates the fluidity of dominant perspectives in 
development policy. The country has had an eventful, rollercoaster-like history since 
coming into existence in 1971 and also provides an insightful backdrop to the 
relationship between mainstream and Islamic approaches to development, the 
context of which will be further explored in the following sections and in the case 
study in the next chapter. 
 
5.3.1 Pre-independence approaches to development and poverty reduction 
 
The region that roughly is today‘s Bangladesh was, as early as the thirteenth century, 
a flourishing agrarian economy was until modern times regarded as prosperous 
(Lesser, 1988).  
 
But famine and natural disasters are an integral part of the Bengali national narrative 
(Sen, 1973). During colonial rule, famine affected the Indian subcontinent many 
times, including the Great Bengal famine of 1943 that claimed 3 million lives 
(Greenough, 1982). Although Bengal had enough rice and other grains to feed itself, 
Sen (1973) argues that due to economic shifts under the un-democratic colonial 
system millions of people were suddenly too poor to buy food.   Land reform was 
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achieved only achieved after colonial rule in East Bengal in 1950, with the 
eradication of the feudal zamindari (tax-collector and landowner) system (Lesser, 
1988).   
 
After partition, Western Bengal went to India whilst the east was allocated to the 
newly formed Pakistan and was later renamed East Pakistan, with its capital at 
Dhaka. But despite the economic strength and sizeable population of East Pakistan, 
Pakistan's government and military were largely dominated by the upper classes 
from the west. People living in rural areas became poorer because the improvements 
introduced could not meet the needs of a growing population (Lesser, 1988) and 
vulnerability increased particularly in the cyclone-prone East. Although 
industrialisation was the focus of Pakistan's five-year development strategy, the 
majority of the budget went to West Pakistan, leaving the east as a poor partner 
(Lesser, 1988). In addition, East Pakistan depended heavily on imports, due to its 
lack of natural resources, and this in turn created a balance of payments problem, 
and more tension between East and West Pakistan (Jahan, 2005). 
 
 
5.3.2 Mujibad: secular state-centred development in early Bangladesh (1971 – 
1975) 
The creation of the Bengali Language Movement of 1952 was perhaps the first 
visible sign of tension between East and West Pakistan (Shamsul Alam 1991). 
Economic, linguistic and cultural issues led to increasing dissatisfaction with the 
central government. In response, the Awami (‗National‘) League was formed in West 
Bengal, with Mujibur Rahman as its leader. Although jailed several times, he was the 
strongest political voice of the Bengali-speaking population.  
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When in 1970 the Awami League won a majority in the Pakistani parliamentary 
elections, it was blocked from taking office by the defeated incumbent president, 
Yahya Khan, which enraged the East Pakistani population. Mujibur Rahman was 
arrested and Khan used the military to regain control over the east. Before his arrest, 
Mujibur Rahman declared the independence of East Pakistan to form the People‘s 
Republic of Bangladesh. This resulted in a civil war which was fought bitterly for nine 
months. The Bangladesh Forces, commonly referred to in Bangladesh as ‗freedom 
fighters‘, also the ‗liberation army‘, conducted wide-spread guerrilla warfare against 
the Pakistani Forces. Crucially, the Bengalis had the support of the Indian Armed 
Forces, which took over 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war during the conflict 
(O‘Donnell, 1984). Unconfirmed estimates of casualities during that time range from 
300,000 to as many as 3 million (Jahan, 2005). 
 
After a hard fought independence struggle, Bangladesh became an independent 
parliamentary democracy in 1971, with Mujibur Rahman as the Prime Minister. In 
subsequent parliamentary elections in 1973, the Awami League gained an absolute 
majority again. The new state was established on principles of socialism and 
secularism, with a socialist statist plan for the economy that nationalised all industries 
(Baxter, 1998). But Mujib soon began appeal to more Islamically-minded people by 
moves such as outlawing alcohol and gambling, and reinstating the Islamic Academy 
(now the Islamic Foundation, which is responsible for research, training and 
propagation of Islam) which had previously supported the West Pakistani leadership. 
Mujib also fostered Bangladesh's relationship with and membership of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Islamic Development Bank 
(IDB) and even reached out to Pakistan.  
 
In pursuit of his socialist vision, Mujib initiated one-party rule in 1975, which he 
attempted to legitimise as the ‗second revolution‘ (Jahan, 2005: 153). He outlawed all 
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other political parties, and this, combined with a series of nationwide famines, meant 
that he came under increasing criticism for economic mismanagement. He struggled 
to fully implement his intended co-operative, collectivist reform of Bangladeshi 
agriculture (Uddin and Hopper, 2001) and all his efforts were abruptly brought to an 
end when he was assassinated in August 1975, by mid-level military officers.  
 
5.3.3 Military rule, market liberalisation and Islamisation under Musthaq, Zia 
and Ershad (1975 - 1990) 
 
After Mujib‘s assassination, Khondakar Mushtaq Ahmed, a conservative member of 
the Awami League, was installed as chief martial law administrator by the military. He 
disapproved of Mujib‘s close relations with India, and initiated a number of 
programmes to de-institutionalise Mujibism (Ziring, 1992). After a bitter battle for 
supremacy that witnessed coups and counter-coups, General Ziaur Rahman finally 
rose to power. General Zia founded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) to 
legitimise his rule and reinstated limited multi-party politics. He was responsible for 
initiating some major ideological changes in the running of the country, including 
distancing Bangladesh from India and the Soviet Union, whilst improving ties with 
other Islamic nations, such as Pakistan. He also formed ties with other regional 
neighbours, culminating in the formation of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) (Jahan, 2005).  
 
These reforms on the part of Zia are credited with rebuilding the Bangladeshi 
economy (Jahan, 2005). He advocated private sector development and initiated 
partnering between private enterprises and public sector corporations. He reactivated 
the Dhaka Stock Exchange and the Bangladesh Investment Corporation in 1976, and 
facilitated foreign direct investment. He also made an ideological realignment at the 
constitutional level: 
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 ―Zia‘s amendment gave a clear signal about the regimes‘ political ideology 
and support base. By redefining socialism and by deleting the provision of 
acquisition of property ‗without compensation‘ Zia made it clear that he would 
follow a capitalist path.‖ (Jahan, 2005: 281) 
 
But it was Zia‘s move towards Islam that brought him the support of Bangladesh's 
proponents of political Islam and added to his popularity amongst ordinary Muslims. 
Although originally framed in explicitly secular terminology, General Zia made 
changes to the wording of the Constitution that sought to ‗Islamise‘ it, initially by 
proclamation order, which he had later ratified by parliament. He inserted Bismillah-
ar-rahman-ar-rahim (In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful) before the 
preamble, and the assertion that a fundamental state principle is ‗absolute trust and 
faith in the Almighty Allah‘ (Article 8(1A), Constitution of the People‘s Republic of 
Bangladesh, 1979). Another clause stated that the government should "preserve and 
strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity" 
(Constitution of Bangladesh, 1979). These changes in terminology clearly reflect a 
commitment to making Islam one of the central symbols of nationalism, as well as 
placing Bangladesh firmly as a member of the Muslim world. 
 
Moreover, socialism was redefined as "economic and social justice" (Article 8(1), 
Constitution of Bangladesh, 1979) – this will be further discussed in section 5.9.2. 
 
General Zia also incorporated changes into the Constitution that allowed Muslims to 
practise their faith in line with the Shari‘ah. He amended Article 25(2) of the 
constitution to include the principle that '"the state shall endeavour to consolidate, 
preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on 
Islamic solidarity." (Constitution of Bangladesh, 1979). These changes fundamentally 
redefined the nature of the republic, and moved the focus away from secularism. 
Zia's rule ended when he was assassinated in 1981 by elements of the military.  
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General Hossain Mohammad Ershad gained control of Bangladesh in a bloodless 
coup in 1982. He also advocated for a place for Islam in the culture and politics of 
Bangladesh. He declared Islam as the state religion, officially abandoning state 
secularism. His ideological position was therefore closer to that of the BNP, Jamaat-
e-Islami, and other smaller Islamic parties (Lesser, 1988). Ershad also sought to 
bring Bangladesh in line with neo-liberal doctrine, by introducing the New Industrial 
Policy, which encouraged private sector activity and the denationalisation of some 
public sector enterprises (Akram, 2008: 310). His changes proved unpopular with the 
both politicians and the public, and in 1990, he was forced to resign after mass 
protests. 
 
 
5.3.4 Return to parliamentary democracy: Sheikh Hasina, Khaleda Zia and the 
Jamaat (1990 - present) 
 
Since Bangladesh‘s reversion to parliamentary democracy, the BNP and the Awami 
League have continued to dominate the political field with General Zia's widow, 
Khaleda Zia, leading the BNP to two election victories, and a period of Awami 
League domination, headed by Sheikh Hasina, one of Mujib's surviving daughters. A 
caretaker government, backed by the military and led by former Bangladesh Central 
Bank Director General and World Bank economist Dr Fakhruddin Ahmed, was 
appointed in 2007, following widespread political unrest. Despite protestations from 
all political parties, the caretaker government strove to remove avenues for political 
corruption prior to the implementation of fresh democratic elections. During this time 
both Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia were arrested, but later released. Elections 
were held in December 2008 and the Awami League returned to power. 
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The Awami League Election manifesto (see Box 4) offers an interesting mix: it 
includes traditional socialist / statist policies such as price control but also plugs into 
the global neo-liberal ‗good governance‘ discourse, although this seems to be mainly  
an appropriation of the discourse in an attempt to clamp down on political and 
religious opposition parties such as the Jamaat. Interestingly, although it seeks, at 
the headline level, to eliminate poverty, the detailed policy prescriptions talk about a 
more rational ‗reduction‘ of poverty, often using the terms ‗elimination‘, ‗alleviation‘ 
and ‗reduction‘ interchangeably. 
 
Box 4: The Awami League Election Manifesto ‘Vision 2021’ 
 
4. Elimination of Poverty and Inequity: The following strategy and aims will be 
followed for socio-economic development.  
 
i. The main strategy of poverty reduction will center on bringing vibrancy in 
agriculture and rural life. Social safety net will be extended for the ultra-poor. By 2013 
poverty level and proportion of ultra-poor will be brought down to 25% and 15% 
respectively. At present there are 65 million poor people in the country. This number 
will be reduced to 45 million by 2013 and will further come down to 22 million in 
2021. In order to achieve this objective, among other steps will be the revival of 
previously adopted projects such as "one house, one farm", rural housing, ideal 
village and returning homes. The number of recipients of old age allowance and 
destitute women allowance would, at the least, be doubled. Employment Banks will 
encourage young entrepreneurs by supplying necessary capital. Revision of the just 
formulated PRSP will be undertaken after a thorough evaluation within six months of 
assuming office. 
 
ii. Employment guidelines: A comprehensive employment guideline will be formulated 
aiming at poverty reduction, solving unemployment problem and making citizens‘ 
lives meaningful. The core components of the guidelines will be: a. creating 
employment opportunities in rural economy b. providing credit and training for self-
employment c. creating employment opportunities for wage-labour in industries d. 
promoting sub-contracting arrangements between big and small & medium scale 
industries and e. providing special training arrangements for facilitating export of 
labour. The number of unemployed people in the country, estimated at 28 million, will 
be reduced to 24 million by 2013 and will be further reduced to 15 million by 2021.  
 
5. Establishment of Good Governance: 
 
i. Terrorism and religious extremism will be controlled with iron hand. Trial of war 
criminals will be arranged. 
 
ii. Genuine independence and impartiality of the judiciary will be ensured. 
Extrajudicial killings will be stopped. The judgment of the Bangabandhu murder case 
will be made effective and the retrial of jail killings will be held. Trial of real criminals 
responsible for the grenade attack of the 21st August, 2004 through proper 
investigation will be arranged. Rule of law will be established, The Human Rights  
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Commission will be strengthened and made effective, and an Ombudsman will be 
appointed. Human rights will be strictly enforced. 
 
iii. The on-going reform programme of the Election Commission and electoral system 
will continue. The Parliament will be made effective and the government will be made 
accountable for all its activities. Wealth statement and source of income of the Prime 
Minister, members of cabinet, Parliament members and of their family members will 
be made public every year. Except for some specific subjects related to the security 
of the state, Parliament members will be allowed to express differing opinions. 
 
iv. Use of religion and communalism in politics will be banned. Security and rights of 
religious and ethnic minorities will be ensured. Courtesy and tolerance will be 
inculcated in the political culture of the country. Militancy and extortion will be 
banned. Awami League will take initiative to formulate a consensual and unanimous 
charter of political behavior. 
 
v. Opportunities will be created for the expatriate Bangladeshis to take part in 
national reconstruction and their right to franchise will be ensured. Special initiatives 
will be taken to attract expatriate‘s remittance in productive investment. A 
consultancy network will be developed to fruitfully use expatriate‘s talents.  
 
vi. Administration will be free from politicization and will be pro-people. Efficiency, 
seniority and merit will be the basis of appointment and promotion in public service. 
Administrative reform, right to information and e-governance will be introduced. A 
permanent Pay Commission will be set up for civil servants.  
 
vii. In order to provide security to every citizen of the country, police and other law 
and order enforcing agencies will be kept above political influence. These forces will 
be modernized to meet the demands of the time. Necessary steps will be taken to 
increase their remuneration and other welfare facilities including accommodation. 
Source: Bangladesh Awami League Election Manifesto 2008 - A Charter for Change 
(2007) 
 
Since the Awami League took power, the election manifesto has become 
government policy, aptly called ‗Vision 2021‘ (see section 5.5.1) for a more detailed 
discussion). Whilst a major shift in policy back towards socialism or a more state-led 
approach now appears perhaps inconceivable, some flagship development policies 
such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), have been questioned by the 
new left-leaning government‘s announcement of a return to a 5-year Plan. This 
intention was indicated to the author by a senior civil servant in the Planning 
Commission months before the official announcement that such a plan would be 
produced was made (interview transcript PC19/01/09). The ruling Awami League 
already decided to recast the PRSP-II, designed by the last caretaker government, 
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with a view to accommodating its election pledges and addressing the problems 
created by the global economic recession. In the leading financial newspaper of the 
country, AMA Muhith, the Finance Minister, was quoted as saying: "We will shift to 
five-year plan from FY 2011. But until then, we will implement the revised PRSP. 
There will be no other PRSP from July 2011.‖ (c.f. The Financial Express, Revised 
PRSP to cost $49b, 3rd December 2009). Whether this represents truly a major policy 
shift remains to be seen. The 5-Year Plan has not only ideological importance, it also 
relates the country back to the Mujib era, when Mujib put into place the first 5-Year 
plan, and it is through his appeal as the Bangabhandu (‗Friend of Bangal‘), that his 
daughter seeks to connect her renewed bid for leadership.  
 
Bangladesh‘s political rollercoaster also reflects to some degree development 
priorities for the country, whose population has experienced colonialism, the partition 
of India, a civil war, military regimes flirting with different political ideologies and a 
fight between two violently opposed political movements. In the short history of 
Bangladesh, the country has been in a constant state of flux or even turmoil, with 
colonialism, socialism, capitalism and political Islam all having considerable influence 
on development policy making. Even the credit for the very creation of the country 
still remains politically contested (Sisson & Rose 1990). The Awami League claims 
that it was Mujib who led the country to independence, whilst the BNP states that it 
was Zia‘s military role that secured the victory. Some are alleged to have violently 
opposed independence, such as Jamaat-e-Islami itself, which was opposed to the 
secession from the Islamic Republic, which it regarded as a symbol of the Islamic 
Ummah (community). These contested readings and interpretations of history 
continue to be the prism through which all direct and indirect political activity is 
evaluated by the Bangladesh elite (Jahan, 2005).  
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The next section offers a brief discussion of poverty and development in Bangladesh 
in order to contextualise the ensuing debates that have been constituted during the 
political rollercoaster. 
 
5.4 Articulations of poverty and development in Bangladesh  
 
Rather than providing a detailed statistical discussion of progress against commonly 
used poverty reduction and development indicators (which have been problematised 
in Chapter 3), this section seeks to draw out the assumptions that underpin the 
development narrative in Bangladesh. This is done by providing some illustrative 
examples of how poverty and development are conceptualised in the mainstream 
policy debates.  
 
Although more than half of GDP is generated through the service sector, 45% of 
Bangladeshis are employed in agriculture (CIA World Factbook). At the same time, 
more than three quarters of Bangladesh‘s export earnings come from the garment 
industry (CIA World Factbook), which began attracting foreign investors in the 1980s 
due to the availability of cheap labour and low conversion costs (Lesser, 1988). In 
2009, the country is one of the world‘s largest exporters of ready-made garments. 
The industry now employs more than 3 million workers, 90% of whom are women. 
Garment exports, totalled $12.3 billion in FY09. Interestingly remittances from 
overseas Bangladeshis, totalling $11 billion in FY10, account for almost 25% of GDP 
(CIA World Factbook) and have been classified as a quasi export ‗product‘ 
(―Remittance sets benchmark‖, Daily Star, 05/01/09). 
  
But only in the recent past the outlook was different. Bangladesh was famously 
declared a ‗basket case‘ by Henry Kissinger in 1974, yet 35 years on, it is claimed to 
be a development success. The economy has grown 5-6% per year since 1996 
 - 187 - 
(World Bank, 2010), ―despite political instability, poor infrastructure, corruption, 
insufficient power supplies, and slow implementation of economic reforms‖ (CIA 
World Factbook). 
 
The British development agency DFID also declares Bangladesh a development 
success, primarily on the basis that is has made good progress towards achieving 
the MDGs: ―Significant growth in Bangladesh has translated into poverty reduction – 
nearly 2% per annum.‖ (DFID website, 2011). Development and poverty reduction 
statistics (see Box 5) are, for example, by DFID presented in terms of the MDGs: 
 
Box 5: Facts about Bangladesh 
 Population: 160 million (UN Statistics Division (UNSD), 2008) 
 Average life expectancy: 66 years (UNSD, 2008) 
 Average per capita income: US$1,450 (purchasing power parity (PPP) 
rate) (World Bank, 2008) 
 Gross national income (GNI): US$232.6 billion (PPP rate) (World Bank, 
2008) 
 Average annual growth rate: 6.1% (WB, 2003-2007)  
 Percentage of people not meeting daily food needs: 40% live below 
international poverty line (Household Income and Expenditure Survey, 
2005) 
 Women dying in childbirth: 320 per 100,000 (2006)  
 Children dying before age 5: 65 per 1,000 (GoB, 2007) 
 Percentage of children receiving primary school education: 90% enrol in 
primary school; 55% complete grade 5 (UNSD, 2008) 
 Percentage of people aged 15-49 living with HIV/AIDS: 0.1% (, 2006) 
 Percentage of people with access to safe, clean water: 80% (UNSD 2006) 
Source: DFID website, 2011 
 
However, as the World Bank points out, Bangladesh‘s relatively successful economic 
development is not an unreserved success story. According to the Bank, "among 
Bangladesh‘s most significant obstacles to growth are poor governance and weak 
public institutions― (World Bank, 2005).  Despite these hurdles, the World Bank 
(2010) is full of carefully phrased praise: 
―Bangladesh has made impressive economic and social progress in the past 
decade, despite frequent natural disasters and external shocks. Poverty 
declined from 57% of the population in 1990 to 40% in 2005. Broad-based 
private sector led growth and macroeconomic stability contributed to 
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significant decline in rural and urban poverty. Bangladesh is on track to meet 
the Millennium Development Goal of halving extreme poverty by 2015. 
 
The average GDP growth over the last six years was over 6%. Bangladesh 
showed remarkable resilience to the global financial crisis, buoyed in part by 
remittances and garment exports. 
 
Bangladesh has made commendable progress in social and human 
development. It has met the MDG for gender parity in education and universal 
primary school enrolment well ahead of time. Nearly 80% of teenage girls 
today have completed primary education, compared to a similar ratio of only 
20% for women in their fifties today. Infant and maternal mortality has 
improved significantly over the last decade, and total fertility rates have 
dropped by more than 50% compared to the mid-1970s. 
 
Despite the good track record, with around 56 million people still below the 
poverty line, Bangladesh faces considerable development challenges. It is 
one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change and natural calamities 
like cyclones and floods-- 60% of the worldwide deaths caused by cyclones in 
the last 20 years were in Bangladesh. Inadequate power and gas supplies 
are a major constraint to growth. Only 47% of households have an electricity 
connection. Growing urban congestion is reducing the benefits of 
urbanization. Malnutrition has been persistent, and the quality of governance 
has hampered the effectiveness of expenditure and the delivery of public 
services. And the labour force is set to grow faster, posing a challenge of 
adequate employment generation. 
In the face of these challenges, the Awami League Government of 
Bangladesh has outlined a vision of becoming a middle income country by 
2021, which would require it to grow at 8% per year. For achieving this 
acceleration, Bangladesh will need to devise a strategy to absorb its growing 
labor force and raise its productivity by enhancing skills, and also invest much 
more, especially in infrastructure. Also, while addressing the other issues 
posed above, it will have to pay particular attention to the looming challenge 
posed by climate change.‖ (World Bank, Bangladesh Country Brief 2010) 
 
 
The growth mantra, at least in the poverty and development research conducted, 
sponsored or disseminated by mainstream development actors such as DFID or the 
IFIs, is ubiquitous. Yet the World Bank appears to be sceptical whether the Awami 
League‘s Vision 2021 is attainable under the proposed policy framework, which 
remains tinged with socialist/statist elements such as price control. 
 
For economic planning purposes, the Government of Bangladesh has traditionally 
defined the poverty line along calorific intake – see section 5.5.1 for further details. At 
the same time, Participatory Poverty Assessments, which include the poor in the 
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analysis of poverty with the objective of influencing policy (Robb, 2001), have also 
been conducted through the World Bank. The PPA in Bangladesh has not been 
particularly flattering towards the government, with the poor reporting many issues, 
including its ‗general unresponsiveness‘ (Robb, 2001: xxix), and wider issues around 
good governance and civil society. The policy influence of the PPA is also difficult to 
gauge. Despite it being referred to in the PRSP, it does not seem to have entered the 
public policy discourse as a key way of indentifying the characteristics of poverty, 
perhaps because the media, such as the Financial Express, prefer quantitative 
statistical data (see for example, ―The Imperatives of Poverty Reduction‖, The 
Financial Express, 20/01/09). 
 
In contrast to DFID and the World Bank, others remain not just sceptical but 
downright pessimistic, particularly due to often inequitable side effects of economic 
growth. Due to the contested nature of poverty conceptualisation and measurement, 
as discussed in Chapter 3, for example, Mohammad (2007) contends that, ―During 
the last ten years, people living under the poverty line increased from 51 million to 61 
million. Only 10 per cent of the population have gained in their share of GDP, while 
for 90 per cent of people it shrunk‖ (Bretton Woods Project website).  
 
Therefore, whether Bangladesh is seen as a development and poverty reduction 
success story largely depends on the perspective adopted. For subscribers to neo-
liberal orthodoxy such as trickle down economics, globalisation and growth are 
always good, whilst both Marxists such as Mohammad and Islamists such as the 
proponents of the Bangladeshi Islamic revivalist movement remain extremely critical 
of the effects of globalisation (see Islamic Economics Research Bureau, 
1998).  Moreover, for elites on either side of the political spectrum poverty is not an 
urgent priority as Hossain (2005) argues:  
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―… the national elite appear[s] to be satisfied to wait for longer-term 
processes of national-level development to enable the poor to help 
themselves. In effect, they rel[y] on economic growth and development 
through the market as the basic anti-poverty strategy, apparently believing 
that, while by no means an ideal or assured strategy for tackling poverty on 
the Bangladeshi scale, this was the most likely – or the least unlikely – means 
of dealing with the problem‖ (Hossain 2005:145). 
 
The above discussion of how mainstream multilateral and bilateral agencies and 
local elites evaluate development in Bangladesh illustrates how the mainstream 
development discourse is underpinned by a range of assumptions that influence how 
poverty and development is conceptualised and measured and that drive policy 
prescriptions. Quantitative, materialistically-determined poverty concepts ranging 
from dollar-a-day poverty lines to calorific intake appear to be a near hegemonic 
formation in the Bangladeshi development discourse. Economic growth is likewise a 
central, near hegemonic formation as a development indicator, as the DFID and 
World Bank statistics listed above illustrate. 
 
The next section further establishes the background context of the development field 
by elaborating on the types of organisations that are situated within it. 
 
5.5 Key development actors 
 
This section briefly describes different types of organisations competing for 
economic, cultural, social, symbolic and linguistic capital (Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992) within the development field.  
 
Bangladesh has been a major recipient of development assistance since it come into 
existence in 1971 (Huq & Abrar, 1999). A variety of development agencies have 
been operational, including bi- and multilateral donors and international NGOs. The 
contribution of the UN system has been relatively small (Murshid, 2008: 99) hence 
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this section will focus on the Government of Bangladesh (GoB), multi-lateral and bi-
lateral donor organisations, non-governmental organisations, community-based 
organisations and social movements.  
 
5.5.1 The Government of Bangladesh 
 
Responsibility for national development is predominantly held by the Planning 
Commission at the Ministry of Finance. It was Mujib who incepted a national-level 
Planning Commission, which was charged with preparing five-year plans to direct 
economic priorities. The planning process draws on the Indian economic planning 
model launched by Nehru in the 1950s (Alamgir 2009).  
 
Five-year plans have been financed through the development, or capital budget, 
which is separate from the government's revenue, or administrative, budget (Lesser, 
1988). The first Five-Year plans were almost completely funded from foreign grants, 
although this decreased considerably towards the late 1990s, when loans began to 
make up a larger portion of development expenditure (Huq & Abrar, 1999). With the 
demise of the Five-Year Plan, the Planning Commission became responsible for the 
drafting of the PRSP that replaced it (see section 5.9.3).  
 
It is the Planning Commission which ‗translates‘ the multi-year development plan into 
public investment budgets through Annual Development Programmes (Lesser, 
1988). Interestingly, the Planning Commission conceptualises and measures poverty 
by calorific intake: 
- ultra poor: intake < 1,600 kcal/person/day 
- extreme poor < 1,805 kcal/person/day (GoB 2009) 
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This, although a derivative of the monetary approach, is different from the way 
poverty is conceptualised by most mainstream development actors and academics 
(compare with the discussion in section 3.4.3), with the notable exception of the 
Indian economic planning discourse (see Palmer-Jones & Sen, 2004). 
 
The Planning Commission‘s role in preparing the Annual Development Programmes 
mean that it wields a lot of power not only over the formal process, but also over 
informal ones, for example, the appointment of consultants, as the preparation of the 
PRSP demonstrates (see section 5.9.3). The Planning Commission also is in control 
of the process that decides whether actual public expenditure is conforming to the 
Five-Year-Plan. This is implemented through a project approval process and through 
its advisory position on the country's most powerful economic decision-making 
bodies - the National Economic Council and its Executive Committee (Lesser, 1988). 
Most of the decisions on major development projects and spending are made by the 
Executive Committee of the National Economic Council, which is chaired by the 
President of Bangaldesh. The Project Evaluation Committee, which monitors the 
progress of Five-year-plan programs, is also involved in the planning mechanism 
(Lesser, 1988).  
 
Hence the complexity of budgeting process can be political (see for example Rakner 
et al 2004) as real distribution and expenditure are more revealing about government 
priorities than the rhetoric of the plan.  
 
The new Awami League Government, elected in 2008, has also formulated a 
development programme, Vision 2021 (see Box 6), for the country, based on its 
election manifesto, also called Vision 2021 (discussed in section 5.3.4). This is, 
however, more based on election sound-bites than the work of the more 
technocratically minded Planning Commission. In it, the Government, led by the 
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Prime Ministers office, expresses its commitment to ―building a country whose 
citizens are able to live prosperous and happy lives. The year 2021 will mark the 
golden jubilee of Bangladesh‘s independence, while the year 2020 will be the 
hundredth anniversary of the birth of the father of the nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman‖ (GoB, 2009). 
 
Box 6: Excerpt from ‘Vision 2021’ 
 
7. Economic development & initiative 
 
a. Meeting basic needs: With a view to providing food, clothing, shelter, education 
and health care to the citizens in accordance with Article 15 of the Constitution, gross 
domestic product will be raised to 8% by 2013 and 10% by 2021 which will be 
sustained thereafter. 
b. Population and labour force: Population in 2021 is estimated at 165m, and labour 
force at 105m. Programmes will be taken up for employment of at least 85% of the 
work force. 
 
c. Alleviation of poverty: We aim not at reduction of poverty, but removal of poverty, 
through which we shall try to achieve the Millennium Goals declared by UN by 2015, 
and by 2017 latest. Beginning in 2021, poverty will be reduced to 15% from 45% 
now, progressively. Number of poor people will rise from 45 million now to 65m in 
2021[sic], and then fall to 25m in 2021. Sustainable safety nets will be established for 
the extreme poor until poverty is removed. 
Source: Government of Bangladesh, Board of Investment website (2011) 
 
The ultimate aim of ‗Vision 2021‘ is for Bangladesh to be a middle income country by 
2021 ―where poverty will be drastically reduced where, our citizens will be able to 
meet every basic need and where development will be on fast track, with ever-
increasing rates of inclusive growth‖ (GoB, 2009). 
 
In trying to see beyond some of the political claims and election promises, it appears 
as if the Government of Bangladesh has made the current pro-poor growth discourse 
its own, whilst also seeking legitimisation by tying present day Bangladesh to the 
golden era of the Bangabandhu.  
 
 - 194 - 
However, there remains considerable conceptual and terminological ambiguity when 
talking about poverty since, at the headline level, the GoB‘s avowed objective is 
poverty ‗alleviation‘, whilst the body of the text speaks not only of poverty ‗reduction‘ 
but also aims at ‗removal‘, often referred to as poverty eradication (this will be 
discussed in more detail in section 5.9.3). These are obviously related, yet are 
conceptually different: reduction gives the impression that poverty is an issue that 
can be rationally understood, measured and addressed (see Cornwall and Brock, 
2005) whilst alleviation has a charitable-welfarist dimension. Removal or eradication 
gives the impression that one or more state interventions can cure the ‗patient‘ from 
a cancer-like affliction. Interestingly, in the Awami League Election manifesto that 
gave rise to the Government‘s Vision 2021 document, there was a similar conflation, 
although in the manifesto, the headline claim was ‗elimination‘ whilst the body of the 
text spoke of ‗reduction‘. 
 
The Government‘s development policy work is further supported by a number of 
agencies. A key role is played by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies 
(BIDS), which is an autonomous government agency established in 1974 to carry out 
development related research: 
‖BIDS serves as a conduit for dissemination of development information 
through its library, publications, website and seminar programmes. BIDS 
researchers also directly contribute to formulation of development policies 
through participation in government committees and task forces (see BIDS 
website).  
 
BIDS policy work and staff are influential but are also seen as heavily influenced by 
Government priorities. 
 
5.5.2 International Financial Institutions 
 
The international finance institutions are omni-present in the Bangladeshi public 
discourse around development. This supports Stiglitz‘s (2002) argument that three 
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organisations govern the current hegemonic formations of globalisation in 
mainstream development discourses: the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation.   In Bangladesh, understanding the 
strength of the IFIs, not just in terms of multi-lateral financing of the country‘s 
development budget but also in terms of the attached policy dictates, is key to 
understanding how it is that the central assumptions of growth, modernisation and 
materially-determined poverty conceptions are able to maintain hegemonic 
formations within mainstream development discourses (Peet 2003). An interesting 
example of symbolic hegemonisation is how the Government‘s Board of Investment  
(BOI) has sought to establish a close link with the World Bank by incorporating the 
Bank‘s globe image into its own logo where it is placed instead of the letter ‗o‘ in the 
acronym. 
5.5.2.1 International Monetary Fund 
In 1973, Bangladesh began ‗policy dialogue‘ with the IMF and received support tied 
to domestic policy reform (Mohammad 2007). In July 1975 a second stand-by 
arrangement with the IMF was signed, which required Bangladesh to implement a 
number of measures, including devaluing its currency, liberalising imports, tightening 
bank credit, raising interest rates, reducing public borrowing from the banking 
system, rationalising the tax system and reducing subsidies on food grains, fuel and 
agricultural inputs (Syeduzzaman, 1991).  
 
Subsequently, in 1980 a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was introduced 
and Bangladesh received support under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for the 
following three years. This assistance entailed policies and measures designed to 
support Bangladesh‘s development objectives under the Second Five Year Plan, 
through fiscal, monetary and external payments stability. The EFF suspended the 
Fund in late 1981, alleging that the macroeconomic fundamentals in Bangladesh 
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were not right (Rashid 2000). Subsequently, the country‘s economy was 
subordinated by targets laid down in the Policy Framework Paper prepared by the 
IMF and the World Bank (Mohammad 2007).  
 
The Policy Support Instrument (PSI) is the IMF‘s most recent intervention and is 
based on the contention that, "in recent years several low-income countries have 
made significant progress toward economic stability and no longer require IMF 
financial assistance. However, while they may not want—or need—Fund financial 
support, they might still seek ongoing IMF advice, monitoring and endorsement of 
their economic policies—what is called policy support and signalling ... ." (c.f. 
Mohammad 2007) This 'control without funds', as Mohammad (2007) terms it, is 
critical for the IMF, although it was met with resistance in Bangladesh: 
―After getting success in countries like Nigeria, a test case of huge resources 
and high poverty, an IMF mission visited Dhaka in September 2007 to sign a 
PSI and put another chain around the country's neck. But the people of 
Bangladesh did not behave as the mission expected. With the world calling 
for a change, the people of Bangladesh also wanted change. They said a 
loud ―NO‖ to the IMF mission. People from all sections of society joined 
together to register their protest against the IMF‘s moves. The IMF mission 
found their allies shaken and literally fled from the country.‖ (Muhammad 
2007) 
 
However, given the rollercoaster nature of Bangladeshi politics, this event was 
overturned by the installation of a military-backed caretaker government led by a 
former World Bank economist. 
 
5.5.3 World Bank 
Bangladesh has been one of the largest recipients of support from the International 
Development Association (IDA), the World Bank‘s concessionary arm. From 1972 to 
2011 the World Bank committed more than $15 billion support to the Government of 
Bangladesh (World Bank website, 2011).  
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The World Bank‘s Country Assistance Strategy for FY 2011 -14 seeks to ‗support 
Bangladesh‘s vision of becoming a middle income country by 2021 by contributing to 
accelerated, sustainable and inclusive growth, underpinned by stronger governance 
at central and local levels‘ (World Bank, 2010 b). The Bank, however, is critical of the 
GoB‘s vision:  
―In the face of these challenges, Bangladesh has outlined a vision of 
becoming a middle income country by 2021, which would require it to grow at 
8% per year. For achieving this acceleration, Bangladesh will need to devise 
a strategy to absorb its growing labor force and raise its productivity by 
enhancing skills, and also invest much more, especially in infrastructure.‖ 
(World Bank website 2010) 
 
This underlines some of the tensions in the poverty reduction process in Bangladesh. 
Whilst the World Bank‘s country assistance strategy has to be based on the country-
led priorities established in the Second National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty 
Reduction (NSAPR II), some of the GoB policy objectives, such as price control and 
increased reliance on the state-sector for employment and welfare are not aligned 
with, and are even in open opposition, to the main policy interventions favoured by 
the IFIs, such as decentralisation, market-liberalisation, macro-economic stability and 
growth. 
 
5.5.4 Asian Development Bank 
Bangladesh joined the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1973. Since then, 
cumulative lending has amounted to about $12.1 billion for 212 loans, with $202.7 
million for technical assistance grants for 363 projects (see ADB website). The 
country is one of the largest borrowers of concessionary Asian Development Fund 
resources. The ADB‘s policy framework is similar to that of the World Bank.  
 
Its Partnership Agreement on Poverty Reduction with the GoB (c.f  Rashid, 2008: 3) 
focuses on goals very similar to the MDGs:  
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- poverty reduction by 25%,  
- 50% reduction of school non attendance,  
- elimination of basic educational gender disparity,  
- reduction of maternal mortality by 35%,  
- reduction of infant and child mortality by 30, and  
- 50% reduction of non access to reproductive health services for women) 
 
All are underpinned, according to Rashid (2008), by the link between goal 1 (overall 
poverty reduction) and goal 6 (family planning) vis-à-vis the issue of poverty 
elasticity. Rashid (2005) argues that pro-poor growth at the target rate of 5% can 
only be achieved if there is a drastic slowing of the rate of population growth. The 
neo-Malthusian argument that population growth must be drastically reduced in order 
to achieve economic growth does not just underpin the work of the ADB but that of 
most other international development agencies. 
 
5.5.5 Islamic Development Bank 
Bangladesh‘s membership of the Organization of the Islamic Conference expanded 
its ties with the worldwide Islamic community. It became a member in 1974 when 
Mujib signed the Islamic Development Bank‘s charter, vowing to Islamise 
Bangladesh‘s economy. This began a partnership with the Islamic Development 
Bank that involved establishing economic programmes, including Islamic banking 
and a number of Bangladeshi economic joint ventures (Lesser, 1988). Since then, 
the Islamic Development Bank has financed a wide range of development projects, 
focusing primarily on infrastructure (see IDB website, 2011). 
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Interestingly, this signifies a major shift away from the aftermath of the war of 
independence, when most OIC members condemned the splitting of Pakistan, which 
was an avowedly Islamic state (Lesser, 1988).  
 
5.5.6 Bilateral donors, OECD and DAC 
In mainstream development articulatory practice, all the countries regarded as bi-
lateral donors are member countries of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), by and large the Western industrialised nations (see 
www.oecd.org). This discursive formation is based on the way the OECD's 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) acts as a forum for selected member 
states to discuss issues surrounding aid, development and poverty reduction in 
developing countries, and collects and publishes statistics on the aid flows of its 
members, termed Official Development Assistance (see OECD, 2006). It describes 
itself as being the "venue and voice" of the world's major donor countries (OECD, 
2006).  
 
As Yahya and Fustier (2011) state: ―A […] view is that the DAC donor countries 
dominate the humanitarian system [here defined as inclusive of development 
assistance, the author] and influence its standards and norms‖ (2011: 22). As a 
result, it could be argued, alternative providers of development assistance ―have 
been isolated in one way or another from the system and processes of humanitarian 
standardization and integration‖ (Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, 2010: 43). 
 
Hence, within this discursive formation created, official development assistance is 
something that is only or primarily provided by OECD countries. Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) includes both outright grants and loans, as long as the loans are 
on significantly easier terms than the commercial norm: the DAC calls these 
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‗concessional‘ loans. Debt forgiveness is counted explicitly as a category of ODA 
(see OECD website, 2011). 
 
Donor organisations ‗do‘ many different types of things, engaging in diverse modes 
of activities and projects that are aimed to deliver aid for specific types of 
programmes to attain various objectives associated with the foreign policy aims of 
their respective nations.  Currently, donor organisations primarily engage with the 
governments of developing nations at the macro policy level, with the aim of 
influencing planning decisions to the Millennium Development Goals and other 
associated policies often through budget support.  Donor organisations also support 
specific NGOs whose activities correspond with their sectoral agendas (Hulme and 
Edwards 1997). 
 
In addition, the DAC has also began to collect some data on the Arab and OPEC 
countries' aid donations, which are significant: in fact OPEC donations are currently 
approximately twice those of the DAC countries as a fraction of donor gross national 
income (see DAC website, 2011). 
 
In Bangladesh, this dichotomy is clearly perceivable. Each of the major bi-lateral 
donor countries, such as the USA, Japan, France, Germany, the Scandinavian 
countries and the UK (which alone provided aid to Bangladesh in the region of 
£148.8 million in 2009/10), have a long track record of providing ODA, but  a number 
of other countries also make substantial loans, grants or in-kind contributions. In 
2007, for example, Saudi Arabia provided in $158 million in response to the cyclone 
Sidr alone, compared to $20 million provided by the USA (Smith 2010). 
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5.6 Multi-lateral bodies and regional co-operation  
Apart from a considerable contribution through the UN food programme, the UN 
agencies‘ footprint, in a monetary sense, is relatively light (Murshid 2008: 103). 
However, the UN system and the flagship policy of the MDGs play a central role 
within the development narrative of the country. 
 
Another important multi-lateral body is the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC). Founded in December 1985 by Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, 
the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan (Sri Lanka and Afghanistan joined SAARC in 2005), it 
is dedicated to economic, technological, social, and cultural development, 
emphasizing collective self-reliance. It is headquartered in Kathmandu, Nepal. 
 
5.7 Non-governmental organisations 
 
NGOs are ubiquitous in Bangladesh. One key informant described the country as 
―the land of NGOs‖ (interview transcript JI 27/04/09). Fundamentally, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) can be described as institutions operating 
outside direct government control.  Attributes of the activities NGOs engage in and 
the reasons behind their existence vary widely.  As Hilhorst (2003) describes: 
…there is no single answer to the questions of what an NGO is, what it wants 
and what it does.  NGOs are many things at the same time.  An NGO may 
adopt a certain structure but in practice where are its boundaries?  NGOs 
present different faces to different stakeholders, for instance in relating to donor 
representatives, clients or colleagues. (Hilhorst 2003: 3 – 4) 
 
One key factor that distinguishes NGOs is their capacity to act outside of the political 
system.  However, there is a type of symbiotic relationship between government and 
NGOs that is based on both cooperation and antagonism (Hulme and Edwards 
1997).  Tandon (1996) considers NGOs to be the tools of international development 
policies.  But as Hilhorst (2003) points out they are the product of interrelating 
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international and national developments, making ideological choices, whether 
intentionally or not (Hulme and Goodhand 2000).  Their choices might also be 
influenced by NGOs‘ reliance on donor funding, particularly from IFIs and bi-lateral 
donor agencies (Zaidi 1999), possibly shedding doubt on their independence and 
perceived neutrality.   
 
There are many types of NGOs in Bangladesh and many focus on development or 
poverty alleviation. The country is often regarded, through the work of Muhammad 
Yunus, as the birthplace of microcredit, which has generated a large number of 
NGOs that work as financial intermediaries. These NGOs, such as Grameen Bank, 
ASA or BRAC are defined as development finance organisation in the Bangladeshi 
legal system (Debuath, 2003).  
 
Many other more generalist NGOs exist, offering a range of services including micro 
finance, education, healthcare, family planning, environment, human rights and 
sanitation.  
 
Despite their ubiquitousness in Bangladesh, the question of whether ‗the potential of 
NGOs to provide an alternative development paradigm has been grossly 
exaggerated‘ (Zaidi, 1999: 217) remains. Anu Muhammad (2011), a prominent 
Bangladeshi economist and Marxist contends that: 
 ―Many NGO honchos have emerged as part of the affluent section of society. 
Therefore, beneficiaries of the poverty alleviation programmes, or micro-
credits etc, are not the poor, but a section of the middle class and the 
wealthy. In fact, with a few exceptions, creating an NGO has become a good 
way of earning money in the name of the poor, environment, gender, human 
rights. That has also led to a spread of a begging culture. This growth of 
NGOs is also a neo-liberal phenomenon … .‖ (‗Voice of the oppressed‘ 
website, 2011) 
 
The rise of the NGO as a reinforcement of, rather than an alternative to, mainstream 
development, it could be argued, is not just a Bangladesh-specific phenomenon, as 
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Hulme and Edwards (1997) have pointed out. However it is amplified by the sheer 
number of NGOs in Bangladesh, the ‗land of NGOs‘.   
 
5.8 Civil society and key socio-political movements 
 
Current social movements in Bangladesh are mostly connected through a network 
that is separated along an antagonistic frontier between mainstream development 
discourses, which support and are supported by many civil society organisations 
(CSOs), and alternatives proposed by both the leftwing and the Islamic religious 
movements. Whilst the variety of principles driving social movement strategies and 
actions and subsequent needs are enormously diverse (Scholte 2000; Della Porta 
2003), they are most often unified through a logic of equivalence (see 
Chapter/section 2.6.1) along this antagonistic frontier.   
 
Social movements are also symbiotically linked to political movements, not just in the 
way conceptualised by Wheen (2000) in the Marxist tradition, but also in the way 
they actually interact in Bangladeshi society, where there is a fluid relationship 
between parties and movements held together by the key tools of human chains and 
hartals (strikes) (UNDP, 2005). 
 
The leftwing movement is typically associated with forms of anti-globalisation and 
anti-capitalist movements such as anti-IFI campaigns in Bangladesh (see 
Mohammad, 2007).  This movement is not institutionally networked, apart from 
where it finds expression in the form of political parties, rather it is unified through a 
logic of equivalence based on common opposition to globalisation and neo-liberal 
doctrine. In addition, the leftwing social movements and the mainstream CSOs are 
also also unified through a further logic of equivalence in their opposition to the 
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religious Islamic movement that opposes the human rights discourse that unifies 
most other actors. 
5.8.1 The media 
 
The media industry in Bangladesh consists of print, broadcast and online sources. 
There is a mix of government-owned and privately-owned media, but all broadcast 
facilities are government controlled, apart from satellite channels which are widely 
available. The print media is predominantly privately owned and consists of hundreds 
of weekly publications, expressing differing opinions and viewpoints.  English 
language newspapers appeal mostly to an educated urban readership, with the main 
English-language papers being The Daily Star and The Financial Express (BBC 
website 2011). 
 
Whilst the Constitution of Bangladesh officially guarantees press freedom with 
‗reasonable restriction‘, there have been considerable reporting restrictions on 
national security issues including domestic political turmoil (BBC website 2011). 
Bangladesh was in 2011 ranked 126th out of 173 countries on the Reporters Without 
Borders Press Freedom Index (see Reporters Without Borders website), with 1st 
being most free. 
 
5.8.2 Academia 
Despite the omnipresence of the notion of development in the popular and political 
discourse in Bangladesh, there are only a few academic institutions that deal with 
issues specifically related to development. Apart from the Bangladesh Institute for 
Development Studies (BIDS), development studies as a social science discipline is 
only offered at the national (i.e. state-owned) University of Dhaka (Development 
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Studies Department, Dhaka University) and at the private North South University 
(Institute of Development, Environmental, and Strategic Studies). 
 
The main academics at Dhaka University‘s Development Studies Department16, such 
as Prof Mahbubul Haq or Prof Atiqur Rahman, both of whom were trained as 
development economists in the 1960s and 70s, maintain that the primary focus of 
development studies as a taught subject is on economic growth (Lecture notes, 
Dhaka University ‗Understanding Development‘, January 2009). The ‗growth is good‘ 
mantra and ‗trickle down‘ economics (see Dollar and Kray, 2001) are a key part of 
the syllabus (Lecture notes, Dhaka University ‗Understanding Development‘, January 
2009) and a more recent critical focus within the development studies discipline on 
concerns around inequality and rights-based development (see the genealogogy in 
Chapter 3) are deemed to be not a priority for development policy in Bangladesh 
(Lecture notes, Dhaka University ‗Understanding Development‘, January 2009). 
However, the adherence to these neo-liberal mantras is slightly surprising given the 
social science faculty‘s general left-leaning orientation and Dhaka University‘s 
reputation as the vanguard of the Mujibist socialist revolution.  
 
Whilst this is only a snapshot of the academic field, it is interesting to note the 
possible intellectual dimension of hegemonic formations.  Peet (2002) contends that 
through the establishment of an Academic-Institutional-Media (AIM) complex, power 
is exercised in the development field.  According to the AIM complex theory (Peet 
2002), discourses are better able to become hegemonic if they originate in theories 
elaborated by academics, often in elite institutions. Movement of personnel and ideas 
between academia and institutions are, in his view, eventually integrated into 
government thinking and policy-making, particularly if they correspond to the 
                                                 
16 The author participated in a short course at the University of Dhaka entitled ‗Understanding 
Development‘ in January 2009. 
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government‘s policy agenda.  This is further aided, Peet (2002) argues, when 
academic discourses are translated into language that can be digested by the 
informational media.  
 
There is a link perceivable between mainstream development institutions and 
academics at Dhaka University, which is both untypical in terms of the general 
relationship of academics and foreign donors and the political tradition evident on 
campus. Possibly due to the adherence of the main academic figuresin the 
Development Studies Department to neo-liberal development orthodoxy, the 
Department has been able to attract funding from mainstream donors.Unlike the rest 
of the campus, which has had held the reputation for being the ‗Oxford of the East‘ 
for nearly 100 years but has not seen much infrastructural improvement since, the 
Development Studies Department has recently been considerably improved through 
funding from Danida, the Danish development agency. The Department, now, has air 
conditioning, high quality furnishing, the latest Powerpoint projector, video 
conferencing, a PC suite and the only lift on campus. This sets the Department apart 
from the rest of Dhaka University and indicates a unique relationship with Western 
donors, consistent with Peet‘s concept of an academic – institutional complex. 
 
The movement of personnel as per Peet‘s (2002) argument is even more clearly 
pronounced with, for example, Prof Atiqur Rahman, who was a senior member of 
BIDS before joining Dhaka University, working closely with the Government. He was 
appointed Director General of the Bangladesh Bank in the major reshuffle in the 
aftermath of the 2008 elections and is a key media commentator on economic and 
development issues.  
 
From this snapshot it would certainly appear that Bangladesh provides fertile ground 
for hegemonic formations across the academic-institutional-media complex. 
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5.8.3 Islamic religious movements and political Islam in Bangladesh  
 
The influence of Islam on the Bengali population began in the thirteenth century. 
Attracted by the egalitarianism of Islam, with its emphasis on equality, brotherhood, 
and social justice, many Buddhists and lower caste Hindus embraced the faith in 
response to work of Muslim missionaries and mystics (Lesser, 1988).  
 
However, Bengalis preserved many of their pre-Islamic cultural traditions from 
Buddhism and Hinduism and created a uniquely Bangladeshi Islam. This was distinct 
from the development of Islam in India and set them apart from their neighbours, 
giving rise to the sentiment ‗Bengali but not Indian, Muslim but Pakistani‘ (White, 
1999: 311) which, as noted above, underpins the triangular relationship between 
Bangladesh, India and Pakistan.  
 
The institutionalisation of Islamic political thought on the subcontinent began with the 
establishment of the Muslim League in 1906 (then called the All-India Muslim 
League).  The Muslim league was the main force behind the creation of Pakistan in 
1947, and was almost eliminated from the political stage in Bangladesh for this 
reason. By the 1980s, other Islamic political parties began to gain a following, 
especially among the educated urban youth (Lesser, 1988). The most important 
Islamic party since the 1980s has been the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, often 
referred to by outsiders and insiders alike as the 'Jamaat', which is the largest Islamic 
political party in Bangladesh. Opposed to the independence of Bangladesh, Jamaat 
groups such as the Razakers and the para-military al-Badr fought on the side of the 
Pakistani troops.  
 
Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh re-established itself under General Zia in 1975 and 
joined the BNP in an alliance, even holding two Ministries in Khaleda Zia's 
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government (2001-2006). However, due to a highly disputed reading of history, some 
of its leaders who resisted Bangaldeshi independence remain accused of war 
crimes, renewed prosecution for which was made a priority by Sheikh Hasina and 
became a major election issue in 2008/9. 
Jamaat-e-Islami‘s positioning on the political stage is therefore complex. The party 
calls for a theo-democracy in line with that propagated by its founder Maududi 
(1976). But also, despite their opposition to Western-style democracy, it advocated 
for the resignation of Ershad and the restoration of democracy in Bangladesh, and 
participated actively in a BNP led government.  
 
In the typology of Islamic revivalists and movements offered in section 4.8, the 
Bangladesh Jamaat spans the modernist spectrum. However, due to the cultural 
dominance of traditional nature of Islam in the country, more traditionalist policies 
can also be seen, such as the accommodation of certain Islamic folk-Sufi traditions, 
despite the Jamaat‘s condemnation of certain syncretic elements that are regarded 
as a link to Hindu tradition (Lesser, 1988).  
 
The party has drawn much of its strength from the urban elites, the growing middle 
class and graduates (Hashmi, 2004). It has a very active student wing, the Islami 
Chhatro Shibir (Islamic Students Camp), which vies with other political party student 
organisations for influence on the country‘s campuses (Hashmi, 2004).   
 
The relationship between the Jamaat and the Awami League has been one of mutual 
enmity, with the Jamaat ―vilifying the Awami-NGO lobby as the ‗enemies of Islam‘, 
‗Indian agents‘ and ‗agents of neo-imperialism‘,‖ and the latter portraying the former 
as ―‗anti-Liberation/Pakistani agents‘, ‗fundamentalist/Taliban‘ and ‗Communal‘ (anti-
Hindu and anti-minority fascist)‖ (Hashmi, 2004: 55). These power relationships 
reflect the triangular identity politics between India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. They 
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also underscore any kind of engagement in the public policy process, in which both 
groupings seek legitimacy and to exclude the other. 
 
There are a number of other smaller parties, such as the Islami Oikya Jote and the 
Islamic United Front, although they possess little influence. Nevetheless, in 1986 the 
Islamic United Front campaigned for the cancellation of the 1972 Indo-Bangladeshi 
Cooperation Treaty (Lesser, 1988), again signifying the antagonistic relationship 
between the Pakistani oriented Islamic political movement and the pro-Indian 
secularists. 
 
There are other large Islamic movements, such as the Tabligh-e-Jamat (Society for 
Spreading Faith), which originated in the Indian subcontinent in the 1920s. Although 
regarded as a highly significant movement promoting internal grassroots missionary 
renewal (Metcalf, 2004), with millions of activists worldwide (Masud, 2000), it is non-
political. On the Islamic revivalist spectrum (see 4.8) the Tabligh-e-Jamat is very 
firmly situated on the traditionalist side, promoting personal piety rather than 
involvement in political issues. 
 
From the early 70s onwards successive Bangladeshi governments have sought to 
increase their role in the religious life of the people. They instrumentalised political 
Islam, in order to win votes and legitimise their rule (Hashmi, 2004). The Ministry of 
Religious Affairs provided support and finance to religious institutions and directed 
the work of the Islamic Foundation Bangladesh in conducting research, training 
imams and maintaining the National Mosque. In 1984 the Zakat Fund Committee 
was established under the chairmanship of the President of Bangladesh, soliciting 
Zakat contributions on a voluntary basis, and spending them on orphanages, 
schools, children's hospitals, and other charitable institutions (Lesser, 1988).  
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Identity politics around Islam are therefore a central component of a carefully crafted 
national identity, and continue to play a significant role in public life. Islam is not 
simply the subject of Islamic parties‘ discourse, it has also been appropriated by 
secular parties such as Awami League, which includes slogans such as "Allah is 
Great" in its banners.  As Lesser (1988) illustrates, when an ‗Islamic way of life‘ was 
included in a constitutional amendment in 1988, no-one paid much attention to the 
understanding and impact of such an important commitment. Outside observers 
feared the impact of this ideological shift, but the only real change it brought about 
was the proliferation of religious parties at both the national and the local levels 
(Hashmi, 2004) This has, however, exacerbated tensions and conflicts between 
secular and religious politicians (Jahan, 2005). Islam, however, has not become a 
signifier that fills public debate with particular shared meanings. In fact, it remains an 
empty signifier that various discourses seek to fill with their own meaning. 
 
The next section of this chapter focuses on the key policies within the development 
field in Bangladesh and their discursive relationship. 
 
5.9 Discursive formations and hegemonic articulations in the 
development field in Bangladesh  
 
After contextualising the development field and its main actors in Bangladesh, this 
section introduces and analyses the main development policies through a brief 
descriptive account, identifying potential areas of discursive interest, particularly 
hegemonic formations and instances of inter-textuality.   
 
There are four primary development policies and fundamental texts at work in 
Bangladesh that are considered in the following sections.   
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5.9.1 Millennium Development Goals 
 
The MDGs underpin much Bangladeshi public policy and discourse and act as a 
conduit for the relationship between the state and many non-state actors. This is 
particularly interesting because Goal 8 of the MDGs stipulates the importance of 
partnerships between government and non-governmental actors.   
 
The reasoning behind the increasing emphasis on these partnerships is the 
perception that governments are not able to resolve problems and provide adequate 
basic services on their own (Brinkerhoff 1999; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002).  In 
Bangladesh‘s case Anu Mohammad argues, from a Marxist perspective, that ―the 
state‘s responsibility towards its citizens is thoroughly reduced and the market is 
given full authority in every sphere of life. In this model, the NGO is a supplement to 
as well as an instrument of market economy.‖ (‗Voice of the oppressed‘ website, 
2011) 
  
The trend of public-private partnerships and emphasis on ‗devolution‘ or ‗de-
centralisation‘ within the last 15 years has been at the core of development policy 
and infuses the MDGs as goal 8 demonstrates.  Based on the notion of power used 
in this research, it is particularly interesting to note the recent efforts in mainstream 
development to promote de-centralised government. Recalling that Foucault (1991) 
defines government as ―[t]he ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, 
analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics, that allow the exercise of this 
very specific, albeit complex, form of power‖ (Foucault 1991: 102), the MDGs can be 
seen as an example of how an ensemble of a number of objectives can exercise 
power without the institutional rigidity of centralised governance, as it is policies 
rather than structures that govern their subjects.  
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5.9.2 Bangladesh’s constitution 
 
The Constitution of Bangladesh was drafted in 1972 but has undergone numerous 
amendments (Khan, 1997). The rollercoaster nature of Bangladeshi politics has 
resulted in a number of drastic political changes and Constitutional revisions. In fact, 
every regime that has come to power since 1972 has altered the Constitution 
(Hashmi, 2004), and there is currently a renewed discussion on whether to move 
back to the original constitution of 1972. The document itself represents an 
antagonistic frontier between different hegemonic formations, as the following section 
will demonstrate. 
 
The original Constitution of Bangladesh was based on the examples of 
representative democracy upheld by Britain and the United States (Lesser, 1988), 
with a few notable exceptions such as party-linked parliamentarianism, which 
appears to be based on the Indian model (Jahan, 2005). The Constitution places 
great emphasis on the rights of citizens, including, interestingly, the right to 
development. The state sees its role as organising a society in which everyone is 
free and equal and welfare is provided for all. In this respect, the government is 
required to provide food, shelter, clothing, medical care, education, work, and social 
security for the people. Socialism infuses the objectives with a commitment on the 
part of the government to "remove social and economic inequality" and "ensure the 
equitable distribution of wealth among citizens" (Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972). 
But there also remains a commitment to private property and private enterprise, 
which are seen as key factors in economic development (Lesser 1988).  
 
General Zia‘s amendments of 1977 sought to realign the Constitution with Islamic 
values and move away from state socialism. In Article 8(1A) the phrase "absolute 
trust and faith in Almighty Allah shall be the basis of all actions"' was added, 
 - 213 - 
replacing the commitment to secularism. Article 8(1) redefined socialism as 
"economic and social justice" (Constitution of Bangladesh, 1979). However, it is 
interesting to note that at no stage in the history of the Constitution, with all its 
various amendments, has Islam been associated with any development related 
issue, or provided the basis for a political, social or economic framework.  
 
It is clear from this overview that the Constitution of Bangladesh has been assembled 
through a number of inter-related discursive processes, undergoing a number of 
amendments that reflect changing hegemonic formations along the lines of the 
Bangladeshi political rollercoaster (see section 5.3).  Most striking, after the 
introduction of Qur‘anic Bismillah in the pre-amble despite the clear socialist direction 
that the original constitution intended, is the incidence of inter-textuality. It is difficult 
to verify which passages of the Bangladeshi Constitution were authored by specific 
groups in the bargaining process that constitutional assembly represented (Huq 
1973) but interesting to consider nevertheless. One striking example will be 
considered here. 
                     
Part II of the Constitution deals with the fundamental principles of state policy 
focusing on planned economic growth in order to secure the basic necessities for the 
citizens of Bangladesh. Article 20, however, expresses in verbatim a recognition of 
the Marxist principle of ―from each according to their ability, to each according to his 
work‖ (Huq, 1973: 73). The phrase used is derived from the slogan ―From each 
according to his ability, to each according to his need (or needs)‖, which was 
popularised by Karl Marx in his Critique of the Gotha Program (Marx, 1875). This 
concept means that in a communist society, every person should contribute to 
society to the best of their ability and consume from society in proportion to their 
need, based on the belief that collective ownership of the means of production in a 
socialist system would generate sufficient resources for this to be achieved. 
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But actually, the phrase was coined in Blanc‘s The Organization of Work (1840). 
Blanc adapted it from Henri de Saint Simon, who had asserted that everybody should 
be rewarded in relation to how much they work (Kirkup, 1909). Interestingly, the 
concept was later adapted in Stalin‘s 1936 Soviet constitution as "from each 
according to his ability, to each according to his work‖ (Post and Wright, 1989). That 
the same principle should appear in the constitution of Bangladesh should not be 
interpreted to mean that the text in its entirety was produced by Marxists or Stalinists, 
but, as reflected in Huq (1973), that many different political groupings vied for 
influence in the constitution and various ideological influences are apparent 
throughout the whole document. Due to Mujib‘s socialist tendencies, it is not 
surprising that the original constitution of 1972 had a clear leaning to the left, a voice 
that represented many of the moderately leftist members of Awami League. The 
Marxist voice that represents this statement, however, appears to come from political 
quarters further to the left with the Communist Party of Bangladesh (Marxist) claiming 
authorship of this particular piece of inter-textuality. 
 
 
5.9.3 Bangladesh’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
 
In Bangladesh as elsewhere the PRSP approach builds on the principles of the 
Comprehensive Development Framework (Centre for Policy Dialogue, n.d.), which 
are a long-term holistic vision, country ownership, partnership and a focus on 
development results with the aim of reducing poverty (World Bank, Comprehensive 
Development Framework Report, 2001).   
 
In the PRSP development process a government, however, can seek as much 
participation as it wishes. PRSPs are supposed to be country-driven, prepared and 
developed transparently with the broad participation of civil society.  But, despite the 
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absence of a template or blueprint, the process for preparing a PRSP is designed by 
donors, which undermines the authenticity of national ownership (Cheru 2001), 
especially where country-ownership is understood primarily as government approval.  
 
Bangladesh‘s PRSPs (GoP 2001, 2003, 2009) focus on macro-economic stability 
and prioritise strategies that emphasise public action as having the highest poverty 
impact. However, the definition and measurement of poverty, and reduction of it, 
which is inextricably linked to its conceptualisation, have been strongly contested 
within Bangladesh. 
 
Bangladesh‘s Planning Commission produced the National Strategy for Economic 
Growth, Poverty Reduction and Social Development, in March 2003. This was the 
equivalent to an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (I-PRSP), favoured by many 
poor countries prior to preparing a full PRSP in order to qualify for debt relief under 
the HIPC initiative, for which Bangladesh was ear-marked, although the World Bank 
ultimately classified it as ‗less indebted‘ and therefore ineligible (Jubilee Debt 
Campaign website, 2012).   
 
The I-PRSP outlined the country‘s existing poverty reduction strategy and detailed a 
plan for the development of a full PRSP, but due to a lack of in-house capacity to 
prepare an I-PRSP, the government decided that the document should be prepared 
using consultants (Centre for Policy Dialogue, n.d.). According to a senior source at 
the Planning Commission, whom the author interviewed in January 2009, there was 
―pressure from the OECD, IMF and the World Bank. We were told to develop a 
PRSP without international consultants […]. But some local consultants from BIDS 
and Dhaka University were used.‖ (Interview transcript Planning Commission, 
19/01/09). Whilst this is interesting in terms of country-ownership, the Planning 
Commission‘s position also shows Foucauldian self-disciplining bio-power (1972) in 
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action, in which only a specific corpus of knowledge and techniques, that of the 
external, international consultant, is deemed adequate for the production of such a  
national strategy.    
 
The formulation of the I-PRSP was heavily influenced by the IMF/World Bank 
prescription that it must be prepared through a broad-based consultation process, 
including with all stakeholders. According to the Centre for Policy Dialogue (n.d.) two 
senior staff of Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) were employed 
by the Government in their individual rather than institutional capacities, as 
consultants to lead the preparation of the PRSP, preparing policy recommendations 
on three areas: 
(i) Poverty Assessment: Trends, Profiles and Determinants  
(ii) Macro-economic Overview: Policies, Economic Reforms and Performance,  
(iii) Poverty Monitoring and Assessment.  
(Centre for Policy Dialogue, n.d.: 42)  
 
Further reports focussed on key sectors and sub sectors of the economy including: 
Growth Performance of Agriculture and Industry; Analysis of Public Expenditure on 
Education and Health; Physical Infrastructures Development and Poverty (Roads, 
and Other Related Infrastructures; Electricity, Energy, Ports and Related Sectors; 
Telecommunications & New Technologies); Public Expenditure on Targeted and 
Safety Net Programmes; Risks, Vulnerability & Poverty Reduction; NGO Sector 
Review: Economic and Social Impacts and Issues; and Governance and Poverty 
Reduction, although these were never made fully available to the public, according to 
the Centre for Policy Dialogue (n.d.). Based on these reports, a draft I-PRSP was 
completed in 2002 and distributed for comments, which were then incorporated  into 
the final version, published in 2003 (Centre for Policy Dialogue, n.d.). The I-PRSP 
summarised Bangladesh‘s strategy for reducing poverty and achieving the 
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Millennium Development Goals, and it layed the groundwork for discussions between 
the Government and donors at the Bangladesh Development Forum in May 2003.  
 
The I-PRSP (GoB 2003) covered the following strategic elements:  
1. Accelerating Pro-poor Economic Growth 
2. Ensuring Macroeconomic Balances 
3. Promoting Good Governance 
4. Agriculture 
5. Rural Development  
6. Manufacturing Growth  
7. Infrastructure Development  
8. Technology Policy  
9. Microcredit Policy  
10. Fostering Human Development of the Poor  
11. Women‘s Advancement and Removing Gender Gaps  
12. Strengthening Social Protection  
13. Supporting Local Government and Broadening Participation 
14. Policies and Institutions for Reducing Inequality  
15. Caring for Environment  
 
This overview of the I-PRSP formulation process demonstrates that the methodology 
used to formulate it followed IFI orthodoxy with a focus on economic growth (items 1, 
6, 7 and 8) and macro-economic stability (item 2). It also included a range of human 
development dimensions (items 10, 11, 12 14) that is reminiscent of the ‗adjustment 
with a human face approach‘ (Stewart, 1987). It was only the micro-credit, rural 
development, manufacturing growth (particularly the ready-made-garment sector) 
and environmental issues that offered a specific Bangladeshi flavour. 
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Twelve thematic groups were formed by the Government in late 2003, to carry out 
consultations with civil society, donors, and others (Centre for Policy Dialogue, n.d.). 
A summary of the findings was reflected in the draft PRSP I produced, which was 
presented to the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC) in 
October 2005, resulting in the formulation of Bangladesh‘s first full PRSP, titled 
‗Unlocking the Potential: National Strategy for Accelerated Growth‘ (GoB 2005). The 
PRSP proposed a wide range of policy recommendations including: 
1. Accelerating Growth for Poverty Reduction 
2. Economic Growth, Investment and Savings 
3. Private Sector Investment 
4. Promoting Foreign Direct Investment 
5. Macroeconomic Stability 
6. Facilitating Fair and Competitive Business 
7. Promoting Employment 
8. Technology and Poverty Reduction 
9. Promoting Trade 
 
These broad categories were then broken down into sector-wide approaches (SAPs), 
which make reference to social safety nets, human development, good governance 
and social inclusion, reflecting the more participatory approach of the time. 
 
Like other countries, Bangladesh embraced the PRSP framework with the intention 
of combing or integrating it with its planning process, although in reality it replaced 
the established Five-Year planning cycle, possibly to the dismay of the Planning 
Commission establishment and those who held the concept of planning to be 
ideologically important. The author‘s senior source in the Planning Commission 
clarified this by stating that, ―planning is not a socialistic tool, [both] India and China 
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have one‖ (Interview transcript Planning Commission, 19/01/09), harking back to the 
influence of the Indian economic planning approach in Bangladesh. 
 
The PRSP I document invited rather hostile criticisms from various stakeholders and 
the civil society for being largely donor-driven. Indeed, there have been continual 
criticisms directed toward Bangladesh‘s PRSPs, mainly evolving around the lack of 
participatory involvement in their development, similar to PRSP critiques 
internationally (Dembele 2003; Fraser 2003).  However, the pragmatism of the 
approach taken in the face of the political realities were identified by a leader in the 
Bangladeshi paper ‗The Financial Express‘: 
―But there will have to be mutually respectable dialogue to this end [the 
formulation of the PRSP, the author]. The amendments to, or changes in, the 
PRSP must not and cannot be a one-sided process of various interest groups 
in Bangladesh. Such interest groups do often shrilly condemn the donors for 
their alleged breathing down the necks of the governments of Bangladesh 
(GOBs) which, according to them, do meekly submit more often than not, to 
donors' dictates. But, in all frankness, all concerned do need to appreciate 
that the PRSP will be substantially planned and funded with donors' money. 
Therefore, it cannot be that the suppliers of funds will take a completely mute 
back seat by not offering any meritorious ideas as they would conceive them, 
while providing supports for the PRSP. This is highly unrealistic and would 
also run the risks of alienating the donors.‖ (The Financial Express, 25th 
August 2009)  
 
Moreover, as is evident from the content of Bangladesh‘s I-PRSP and PRSP I, which 
are very similar and also quite standardised, following the general blueprint of 
commitment to macro-economic stability, good governance and pro-poor growth, the 
agenda was already set. The same senior Planning Commission official underlined 
this general pattern dictated by the hegemonic policy formation of the IFIs and 
bilateral donors: ―There is nothing innovative in our poverty reduction process. The 
PRSP as a document is nice, but there is no detail and various problems, for 
example manpower shortage, are not discussed‖ (Interview transcript, Planning 
Commission, 19/01/09). Bangladesh‘s PRSPs, not dissimilar to many others, remain 
framed by mainstream discourses that govern the field. 
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Moreover, despite the local and international criticism and the rollercoaster nature of 
politics in Bangladesh, the Awami League‘s revised PRSP II, that was added to the 
original PRSP II in 2009 to reflect the AL‘s agenda, follows the same general lay-out 
and uses mainstream international development terminology to put across its 
development policy priorities: 
 Macroeconomic Environment for Pro-Poor Economic Growth  
o Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Development  
o Promoting Decent Employment  
o Improving the Environment for Private Sector Development (PSD)  
o Agriculture  
o Water Resources Development and Management  
o Land Use Policy and Management  
o Urban Development  
 Essential Infrastructure for Pro-Poor Economic Growth  
o Power and Energy 
o Transport 
o Post and Telecommunication 
o Housing 
 Social Protection for the Vulnerable  
o Social Safety Net Programmes 
o Food Security, Disaster Management 
o Microcredit 
Excerpt from the Revised PRSP II, GoB, 2009 
 
The revised PRSP II is, however, much more prescriptive in terms of output, 
reminiscent of a planned economy approach. It also makes a particular point of 
explaining the proposed changes in macro-economic stability policy, to which a 
whole section is dedicated. This is important, because, the Awami League‘s election 
pledge of price stability, i.e. increased state subsidy for staples and fuel is an open 
challenge to the free market agenda promoted by the IFIs. 
 
As interesting as what the Bangladesh‘s PRSPs do contain, is what they do not 
contain, particularly in the light of Foucault‘s notion of excluding procedures (1977). 
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Despite the reasonable expectation based on the fact that Islam has penetrated 
many political instruments such as the constitution and is instrumentalised to varying 
degrees in popular and political culture and identity politics, as the previous sections 
have demonstrated, all the PRSPs are devoid of any references to Islamic teachings. 
Traditional channels of poverty alleviation such as Zakat or welfare provision or 
employment creation through Waqf (endowment), which previously played a 
significant role in Bangladesh (see, for example, Waqf losing appeal to affluent 
Muslims, Financial Express, 6/11/2010) have not been touched upon. Not 
surprisingly, Jamaat-e-Islami MP Md. Azizur Rahman Chowdhury ―urged the drafters 
of the PRSP to integrate the issues of distributive justice as delineated in the Holy 
Qur‘an‖ (Bangladesh Institute for Parliamentary Studies, 2005: 17)  
 
These ommissions, coupled with the general conditioning of the language of the 
PRSPs to echo the international language of development, appear to be not just 
matters of convention, but also hint at what Foucault termed an ‗exclusion 
procedure‘. In this case, the exclusion process is double, with the PRSPs language 
firstly reflecting mainstream international development discourses, whilst secondly, 
due to the influence of the left-leaning Awami League government, it is being infused 
with more statist elements.  
 
At the same time, there are examples to suggest that the language of mainstream 
international development that is populated with terms such ‗poverty reduction‘ is 
actually an empty signifier that can be filled with different meanings by different 
discourses. An interesting example is the discussions with parliamentarians, such as 
Md. Karim Abbasi, an MP for the then governing BNP, who questioned why the draft 
PRSP did not seek poverty eradication instead of merely reduction (Bangladesh 
Institute for Parliamentary Studies, 2005: 16).  
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The conflation of the terms reduction and eradication continues todate, as is evident 
in Awami League‘s election manifesto 2009 as discussed previously.  This is perhaps 
indicative of the trend that the discourse on poverty has become an empty signifier 
and various discourses have sought, albeit without evident success, to attach 
meaning to it by relating it to either reduction, alleviation or eradication strategies. 
 
5.9.4 Five-year plans 
 
As the predecessor of the PRSP, Five-Year Plans (FYP) have a number of areas of 
significance. First of all, FYPs are policy documents with a history, offering 
themselves to either selective appropriation or fading away. Secondly, they are also 
policy documents of the future, as a new FYP will replace the PRSP II in due course. 
In this sense history and future are fused with the ideological commitment to 
economic planning being translated into an IFI endorsed strategy. 
 
Neither the I-PRSP (2003-05), the PRSP I (2005-07) nor the PRSP I (extended to 
2008) make explicit, substantive reference to their predecessor, the 5th FYP (1997-
2002), since the former two were conceived under the BNP government, and the 
latter under the technocrat-led caretaker government. For neither of the BNP-
authored PRSPs might it have been an ideological or political necessity to link them 
with the socialist planning process initiated by Mujib. However, for more than political 
expediency, the Awami League government made both an election pledge and then 
a political reality to reintroduce the FYP. The revised PRSP II (2009-11) made an 
explicit mention of the re-introduction of the five-year-planning cycle: 
―The government has also adopted a long term vision for the development of 
the country which will be reflected in the long term Perspective Plan (2010-
2021), under preparation by the government. For realizing the Vision, the 
government would start the implementation of the Sixth Five Year Plan 
(FY:2011-2015) from July 2010. The present NSAPR II (revised) shall remain 
in force until FY11 and its performance will be reviewed each year in normal 
course. Eventually, the time frame for MTBF (medium term budget 
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framework) shall be extended from three to five years, which shall facilitate 
continuation of spill over projects or programmes as well as inclusion of new 
ones.‖ (GoB, 2010) 
 
Whilst this statement shows an attachment to the planning process that is either of a 
macro ideological nature (i.e. because of adherence to socialist principles) or of 
micro ideological expediency (i.e. the value of relating development to the legacy of 
the struggle for independence led by the Bhangabandu) it is also smoothly couched 
in contemporary neo-liberal development terminology such as MBTF, enabling the 
Government of Bangladesh to also keep an important relationship with IFIs.   
 
The key ingredients of documents discussed above (MDGs, the Bangladesh 
Constitution, PRSPs and FYPs) form the major discursive formations within the 
development field in Bangladesh. This section examined how these processes and 
the contents of the documents relate and influence each other through analyses 
focusing on inter-textual referencing (Fairclough 2003).  The point was to highlight 
where voices and pieces of texts are directly incorporated from one document or 
policy arena to another and where particular selections of voices and pieces of texts 
have been re-contextualised, meaning that they are included in or excluded from 
other policies and significant historical, ideological and religious literatures.   
 
As has been demonstrated in this section, most development related polices are 
clearly inter-textually related in Bangladesh, such as the constitution that has both 
Marxist and Islamic elements.  
 
The next section will identify how this process of inter-textuality has led to the 
formation of hegemonic articulations. 
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5.10 Mapping the discursive relationships of Bangladeshi development 
policy 
 
This section further examines how the multiple discourses that are embedded within 
the assumptions of the mainstream development discourses in Bangladesh can build 
hegemonic formations. 
 
 At this stage it is helpful to recall that Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 112) argue, that ‗any 
discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest 
the flow of differences to construct a centre‘.   The success or failure of such 
attempts can be understood as being related to a Foucauldian link between the 
political exercise of power and the legitimacy of certain types of knowledge over 
others.  It could be argued that the key intention of attempts by discourses to 
dominate a discursive field is to create meaning that is understood as commonsense, 
weaving together different strands of discourses in an effort to dominate or organise 
a field of meaning (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 3). 
 
In pursuit of one of this study‘s objectives, that of unpicking the power relations that 
arguably underly and are contributed by the mainstream discourse, it is important to 
investigate the antagonistic frontiers that these discursive formations create in order 
to create and maintain hegemony, to construct a centre or a ‗nodal point‘ (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985)  
 
In Bangladesh, it would appear that within the historic process that is represented by 
the Constitution of 1972 and the Five-Year-Plans as compared to the later PRSPs, 
an antagonistic frontier has been formed between more leftist-statist and neo-liberal 
discursive formations. These discursive formations tend to be fixed around the nodal 
points of planning/state control and market forces/liberalisation.  It is noteworthy to 
point out that these discursive formations are not necessarily neatly demarcated and 
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there are internal contradictions to do with the multi-authoring of texts over time. This 
is particularly evident in the Constitution, both in the way various sections of the 
Constitutional Assembly were vying over influence and how a number of 
amendments changed some fundamental provisions, as the previous section has 
demonstrated.     
 
In the next analytic discussion a better understanding of the depth of struggle 
occurring in and around these nodal points will be illustrated.  The struggles amongst 
the main policies are struggles in which the orders of discourses do not vary to a 
significant degree as they are unified through the dominance of mainstream 
development discourses.   
 
With the rationale of illustrating the extent of how each policy is inter-textually 
influencing each other, the diagram (Fig. 6) maps all the major policies and 
significant pieces of literature that are referenced within the major Bangladesh 
development policies. 
 
The first layer of referencing is created through the shapes in the diagram, with the 
triangle denoting global ‗ideas‘ such as globalisation or socialism, the rectangle 
referring to ‗texts‘ such the Bangladesh Constitution or the Qur‘an,  and the circle 
national development policies.  In addition, each shape has been colour-coded to 
denote the general ideological orientation of a text, idea or policy, with red referring 
to socialist/statist, blue to neo-liberal and green to Islamic.  
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Due to the inherent complexities of authorship in textual analysis, this diagram is 
meant to provide an approximation, denoting the complexity of inter-textual 
relationships. Sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.6 discussed the attributes of the IFIs and the 
Figure 6:  Inter-textual relationships between major national development policies, 
‘global’ ideas and texts in Bangladesh 
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major bi-lateral donor organisations.  Bi-lateral donor organisations carry out 
practices that are in alignment with the political priorities of their corresponding 
nation, as well as OECD principles and objectives.  UN multi-lateral organisations 
have far fewer financial resources than their multi-lateral IFI counterparts, but are 
influential, particularly in terms of conceptualising various social development 
practices.   
 
There are a range of chains of equivalence (hegemonic practices) amongst the IFIs 
and bi-lateral donors that have reached near hegemonic formations in the 
mainstream development discourses.  However, with the re-election of Awami 
League, a long-standing antagonistic frontier has been re-awakened that not only 
seeks to counter the neo-liberal hegemonic articulation that the mainstream 
development discourse constitutes, but also seeks to appropriate some of its main 
terminology and rhetoric.  
 
As a result, the concepts of ‗development‘ and ‗poverty‘ have become floating 
signifiers, particularly well illustrated by the Awami League‘s interchangeable use of 
the terms reduction, alleviation and elimination in relation to poverty. Due to the 
interchangeably used reference to interventions against poverty, the aim of 
intervention, i.e. reduction, alleviation or elimination has become an empty signifier, 
devoid of any actual meaning. 
 
Development has also been nearly emptied of meaning during the progression of 
FYPs and PRSPs, referenced yet not necessarily ideologically linked to global 
development policies. In Bourdieu‘s (1977) sense, ‗development‘ has become 
essential: ―What is essential goes without saying because it comes without saying‖ 
(Bourdieu 1977: 167).  This is, arguably, a logic of difference in the way 
conceptualuised by Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 2001) unifying actors, institutions, 
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policies and theories within the development field to a significant extent.  
Development has, hence, to be seen as a near empty or at best floating signifier with 
the various discourses competing to attach their meaning to it. 
 
Interestingly, the dominant discourses within the above logic of difference reflect the 
mainstream development discourses identified in Chapter/section 3.4 (economic 
growth, modernity and materially-determined quasi-monetary poverty 
conceptualisations), although in the Bangladeshi scenario a further dimension is 
added to the mainstream, based on the policy review in the previous sections that 
identified the influence of Mujibist socialism, which has led to a hegemonic 
articulation matrix: 
 Independence - Globalisation 
 Growth – market vs. state 
 Materially determined, quasi-monetary poverty conceptualisation 
 
These hegemonic articulations imply a process of charging empty signifiers with 
meaning or partially fixing floating signifiers, which became particularly relevant when 
examining the relationship between discourses around Islamist conceptualisations of 
society, economy and politics and mainstream development policies. In Fig.7 this 
relationship is illustrated. The antagonistic frontier between Islamist discourses and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7:   Hegemonic articulation of mainstream development in Bangladesh  
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mainstream development policy is underpinned by a chain of logic of equivalence 
where a diverse range of mainstream discourses are unified in their opposition to the 
Islamist discourse. 
 
At the same time ‗Islam‘ has also become an floating signifier, with practically each 
political party, including the Communist Party of Bangladesh, utilising Islamic slogans 
and quotations from the Qur‘an in their political material (Hashmi, 2004). Yet, despite 
the strong Islamic flavour of the constitution, it does not provide a policy framework, 
which is surprising, ―[s]ince Bangladesh is the third-largest Muslim country in the 
world (after Indonesia and Pakistan), it is only natural to assume that Islam plays an 
important role in molding its politics and culture‖ (Hashmi, 2004: 37). The various 
‗Islams‘ are only provided with meaning when they are unified in a chain of logic of 
equivalence, as represented in the term Islamic political movement, which spans a 
number of parties and groups opposed to ‗other‘ cultures, systems and influences 
such as the ‗West‘ or ‗India‘.  
 
In the same way, development becomes charged with a range of meanings around 
particular nodal points or privileged signifiers that partially fix its meaning as 
illustrated in Fig.8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8:   Nodal points charging development with meaning  
Development  
Secular 
 modernity 
Economic 
 growth 
Liberal 
democracy 
 - 230 - 
Thus, within the broader mainstream development discourses spanning both the 
neo-liberal and neo-Mujibist Awami league policies, the floating signifier 
‗development‘ has been partially fixed through the nodal points of liberal democracy, 
secular modernity and economic growth.  
 
Within these nodal points, however, rhetorical styles differ, objectives are re-
contextualised through contrasting prioritisation rankings and some objectives are 
included in policies whilst others are excluded.  At a lower order of discourse, for 
example, the nodal point of economic growth, in turn, is contested as it if were a 
floating signifier that is sought to be filled with meaning through either market or plan-
based economic discourses.  
 
Some of these contestations are another level of antagonistic frontier. Some of the 
internal contradictions can be partially explained by identifying the key players 
involved in the authoring of each policy, and they can also be accounted for by 
examining evolving political interests that respond both to world events and external 
challenges and internal political dynamics.   
 
The next section will provide a conclusion for this discussion of the policy field in 
Bangladesh.  
 
5.11 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has mapped out the development field in Bangladesh by providing an 
overview of development actors and how the key development and poverty reduction 
policies espoused are framed by them. Against the initial charcoal sketch offered in 
section 5.1, the development field in Bangladesh is complicated by the rollercoaster 
nature of its political history. The three main discourses identified vying for influence 
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in public policy are Mujibist socialism (including Awami League neo-Mujibism), neo-
liberalism and political Islam. 
 
The analysis of the key development actors and policies has shown that there is a 
high degree of inter-textuality embedded within each other. It has also identified a 
number of antagonistic frontiers, particularly one between political Islam and 
mainstream development discourses made up of a logic of equivalence between 
neo-Mujibism and neo-liberalism. A further antagonistic frontier has been identified 
within mainstream development discourses, which vye to lend meaning to the 
floating signifier of ‗development‘ itself. 
 
This chapter has hence demonstrated that by the way discourses struggle for 
hegemony by seeking to fill empty signifiers and fix floating signifiers in the policy 
space, antagonistic frontiers are opened up. These determine the actors‘ articulatory 
practice and importantly the power relations with other actors in the field. 
 
In this context, the next chapter will offer a case study of an important Islamic 
development actor to investigate how the global and Bangladesh-specific discourses 
frame policy-making and how these discourses generate power relationships with 
other actors in the field.  
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CHAPTER 6:  
INFLUENCES AND RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ISLAMIC AND MAINSTREAM 
DEVELOPMENT IN BANGLADESH: THE CASE OF THE ISLAMI BANK 
BANGLADESH 
 
6 Introduction and purpose 
 
After establishing the ‗global‘ or macro structures, such as the overall topics and the 
schematic organisation of the mainstream and Islamic development discourses in 
Chapters 3 and 4, the previous chapter has investigated the meso structures of these 
discourses within the context of development policy making in Bangladesh, 
contextualised by what this study has referred to as the Bangladeshi political 
‗rollercoaster‘.  
 
In this chapter the local or micro articulations of the discourses identified will be 
explored in form of a single ‗telling‘ case study of the Islami Bank‘s Rural 
Development Scheme in order to shed light on the question at the centre of this 
doctoral thesis as to how discourses frame policy-making17. Utilising Mitchell‘s (1984) 
concept of a ‗telling‘ case study, the Islami Bank has been selected to theoretically 
explore the research question within the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 1.  
 
As elaborated in the methodological discussion in Chapter 2, the selected case of the 
Islami Bank can be regarded as ‗instrumental‘ (Stake 1995) to the overall argument 
of the thesis, namely that discourses frame policy making by defining what is 
acceptable development knowledge in the way conceptualised by Foucault (see 
Chapter 1). Within the context of the discourses identified through the genealogies in 
Chapters 3 and 4 it is also intrinsic; the case is of interest in itself as it sheds light on 
how discourses frame policy making and hence adds to the body of critique by the 
                                                 
17 Parts of this Chapter have been published by the author – see ‗Recasting Development: 
Islamic Banking and the Case of the Islami Bank‘s Rural Development Scheme in 
Bangladesh‘, Journal of International Development, Vol. 23, Issue 5, August 2011 
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post-development school, which suggests that development is a discourse that 
orders and creates the problem that it seeks to address. 
 
In order to reconstruct and deconstruct the narratives and social practices of the 
Islami Bank, this case study will draw on discursive ‗data‘ from three sources: 
interviews, observations and documentary data gathered during field work in 
Bangladesh between November 2008 and May 2009. This will be supplemented by 
more recent documentary evidence to retain the currency of the study and to trace 
the trajectory of the Bangladeshi political ‗rollercoaster‘ during a period of change 
very relevant to the study.  As elaborated in Chapter 2, the term ‗deconstruct‘ is used 
here based on the general understanding that a text is not a discrete entity and in 
order to be understood must be ‗deconstructed‘. This will be done vis-à-vis the 
conceptual and analytical apparatus discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. 
 
This chapter will utilise CDA-based critical policy analysis (see Chapter 2) to explore 
the 'local' micro structures of the discourses identified. It will pay particular attention 
to how the hegemonic formations identified in the previous chapter shape the 
particular antagonistic frontiers at which the Islami Bank operates in order to fill 
development with its own specific meaning.  
 
6.1 Background: History and objectives of the Islami Bank 
 
The reason why the Islami Bank has been selected as a telling case study for this 
doctoral dissertation lies in its very history, which straddles the antagonistic frontiers 
identified in the previous Chapter. This section will explore the origins and 
development of Islamic banking in Bangladesh and in particular those of the Islami 
Bank. 
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The purpose of the case study is to explore how particular discourses frame the 
Islami Bank‘s development narrative. Hence, the case study focuses exclusively on 
the Islami Bank‘s account of the situation and their articulatory practice in regard to 
other actors but doesn‘t seek to provide a comparative dimension. 
 
6.1.1 Origins of the Islami Bank Bangladesh  
 
As the first fully-fledged Islamic Bank in South-East Asia, the Islami Bank 
Bangladesh Limited (IBBL) was founded in 1983 with start-up capital provided by the 
Jeddah-based Islamic Development Bank, a number of public and private banks and 
institutions from the Middle East, key figures from the Bangladeshi business 
community, and political and religious leaders linked to the Jamaat-e-Islami.   
 
A long list of local sponsors is named in various IBBL publications (e.g. IBBL Annual 
Report 2007), although any political connections are not made clear. The 
domestically potentially less controversial foreign dimension of the Bank‘s ownership 
is fully explained on its website:  
―IBBL is a joint venture multinational Bank with 63.92% of equity being 
contributed by the Islamic Development Bank and financial institutions like-Al-
Rajhi Company for Currency Exchange and Commerce, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait 
Finance House, Kuwait, Jordan Islamic Bank, Jordan, Islamic Investment and 
Exchange Corporation, Qatar, Bahrain Islamic Bank, Bahrain, Islamic 
Banking System International Holding S. A., Luxembourg, Dubai Islamic 
Bank, Dubai, Public Institution for Social Security, Kuwait,  Ministry of Awqaf 
and Islamic Affairs, Kuwait and Ministry of Justice, Department of Minors 
Affairs, Kuwait. In addition, two eminent personalities of Saudi Arabia namely, 
Fouad Abdul Hameed Al-Khateeb and Ahmed Salah Jamjoom are also the 
sponsors of IBBL.‖ (IBBL website 2011) 
 
These Middle-Eastern finance institutions and ‗eminent personalities‘ have offered 
their own dynamics. They have been described by Monzer Kahf (2004) as an ‗Islamic 
bourgeoisie‘, well linked to the political and religious establishment in the Muslim 
world that has led the global establishment of the Islamic finance industry (Kahf, 
2004: 18). 
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This is further underlined by the way the IBBL was established, with the precise point 
of origin, anecdotally related to the author by a number of senior staff (for example, 
interview transcript IBBL 30/03/09 and interview transcript IBBL 31/03/09), to be 
found in General Zia‘s attendance of the OIC summit in 1981 in Saudi Arabia. The 
account varies from one which describes a more technical lobbying of OIC and IDB 
officials to one with a spiritual dimension where the Saudi ambassador pleads with 
the General himself for support for the proposed bank whilst circumambulating the 
Kaabah on pilgrimage in Makkah. Others, however, have argued that President Zia-
ur Rahman himself proposed the concept to other leaders of the Muslim world, 
quoting Zia as reportedly stating that: "The Islamic countries should develop a 
separate banking system of their own in order to facilitate their trade and commerce‖ 
(c.f. Mukhlesur Rahman, in The Financial Express, Views and Opinions, 18th March 
2010).  
 
 
6.1.2 The legal environment 
 
Subsequently, Zia established a basic legal framework for Islamic banking by 
presidential decree and the Bangladesh Bank was instructed to study the operations 
of Islamic banks in other countries. Due to the lobbying, the IDB helped to establish a 
joint venture Islamic bank. In November 1982, with technical support from the Dhaka-
based Islamic Economics Research Bureau (IERB) and Bangladesh Islamic Bankers 
Association (BIBA) (Sarkar 1999). The Muslim Business Forum (MBF) provided 
support in raising capital from within Bangaldesh. As a result, the Islami Bank began 
trading in March 1983. Concurrently, due to Zia‘s presidential decree, the Finance 
Ministry instructed the Bangladesh Bank to ask all state-owned commercial banks to 
open an Islamic banking ‗window‘, on an experimental basis, including separate 
Islamic banking counters with separate ledgers in all their branches (Sarkar 1999).  
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Despite the rollercoaster nature of Bangladesh politics, successive governments 
have at least tolerated if not supported the Islamic banking system. As per 
Bangladeshi banking legislation (Debuath, 2003), the banking sector is broadly 
divided into Nationalised/Government Controlled Banks (NCBs), Foreign Commercial 
Banks (FCBs) and Private Commercial Banks (PCBs), the latter segment having 
experienced massive growth since the roll-back of the nationalisation of the banking 
sector, particularly since the pro-capitalist Ziaur Rahman (1977-1981) and Ershad 
(1982-1990) regimes (Debuath, 2003). Further state-owned financial institutions 
focusing on industrial or agricultural lending are categorised as development finance 
institutions (DFIs), whilst the well-known Grameen Bank, BRAC and other micro-
finance institutions are not scheduled with the Bangladesh Bank (BB), the country‘s 
central bank, and their operations are more flexible. 
 
Whilst the symbolism of the creation of the first Islamic Bank in Bangladesh is 
significant, not at least because Zia posthumously is given either a pro-active or a 
more passive role depending on the account, the Islamic finance industry is now an 
undisputed and significant feature of the Bangladeshi financial sector (see the next 
section for a discussion of competing conceptions of ‗Islamic‘ in seeking to fix its 
meaning). Almost every bank offers an Islamic ‗window‘ and some conventional 
banks have been recently converted into Islamic banks:  
―Islamic Banking has experienced a phenomenal growth and expansion in 
Bangladesh in the backdrop of strong public demand and support for the 
system along with its gradually increasing popularity across the world. As a 
result, a number of full-fledged Islamic Banks has been established, while a 
good number of conventional banks have come forward to offer services 
compliant with Islamic Shariah through opening of Islamic branches along 
with conventional ones. There is also a trend of conversion of conventional 
banks into Islamic banks.‖ (Bangladesh Bank 2011) 
 
 
In 2009 Bangladesh had six fully-fledged Islamic banks, which has grown to seven in 
2010, including Exim Bank Limited and First Security Islamic Bank Limited, which 
 - 237 - 
had recently been fully converted into Islamic banks.  Eleven other private 
commercial banks operate Islamic banking windows and the three large state-owned 
banks, Sonali Bank Limited, Agrani Bank Limited and Janata Bank Limited, are also 
preparing to open Islamic banking windows.  
 
Islamic banks, despite their different lending philosophy and operations, are regarded 
as PCBs and regulated by the BB accordingly (Debuath, 2003), to the chagrin of 
many Islamic bankers who feel that the conventional reserve requirements are 
inappropriate for Islamic banks (Mukhlesur Rahman, in The Financial Express, Views 
and Opinions, 18th March 2010). The main Islamic financing arrangements offered by 
Islamic banks are either sales contracts in the form of deferred payment with a ‗mark-
up‘ (Murabaha) and lease purchases (Ijarah) or equity-based profit sharing 
investments (Mudaraba) or business partnerships (Musharaka) (Al-Jahri, 2003).  The 
IBBL lobbied the previous BNP-Jamaat coalition government to change the 
legislation to allow for different reserve and mark-up policies. This is because they 
argue that Islamic banks do not lend money, and that the current ‗profit‘ paid on 
deposits and required from borrowers should not be bench-marked on the BB-set 
interest rate but based on actual returns on investments realised, as stipulated by 
most Shari‘ah experts. The governance structure of most Islamic banks is also such 
that, whilst there is a board of directors, a Shari‘ah board made up of external 
experts in Islamic jurisprudence also plays a significant role, for which there is under 
current legislation possibly insufficient legitimation. 
 
In the face of a rapidly growing Islamic banking sector, the new Awami League 
government has requested the Islami Banks Consultative Forum to submit 
recommendations for eventual legislation. Some guidance has since been issued by 
the Bangladesh Bank (in November 2009), although the ‗Central Shariah Board for 
Islamic Banks in Bangladesh‘ has lamented the continued absence of Islamic 
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banking-specific legislation, particularly given the fact that Islamic finance has been 
operational in the country for over 35 years (Mukhlesur Rahman, in The Financial 
Express, Views and Opinions, 18th March 2010).  
 
6.1.3 Role and objectives of IBBL 
 
Whilst legally a private commercial bank (PCB) and regulated by the Bangladesh 
Bank, the Central Bank, some senior managers would like the IBBL to see itself as a 
‗development finance institution‘ (DFI) (interview transcript IBBL 09/11/08), 
particularly in regards to its micro-finance operations, which are hampered by the fact 
that the IBBL is a scheduled bank and is tightly regulated by the Bangladesh Bank, 
unlike Grameen and Brac which as DFIs can operate more freely.  
 
The IBBL was, in 2008, in profit terms the largest private commercial bank in 
Bangladesh (Bangladesh Bank, 2009), double the size of the second largest bank.  
IBBL claims that it finances approximately 20% of Bangladesh‘s exports and that a 
quarter of the foreign remittances received by the country are channelled through the 
bank (interview transcript IBBL 09/11/08), making it a significant player, particularly 
because ‗manpower‘ exports and the ready-made garments industry play such an 
important role in the way Bangladesh has defined its own development success story 
(see Chapter 5). Its commercial success is also noteworthy, because compared to 
the state-owned banks, the IBBL, with just over 200 branches in 2009, has only a 
fraction of their retail banking or venture capital exposure but manages nevertheless 
to be very profitable, so much so that it was the highest largest corporate tax payer in 
2008 (interview transcript IBBL 09/11/08). 
 
Whilst the IBBL is a commercial bank, its objectives are quite wide-ranging, although, 
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it could be argued, they are presented in a slightly confused manner. In many IBBL 
public documents, the Bank‘s stated mission is to,  
―establish Islamic Banking through the introduction of a welfare oriented 
banking system and also ensure equity and justice in the field of all economic 
activities, achieve balanced growth and equitable development through 
diversified investment operations particularly in the priority sectors and less 
developed areas of the country. To encourage socio-economic upliftment and 
financial services to the low-income community particularly in the rural areas.‖ 
(e.g. IBBL Annual Report 2007 and IBBL Pocket Diary 2009) 
 
In an effort to realise its mission of development within an Islamic framework, the 
IBBL has two arms which carry out welfare and social development work, the Islami 
Bank Foundation and the Rural Development Scheme. The Islami Bank Foundation, 
a charitable subsidiary of IBBL, runs a number of projects throughout the country 
which are archetypically traditionally Islamic in nature: income-generation schemes 
through interest-free loans, education including Madrassahs, free or highly 
subsidised healthcare, relief work and Islamic propagation, linking the Foundation 
further to the primarily Islamic micro-credit operation through the Rural Development 
Scheme. 
 
In contrast to the social development dimension of the mission statement, the IBBL‘s 
vision is more expressed in more technical terms: 
―Our vision is to always strive to achieve superior financial performance, be 
considered a leading Islamic bank by reputation and performance. 
 
- Our goal is to establish and maintain the modern banking techniques, to 
ensure the soundness and development of the financial system based on 
Islamic principles and to become [a] strong and efficient organization with 
highly motivated professionals, working for the benefit of people, based 
upon accountability, transparency and integrity in order to ensure stability 
of financial systems 
- We will try to encourage savings in the form of direct investment 
- We will also try to encourage investment particularly in projects which are 
more likely to lead to higher employment.  
(IBBL Annual Report 2007: 6) 
 
At the same time, IBBL‘s website does not include its mission and vision statements, 
instead setting out only the bank‘s aims and objectives as follows (see box 7): 
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Box 7: Aims and Objectives of IBBL 
 To conduct interest-free banking. 
 To establish participatory banking instead of banking on debtor-creditor 
relationship. 
 To invest on profit and risk sharing basis. 
 To accept deposits on Mudaraba & Al-Wadeah basis. 
 To establish a welfare-oriented banking system. 
 To extend co-operation to the poor, the helpless and the low-income group 
for their economic upliftment. 
 To play a vital role in human development and employment generation. 
 To contribute towards balanced growth and development of the country 
through investment operations particularly in the less developed areas. 
 To contribute in achieving the ultimate goal of Islamic economic system. 
 
Source: IBBL website 2011 
 
Most interesting for this research is the reference in the IBBL‘s aims and objectives 
to the bank seeking to ―contribute in achieving the ultimate goal of an Islamic 
economic system‖ (IBBL website 2011). It is not entirely clear from other materials or 
policy work by the IBBL what shape this contribution has taken, apart from promoting 
interest-free banking. The concept of an ‗Islamic economic system‘ also relates the 
bank to the ideological position strongly popularised by Maududi, who called for an 
Islamisation of economics and all other human affairs, as has been described in the 
genealogy of the Islamic development discourse in Chapter 4. 
 
In addition, it is an issue that seems to cause some unease within the Bank‘s senior 
ranks, as it is located in the centre of the antagonistic frontier where ‗Islamist‘ 
conceptualisations of society, economy and politics clash with either socialist or neo-
liberal political doctrine as has been explored in the previous chapter. This will be 
explored in the next section, from the perspective of the IBBL, in order to understand 
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how diverse discourses compete in the meaning-making process that surrounds the 
issue of Islamisation of the economy within the development policy context. 
 
6.2 Islamic banking at the crossroads: the antagonistic frontier 
between political Islam, secular Mujibism and the Washington 
Consensus  
 
In the light of Fairclough‘s (2001) proposed analytical framework for CDA (see 
discussion in section 2.5.1), this section seeks to understand how meaning is made 
of Islamic finance in Bangladesh. This particular investigation is located along the 
antagonistic frontiers identified in the previous chapter and further problematised in 
the previous section about the history of the IBBL.  
 
As has been shown, whilst the IBBL is commercially a significant player, it is also a 
mainstream actor within the policy and legal context of Bangladesh, since Islamic 
banking is officially state policy, with Mujibur Rahman as early as 1974 committing to 
a restructuring of Bangladesh‘s banking system and, ultimately, the whole economy, 
by ratifying the Islamic Development Bank Charter (see section 5.5.5). However, 
todate Islamic banking seems to have only been instrumentalised by various 
governments to stress the Islamic credentials of the country and hence secure 
support from the OIC and the Islamic Development Bank, rather than being a first 
stepping stone towards the full Islamisation of Bangladesh‘s economy. A very senior 
IBBL source underlined this: ―We‘ve even been used by our government to 
demonstrate in Riyadh [the capital of Saudi Arabia] that Bangladesh is committed to 
Islam‖ (interview transcript IBBL 31/03/09). This statement, made in reference to the 
secular Awami League government, indicates how important the IBBL is. But it also 
underlines that the Government of the day might seek to maximise the political 
capital that can be derived from Islamic finance without giving it too much scope to 
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live up to the high aims of the IDB Charter, as the continued absence of a legal 
framework for Islamic banking might indicate.  
 
The Islami Bank‘s aim to ―contribute in achieving the ultimate goal of [an] Islamic 
economic system‖ (IBBL website 2011) should in itself not be contentious, since past 
and present Governments have at least stated a committment to the phased 
Islamisation of Bangladesh‘s economy. However, given the instrumentalisation of 
Islamic finance, it is not unsurprising that the IBBL‘s vision does not make a detailed 
call for full conversion to an Islamic economic system and specify how it as a 
commercial bank might contribute to such an objective. In fact, what is now only a 
slightly clumsily and tentatively worded last item in a long aims and objectives list, 
seems, with the turn of the political tide, to have been further downgraded, despite 
being the Bank‘s ―ultimate aim‖ (IBBL website 2011). Somewhat coinciding with the 
loss of the ruling BNP-Jamaat coalition, IBBL officials offered various responses to 
the change of bank policy, ranging from the pragmatic ―[we] cannot do this alone‖ 
(interview transcript IERB 23/03/09), or ―we need greater market share‖ (interview 
transcript IBBL 23/03/09) to the politically astute ―the Awami League are secular and 
it would be unwise to pursue this goal [too] openly‖ (interview transcript IBBL 
13/01/09 b). This is particularly interesting, since successive Bangladeshi 
Governments since independence have been in ‗need‘ of Islamic banking, 
demonstrated by the use of the IBBL, co-owned by the IDB, a premier example of 
Islamic banking, as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the OIC and the IDB. 
However the very cautious sentiments expressed by IBBL officials show a degree of 
scepticism about the options that the current government might consider in practice, 
therefore continuing the restricted instrumentalisation of Islamic finance. 
 
Hence, for the IBBL at least, the Islamisation of the economy as a development 
strategy, despite being an entirely legitimate endeavour, is a ‗social problem‘ 
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(Fairclough‘s 2001) due to the instrumentalisation of Islamic finance by state power. 
This problem will be the starting point for the critical discourse analytical approach at 
the heart of this chapter. 
 
 
6.3 Analysis of the network of practices in Islamic finance in 
Bangladesh: the case of the Islami Bank 
 
At this stage, it is pertinent to recall that the choice of case study that the IBBL 
represents was not based on the objective of investigating technical or religious 
aspects of Shari‘ah-compliant banking, or ascertaining whether Islamic development 
approaches ‗work‘ or are more or less effective or efficient than other models. Rather 
the analysis is about the process of meaning-making within the contested 
development policy field in Bangladesh. 
 
It could be argued that the IBBL is merely a commercial entity seeking to maximise 
shareholder profits, but it was made very clear to the author by all the senior staff 
interviewed that this is exactly what the bank is not about. A very senior source 
underlined this by saying: ―IBBL is so successful because the founders and directors 
have been honest and uncompromising on Islamic principles; investors do not seek 
profit, dividends at any rate but seek halal [lawful] return; and the same values are 
inculcated in the mind-set of the management.‖ (interview transcript IBBL 31/03/09). 
Another senior source echoed this: ―IBBL is not a commercial bank in the ordinary 
sense. It has a broader remit and sees itself as a development finance institution. 
The objective of IBBL is the establishment of industries, which lead both to import 
substitution and subsequently domestic job creation. Welfare work for those not so 
fortunate is being carried out by the Islami Bank Foundation‖ (interview transcript 
IBBL 13/01/09).  
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The Islami Bank Foundation is, therefore, not only a vehicle for corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) or a broader scheme of making finance more accessible to 
excluded groups, which all the commercial banks are encouraged and incentivised to 
do by the central bank. The Foundation‘s programme goes well beyond the usual 
scope of corporate philanthropy which might seek to offset a company‘s impact on 
the environment or communities. For example, the largest private yet heavily 
subsidised hospital in the country is run, and a considerable number of Madrassahs 
provide free Islamic education under the banner of the Islami Bank Foundation. 
Hence, while the Foundation might be seen as CSR in an Islamic framework, it goes 
beyond normal CSR by establishing major providers of healthcare and education in 
the country. This point will be revisited in section 6.7.  
 
The funding for the work of the Islami Bank Foundation comes from a range of 
sources from within the Bank, and there is also an external appeal for donations in 
the form of Zakat, the obligatory alms tax. Whilst the appeal for donations for 
philanthropic work should not be controversial, it has become a problem for the 
Islami Bank Foundation. It has been challenged by the government controlled Zakat 
Board which, established under Ershad, sought responsibility for the co-ordinated 
collection and distribution of Zakat in Bangladesh. The complaint hinges on a 
legitimacy claim: ―In a letter to the BB governor, the Board said it is entitled to collect 
Zakaat through an account under the name of 'Government Zakaat Fund'. But the 
Islami Bank opened a similar account in the name of 'Islami Bank Foundation' to 
collect Zakaat‖ (The Financial Express, BB starts inquiry into alleged misuse of 
Zakaat Fund, 30th December 2010).  
 
The question as to whether the Islami Bank Foundation is legally entitled to appeal 
for, collect and disburse Zakat, which is voluntarily given and no officially enforced 
process exists in secular Bangladesh, is not yet resolved. The practice in 
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Bangladesh is such that, whilst Zakat is seen as a religious duty upon the individual 
Muslim, individuals disburse their contributions on their own accord and only very few 
Muslim countries such as Malaysia have a systematically state-managed process for 
the collection of Zakat. Moreover, Ershad‘s attempt to establish a Zakat Board seems 
to be more focused on tapping into an Islamic sentiment to legitimise his rule, rather 
than to enforce the collection of charity through the state, given the absence of any 
administrative apparatuses for the collection and distribution of Zakat apart from the 
aforementioned account. In practice it appears that the IBBL and its charitable 
Foundation are regarded by the current Government as a challenge, not just 
because of its sheer size but also perhaps due to the utilisation of the funds collected 
to promote a particular Islamic vision and gain popular support. 
 
The articulatory practice that, whilst legally the IBBL is a private commercial bank, 
senior leaders talk about it as more than just an ordinary bank, conventional or 
Islamic, offering a way of appreciating the ‗problem‘ that the IBBL experiences in 
regard to its broader Islamisation objectives. IBBL leaders stress that the 
organisation, due to its special history, is a pioneer, but junior and senior IBBL 
sources also claim that the IBBL is the only ―real‖ (interview transcript IBBL 13/01/09 
b) or ―true‖ (interview transcript IBBL 31/03/09) Islamic bank in Bangladesh due to its 
commitment to Islamise the economy and operate welfare oriented banking in an 
Islamic framework rather than just seeking shareholder profits. These assertions that 
none of the other Islamic banks are not real and are in the business of Islamic 
finance for profiteering hints that there is an exclusion procedure (Foucault, 1971) in 
operation here, where the IBBL is good (―truly Islamic‖) and others bad (―sinful‖). 
Foucault (1977, 1980, 2003) explains this behaviour by stressing that discourse is 
related to power and operates by rules of exclusion. Within the internal narrative 
observed at the IBBL, other Islamic banks are denounced as not properly Shari‘ah-
compliant and, it is alleged that they practise Islamic banking only because of the 
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commercial success of the IBBL (interview transcript IBBL 31/03/09), thereby 
exploiting and perverting the Islamic sentiment of their customers.Discourses 
therefore also include excluding procedures, not just of arguments and themes, but 
also of groups constructed as the ‗other‘ and denounced as ‗outsiders‘ or in this case 
―sinners‖. In the case of the IBBL, conventional banks are regarded as ―sinful‖ 
(interview transcript IBBL 07/12/08) or ―destructive [particularly but not exclusively in 
the context of the global financial crisis]‖ (interview transcript IBBL 09/11/08), due to 
a number of issues ranging from their position on dealing with interest, speculation, 
hoarding etc.  
 
Hence, there is a clear network of practices observable within the Islamic finance 
industry in Bangladesh. It includes those who claim not to compromise Shari‘ah 
compliance for profit, as their commercial work is underpinned by a wider welfare 
and development agenda beyond the realm of CSR, coupled with an overt 
subscription to the Islamisation of the economy agenda. The IBBL places itself firmly 
in this arena. 
 
In this sense, Islamic banking and even the Islamisation of the economy can be seen 
as floating signifiers that a number of discourses that compete for dominance have 
sought to fix. This order of discourse confirms Nienhaus‘ (1982) typology of Islamic 
economic thought discussed in Chapter 4. The reference to the Islami Bank being 
the only ‗true‘ Islamic bank (interview transcript IBBL 31/03/09) indicates, within the 
logic of Nienhaus‘ typology, that the IBBL subscribes to the utopian model, based on 
a systematisation of Islamic economic ethics into an ‗Islamic system‘.  The traditional 
recitative approach based on orthodox legal thought is deemed important yet 
insufficient to achieve the objective of the Islamisation of Bangladesh‘s economy. In 
this context, a very senior IBBL source pointed out that:  
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―Initially there was doubt amongst the Ulema [religious scholars] about 
Islamic banking because they had not been taught about the importance of 
Halal [allowed by the Shari‘ah] economic life. If your economic life is Halal 
[allowed and therefore regarded as wholesome], everything is Halal. Islam 
was [by their interpretation] confined to Ibadah [worship] and minor Fiqh 
[jurisprudence] issues which caused lots of debate. … When they [the Ulema] 
saw that Islamic banking arose, it was surprise. Even Muslim intellectuals 
thought it impossible.‖ (interview transcript IBBL 31/03/09) 
 
The traditional interpretation of Islam as primarily confined to rites of worship has 
also been rejected as a colonialist plot (interview transcript IBBL 31/03/09). A senior 
cleric of a large mosque in an affluent suburb of Dhaka opined that ―Al masjid fee 
Allah, wa laysat fee an-naas [translated from the Arabic meaning that the ‗mosque is 
for the worship of God and not for the welfare of mankind] (interview transcript BM 
05/12/08). When this statement was conveyed to an IBBL senior manager, he 
replied: ―This epitomises the failure of the religious leaders to implement Islam and 
live by the Islamic teachings of welfare and care for the community‖ (interview 
transcript IBBL 07/12/08). Therefore, the Islami Bank appears to subscribe to a 
utopian approach to the Islamisation of the economy, while rejecting traditional 
methods centred on following the guidance of religious scholars, which in its ultimate 
form is Taqlid (‗blind following‘, as discussed in section 4.7.2). 
The fact that Islam is regarded as a complete way of way also infuses IBBL‘s HR 
policy and practice. Daily congregational prayer during office hours, covering the 
noon, mid-afternoon and evening prayers, is obligatory upon all staff. An inspirational 
talk either on a religious or Islamic economics topic is given after every mid-afternoon 
prayer, by all staff on a rota basis. Being, and being perceived to be, a practising 
Muslim is regarded as a prerequisite for employment at the Bank as an Islamic 
organisation (interview transcript IBBL 07/04/09 b). The bank gives ‗Shari‘ah-marks‘ 
to its entire senior and junior staff through an Annual Confidential Report. This 
‗Report‘ is carried out by the IBBL Shari‘ah Council Secretariat in conjunction with the 
HR division and covers aspects of personal (18 out of 50 Shari‘ah marks) and 
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professional (20 Shari‘ah marks) conduct and the staff member‘s private dealings (12 
Shari‘ah marks), such as the practice of Islam in personal lives (IBBL Annual 
Confidential Report Form, 2009) of staff and their close family members (interview 
transcript IBBL 08/04/09 a). This means that female staff have been recruited at the 
bank only very recently, and that most IBBL staff are male and have to exert a 
degree of control over their households in pursuit of a career with the Bank. The 
Report forms the basis for staff promotion, together with a written and oral exam 
covering ―moral issues‖ (interview transcript IBBL 08/04/09 a).   
However, whilst Islam is stressed as a complete way of life, with the Shari‘ah 
legislating all aspects of human affairs, the IBBL leadership also acknowledges that 
their own approach is still ultimately a utopia, admitting that ―Islamic economics is not 
ready to step onto the global stage to respond to the financial crisis and act as an 
alternative to Western economics‖ (interview transcript IBBL 31/03/09). This reflects 
the author‘s analysis of the Islamic development discourse in Chapter 4, which 
concluded that current Islamic development thought is not really epistemologically or 
methodologically dissimilar from the mainstream. 
Hence, despite its recognition that the Islamisation of Bangladesh‘s economy is 
under current conditions, politically and, importantly, intellectually extremely 
challenging, it is a utopia that the IBBL still pursues. It is a utopia shared with a 
number of other Islamic organizations, loosely networked around the Jamaat-e-Islam 
movement. This network is held together by a logic of equivalence around issues 
such as the Islamisation of Bangladesh‘s economy, which will be further explored in 
section 6.6. 
On the other side of this antagonistic frontier, adaptive and pragmatic approaches 
(Nienhaus, 1982 a) can be found, elements of which are arguably instrumentalised 
by the IBBL in order to function as a commercial bank under a conventional 
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regulatory framework. Such finance institutions, labelled by IBBL officials as not 
―real‖ or ―true‖ Islamic banks, apply a more ‗modernistic‘ interpretation of Islamic 
sources and adapt their systems to ‗Western‘ thought, or are outright based on 
mainstream theoretical economic models and are not backed by a comprehensive 
and consistent ‗Islamic‘ worldview (Nienhaus: 1982 a: 87-88).  
As discussed above, the Islamic worldview embodied by the IBBL demands a 
comprehensive and consistent regulatory framework in the form of particular 
legislation that would facilitate the ‗full and proper‘ operationalisation of Shari‘ah 
compliant banking (interview transcript IBBL 23/03/09). Hence across this particular 
antagonistic frontier, the way meaning is made of the term ‗Islamic‘ is located in the 
centre of the dividing line. As Nienhaus‘ four-fold typology demonstrates, especially 
in the way it echoes the typology offered for the analysis of Islamic revivalism (see 
Chapter/section 4.8), the utopian approach here corresponds to the fundamentalist 
method that seeks to establish a utopia based on the sacred past, whilst the 
recitative harks back to the approach of traditionalists in their quest to preserve 
traditional customs and ethics, and the adaptive to the modernists‘ objective to adapt 
Islamic values to contemporary challenges. Both typologies also hint at the difference 
in epistemology that has underscored Islamic philosophy from the outset, with the 
adaptive/modernist approach harking back to the rationalist Mutazilite position that 
allows for an individually reasoned interpretation of Islamic law. 
As a network of practices, Islamic banking appears at first to be a unified entity, held 
together by a number of professional bodies such as the Islamic Economics 
Research Bureau and the Islamic Bankers Consultative Forum. However, the above 
analysis demonstrated the semiotic relationship around what ‗Islamic‘ means and 
which consequences it carries, particularly in support of the legitimate pursuit of 
Islamising the Bangladeshi economy. This creates an antagonistic frontier within the 
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financial sector in general and even more so within the Islamic segment. The way 
meaning is made of ‗Islamic‘ hence creates an order in this discourse in which the 
configurations of how Islam has been conceptualised and which role it has been 
assigned in relationship to the economy, society and politics are in conflict. 
 
This order of discourse is also observable in the way the IBBL is perceived by the 
Awami League government. The IBBL has been singled out by the Awami League as 
an enemy of the post-independence state. For example, Minister for Law, Qamru 
Islami, claimed publicly that the Islami Bank was involved in financing 
fundamentalists and needed to be investigated (The Financial Express, 10th April 
2010). On a number of previous occasions the IBBL had been accused of similar 
acts, including an accusation that a later convicted terrorist had been a customer at 
one of the bank‘s branches (The Daily Star, Govt okays release of fund to 'terror 
funder‘, 5th December 2005). During this research, no other Islamic or conventional 
bank was alleged to have been materially supporting terrorism or financing 
extremism (The International Crisis Group 2010). Given the IBBL‘s status as the 
largest private commercial bank in the country, such allegations and accusations 
cannot, unless and until legal proceedings are brought against the bank and its 
leaders have been convicted of wrong-doing, be regarded as merely rhetoric across 
the antagonistic frontier between political Islam and secularism in Bangladesh. 
 
Yet again, at a recent event on the global financial crisis and the strength of Islamic 
banking organised by the Islamic Banks Consultative Forum and sponsored by the 
IBBL, the Bangladesh Bank (BB) Governor Atiur Rahman called on the "authorities 
concerned for keeping Islamic banking free from any influence of extremists aiding 
and abetting terrorism" (Priyo website, 2011). It can, of course, not be deduced from 
this statement that the IBBL was the target, but the post of the BB governor is a 
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political appointment and a pattern of accusations against the largest commercial 
bank of the country has already been established. 
 
This raises the question as to why the IBBL is particularly singled out, apart from 
having created its own excluding procedure, as previously discussed. The next 
section will explore the special multi-faceted status of the Islami Bank.  
 
6.4 Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited: financial institution, social 
development agency or political force? 
 
It appears that the basis for IBBL‘s distinguishing itself from and excluding others is, 
in turn, also the basis for it being denounced as an outsider by the Awami League 
government.  It is IBBL‘s ideological position, expressed by a number of senior staff 
(interview transcript IBBL 23/03/09, interview transcript IBBL 31/03/09), that sees 
Islam as a Deen, a complete way of life (see the discussion in section 4.2 as to how 
Maududi has put this term at the core of the Islamisation process) , and the Shari‘ah 
as the superior legal framework that creates an antagonistic frontier with more 
secular interpretations of the role of religion, particularly Islam, in public life in 
Bangladesh. This Islamic ideological framework is reminiscent of the attributes 
ascribed to the controversial category of political Islam or Islamism.  
 
The term ‗political Islam‘ is not only controversial and contentious (Halliday 1996; 
Esposito 1997, 1998) but also not particularly insightful, since the phenomenon of 
ascribing or conversely negating a political role to Islam takes different forms and 
spans a wide range of strategies and tactics, some of which have been discussed in 
section 4.7.  
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However, it is evident that the IBBL subscribes to a religiously inspired philosophy or 
ideology that is labelled by its opponents as political Islam or Islamism due to its 
adherents‘ understanding of Islam as a complete way of life governed by the 
Shari‘ah. In the opposing discourse, any political role for Islam appears to be 
regarded as extremism, as the allegations of supporting extremism or terrorism 
demonstrate. This labelling process is, in turn, an exclusion procedure, in which the 
IBBL has become ‗the other‘ and is shunned. The understanding of the position and 
relevance of the role of the Shari‘ah here appears to be a key nodal point through 
which the IBBL and its ‗opponents‘ seek to charge the Islamisation of the economy 
with a particular meaning, with obviously conflicting consequences. For the very 
senior leaders of the IBBL, the Shari‘ah is the unchangeable law of God (interview 
transcript IBBL 23/03/09), the purpose of which is to guide humanity in all its affairs 
and not only rituals of worship (interview transcript IBBL 07/12/08 and interview 
transcript IBBL 31/03/09). In their construction and application of the Shari‘ah, 
conceived of as an uncodified set of rules derived by scholars from the primary 
sources of the Qur‘an and Sunnah and a range of differing secondary sources, the 
IBBL positions itself at a particular locus on the Islamic spectrum. As discussed in 
section 4.8, this spectrum ranges from traditionalist to fundamentalist, modernist and 
pragmatist (Husain 1995) and offers helpful analytical categories to evaluate the 
nature of the Islamic meaning-making process. 
 
The combination of a number of senior IBBL leaders‘ condemnation of the traditional 
approach that focuses on rites of worship as insufficient, and its own ultimate aim of 
the Islamisation of the economy under an ideological framework of Islam as a Deen 
that governs all aspects of human existence through the Shari‘ah, would place them 
firmly in the fundamentalist camp. However, they reject aspects of the traditionalist 
and fundamentalist advocacy of strict adherence to the letter of Islam, for example, 
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with respect to male dress code centred around traditional Muslim garb and issues 
around the beard (interview transcript IBBL 23/03/09 and interview transcript IBBL 
13/01/09 b). This suggests that their locus on the spectrum spans across to more 
modernist interpretations. The institutionalisation of the IBBL as a modern 
commercial bank also suggests that its leaders are very open to embracing and 
Islamising a range of aspects that make up modernity. In this context, however, it is 
important to point out that the categories along the Islamic spectrum are at best 
indicative and the IBBL as an organisation is made up a number of individuals, who 
might or might not fit into a particular category comfortably. For example, the staff of 
the Shari‘ah Secretariat are often graduates of Islamic universities and in their 
appearance fit more closely with the traditional stereotype, whilst banking operations 
staff often have MBAs or other business-related qualifications from European or 
American Universities and fit more closely to the professional banker stereotype. 
One banker acknowledged this internal friction, stating that in his view Islamic dress 
and a long beard are not a necessity in Islam (interview transcript IBBL 17/12/08). 
These differences straddle the organisation and add to the complexity of clearly 
identifying the origins of internal voices and narratives. 
 
Yet, IBBL as an institution occupies a particular locus on the spectrum by 
establishing subtle reference points to a specific Islamic discourse. These reference 
points, including the Islamisation agenda, unwittingly or wittingly link the IBBL to the 
broader political Islamic movement.  For example, on the IBBL‘s website under the 
concept and ideology of Islamic banking, the concept of interest is explained (see 
Box 8 below):   
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Box 8: IBBL Concept and Ideology 
 
Islamic Banking: Some Conceptual Issues  
 
Riba and its basic features  
The word used by the Quran concerning ‗interest‘ is Riba. The literal meanings of 
Riba are money increase, increase of anything or increment of anything from its 
original amount (Maududi 1979, p.84). However, all increases are not considered as 
Riba in Islam. Money may increase in business activities as well. This increase is not 
at all considered as Riba. The increase, instead of being prohibited (Haram), is 
approved (Halal) in Islam. Islam prohibits only those increases that are charged on 
the loan with a prefixed rate. 
Source: IBBL website 2011 
 
Whilst this particular definition is not necessarily controversial within the main body of 
thought on Islamic economic and banking, it is striking that a reference is made to 
Maududi who is not a key Islamic economist. As the previous chapter has explained, 
Sayyid Abul ‗Ala Maududi was the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami movement. Whilst 
he played an important role in popularising the concept of Islamic economics, within 
this body of thought there many others who might equally have been quoted. As 
discussed in section 4.2, Maududi (1976 a) is also very closely associated with the 
concept of Islamisation and the concept of viewing Islam as a Deen. Thus it has to 
be assumed that the selection of this quote is deliberate as it fits into the overall 
picture already established. 
 
Moreover, this reference is even more interesting because in Bangladesh, Maududi‘s 
Jamaat-e-Islam is also positioned across the antagonistic frontier between Islamist 
and secular influences on the political rollercoaster. The controversy that Maududi, 
over 30 years after his death, generates in the Awami League dominated political 
environment cannot be underestimated. Recently his books were even banned: 
―The Bangladeshi government has ordered mosques and libraries across the 
country to remove all books written by a controversial Islamic scholar. The 
chief of the government-funded Islamic Foundation told the BBC that the 
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books by Syed Abul Ala Maududi encouraged ‗militancy and terrorism‘". (BBC 
News online 2010) 
 
Hence, a reference to Maududi, who has to be seen primarily as a political figure and 
is officially now regarded as subversive relates the IBBL at least ideologically to the 
Jamaat and thereby also as subversive. The precise involvement of Bangladesh‘s 
leading Islamic political party in the Bank is difficult to pinpoint, although in terms of 
the personality politics that are all-pervasive on the subcontinent, a good indication 
would be that the current Chairman and many of his predecessors, to a varying 
degree , have had links with Jamaat-e-Islami. Shah Abdul Hannan, for example, who 
served as IBBL chairman from 2000-2004, is a very well-known Islamic intellectual 
and former deputy governor of the Bangladesh Bank.  He is now a member of the 
Central Sharia Council of Islami Banks of Bangladesh and is also serving as the 
Chairperson of the Islamic Economics Research Bureau based in Dhaka. Despite his 
involvement in many initiatives closely linked with the Jamaat, he does not take any 
formal role within the party. However, the Current IBBL Chair, Abu Nasser 
Muhammad Abduz Zaher, is the Chairman of Industrialists and Businessmen 
Welfare Foundation and the Islamic Banks Consultative Forum, Vice Chairman of 
Bangladesh Association of Banks, Senior Vice President of the Bangladesh 
Association of Pharmaceutical Industries, Managing Director of Ibn Sina 
Pharmaceuticals Industry Limited  (The Financial Express, IBBL re-elects Zaher 
chairman, 2nd September 2007), and also a member of the Central Executive 
Committee of the Jamaat18.  
  
To deduce from the involvement of the Jamaat, whose alleged role as an anti-
liberation force must be understood through the contested reading of Bangladesh‘s 
history, that either a political infiltration has taken place or that the bank has been 
created to subvert the banking sector would be to misconstrue the role of political 
                                                 
18 correct in 2009 - see http://jamaat-e-islami.org/index.php?option=com_organization&task=central_committee  
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parties and particularly an Islamic socio-political movement such as the Jamaat-e-
Islami, in welfare work in the sub-continent. In fact, as highlighted by Maududi (Bano 
2009), welfare work is the very rationale for Muslims and Islamic movements. To 
which degree welfare work has been either essentialised or instrumentalised in the 
case of the IBBL is not entirely clear, due to the existence of both more traditionalist 
and modernist factions that might view the Bank‘s welfare work as either Daw‘ah or 
CSR respectively. The Bank‘s association with the Jamaat is well known, as a former 
Jamaat student wing leader pointed out:  
―Everybody knows that the IBBL is a Jamaat organisation but it is both a 
genuine bank and only part of a benign network to Islamise Bangladeshi 
society and business. But it is a strategic mistake … not to be more open. 
The Jamaat should include independent people in such ventures.‖ (interview 
transcript JI 27/04/09) 
 
Because it is evident that that the Bank is driven by the same ideology as the 
Jamaat-e-Islami, the decision not to make the link explicit appears to be strategic.  
 
That the link exists is, moreover, borne out by other personnel links between the 
Jamaat and the IBBL. For example, Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, the Vice Chair and 
founding member of the IBBL Shari‘ah Council is also the Naeeb-e-Ameer (Deputy 
Leader) of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami. Indicative of the antagonistic frontier that 
the IBBL straddles, Sayeedi, a Member of Parliament from 1996 to 2008 and a 
prominent religious scholar and public speaker with his own popular satellite TV 
programme, has now been arrested and charged with ‗war crimes‘ together with two 
other senior Jamaat leaders due to their alleged collaboration with West-Pakistani 
forces during the liberation war. 
 
The targeting of the Jamaat leadership has been expected since the Awami League 
election victory. The author was warned by both very senior and junior sources at the 
bank that ―secular‖ (interview transcript IBBL 13/01/09 b), ―anti-Islamic‖ (interview 
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transcript IBBL 02/12/08), and ―pro-Indian‖ (interview transcript IBBL 16/04/09) forces 
will challenge and attack those who ―uphold Islam‖ (interview transcript IBBL 
02/12/08), such as the Bank and the Jamaat. As one source put it: ―‗They‘ think that 
IBBL is the lifeblood of the Islamic movement and therefore they are trying everything 
to stop us‖ (interview transcript IBBL 16/04/09). 
 
Due to its triple identity as a financial institution with a development goal driven by 
Jamaat ideology, the IBBL case illustrates that the discourses this organisation 
subscribes to generate power relations with others across the antagonistic frontiers 
that divide the public policy space in Bangladesh in the way that has been stipulated 
by Foucault and Laclau, as discussed in section 1.5. The exclusion procedures 
observed, both by the IBBL labelling other Islamic banks as not ‗real‘ or ‗true‘ and the 
Awami League labelling of the Jamaat-e-Islami movement as ‗anti-liberation‘, 
emphasise the existence of particular networks of practice. These networks thrive by 
polarising the discourses in the pursuit of hegemony. Despite their respective 
exclusion procedures, both networks need each other to counter-construct their own 
legitimacy, based on either upholding ‗true Islam‘ or ‗secular independence‘. 
 
For the critical discourse analytical approach employed in this analysis the above 
discussion of the Islamic economics network of practice that the IBBL is embedded in 
was the first step to understanding the ‗problem‘ inherent to the meaning-making 
process around Islam.  In pursuit of the research question as to how Islamic 
discourses frame development policy-making, the next section will more closely 
investigate the IBBL vision of development and in particular the bank‘s Rural 
Development Scheme.  
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6.5 The Rural Development Scheme: Material or spiritual growth? Or 
both?  
 
Whilst the Islami Bank‘s commercial lending is considerable and is geared around a 
policy of import substitution and job creation, it is operating in a heavily competitive 
market that is strongly regulated by the Bangladesh Bank.  However, with the Rural 
Development Scheme (RDS), which is perhaps the single most directly development-
focused programme of the Islami Bank, it targets a particular segment of the 
Bangladeshi economy and population, the rural poor. Although such schemes are 
plentiful in the NGO sector, commercial banks have been much less engaged.  
 
In 2008/9 the Rural Development Scheme, initiated in 1995, provided micro-credit to 
over 500,000 people in over 10,000 villages throughout the country. The programme 
embodies the ambitions of the more welfarist-focused leaders of the IBBL, who 
would like the bank to be more of a development finance institution (interview 
transcript IBBL 09/11/08). Yet the commercial realities show that the programme is 
still a small part of the Bank‘s operations, despite a considerable year-on-year growth 
of between 50 and 100 percent in the past. The overall volume of the RDS in 2008 
was only 2.9 percent of the bank‘s working capital (IBBL Investment Policy 2008 – 
2012). Also despite the importance given to the RDS by most senior staff (e.g. 
interview transcript IBBL 09/11/08), the Board envisages a slowing down of the 
expansion of the programme to a rate of 29 percent in 2011 and 22 percent in 2012. 
This has been heavily criticised by some, including a senior manager of the scheme, 
who regards it as ―hypocrisy‖ and would like to see a more direct poverty reduction 
focus in the bank‘s priorities (interview transcript IBBL 07/04/09 c)  . 
 
The overall importance of the programme can also be gauged by the location of the 
Rural Development Division within the IBBL as a physical and organisational 
structure. The IBBL Head Office is located in the commercial area of Motijheel where 
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all the national and international banks are headquartered, overlooked by the 
Bangladesh Bank Tower. The main head office is in the impressive 18-storey Islami 
Bank Tower, with the 18th floor taken up by the Board Room and the Chairman‘s 
office and the 17th floor by the Managing Director.  The author‘s transecting 
walkthrough as part of his ethnographically inspired approach indicated that the most 
important functions of the Bank are situated in the Tower. Other departments are out-
located. For example, the Research, Planning and Development Division, which was 
described as the organisation‘s ―garbage can‖ (interview transcript 02/12/08), where 
trouble-makers or unwanted elements are posted, likened to a ―military staff 
academy‖ (interview transcript 02/12/08) is housed on one floor owned by the IBBL in 
another less impressive and unbranded building diagonally opposite the Tower (see 
Fig 9).  
 
 
 
Further, the Rural Development Division is based in a small rented office within 
another office building around the block from the Islami Bank Tower occupied by a 
number of different tenants (see Figure 9: Map of IBBL Head Office location). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Map of IBBL Head Office location  
IBBL  
Rural Development 
Division 
7th Floor, 63 Dilkusha 
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Development Division 
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Unlike the much smaller Research, Planning and Development Division, which has 
two staff but is headed by an Executive Vice President, the staff grade below Deputy 
Managing Director, the Rural Development Division is led by a lower-ranked Senior 
Vice President, despite its considerable staff and budget. It is of course difficult to 
gauge from the walkthrough how much importance is given to the RDS, but it 
appaers that it is not a flagship programme. 
 
Nevertheless the RDS is deemed important, particularly vis-à-vis the IBBL‘s claim to 
being a welfare bank. In 2010//11 the IBBL disbursed the largest amount of money 
for poverty alleviation among the private and foreign banks. According to the 
Bangladesh Bank, IBBL disbursed more than Tk.2.29 billion during the period, which 
is around 53 per cent of the total disbursement by 40 private (PCB) and foreign 
commercial banks (FCB) in the sector. PCBs and FCBs together disbursed a total of 
Tk. 4.05 billion, of which PCBs disbursed Tk 3.38 billion and the FCBs have 
disbursed Tk 6.774 million (c.f. The Financial Express, IBBL disbursement tops 
poverty alleviation drive, 6th June 2011). The Bank‘s welfare credentials were 
underlined by a newspaper interview with the IBBL‘s Managing Director Muhammad 
Abdul Mannan: 
"Islami banking always encourages using funds for reducing gap between rich 
and the poor rather than resource centralisation to a selected group of 
people," Managing Director (MD) of Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd Md Abdul 
Mannan told the FE. We always try to emphasize on need-based banking 
rather than greed based banking." (c.f. The Financial Express, IBBL 
disbursement tops poverty alleviation drive, 6th June 2011)   
 
Whilst essentially economic in nature, the Rural Development Scheme also has a 
strong social development approach, focusing on the promotion of Islamic values 
and religious practice. One of the aims of the RDS is to develop ‗moral values‘ and 
create awareness about social rights and responsibilities. Towards this end, in the 
weekly meetings with clients, Field Officers deliver lectures on different topics from 
an Islamic perspective.  An internal IBBL document states that: 
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―At a very basic level the disbursement of collateral free loans in certain 
instances is an example of how Islamic banking and microfinance share 
common aims. Thus Islamic banking and micro credit programmes may 
complement one another in both ideological and practical terms. This close 
relationship would not only provide obvious benefits for poor entrepreneurs 
who would otherwise be left out of credit markets, but investing in micro 
enterprises would also give investors in Islamic banks an opportunity to 
diversify and earn solid returns‖ (IBBL internal document, Grameen Bank vs 
RDS of the IBBL, 2007).  
 
This is further indicative of the dual aim of the RDS: on the ideological side the 
promotion of Islamic ideals and on the practical side the selling of what is a 
marginally profitable product for the Bank. 
 
6.5.1 Making meaning of development 
In spite of the Islamic terminology, the RDS is very closely based on the Grameen 
Bank model of social collateral lending, and its technical development has been led 
by former Grameen staff such as the current manager. RDS has made the group 
lending approach its own, and bestowing ultimate legitimacy on it by the use of 
scriptural references: ―The cardinal principle of the Rural Development Scheme‖, an 
internal document states, ―is the 'Group Approach'. Allah loves those 'who conduct 
their affairs by mutual consultation' (Al-Quran 42:38). For all decision-making 
activities, this mutual consultation is given high priority‖ (Grameen Bank vs RDS of 
the IBBL, IBBL internal document, 2007). A senior researcher at the bank‘s research 
and training division put it even more bluntly: ―We have taken the whole idea [of 
social collateral lending] from Professor Yunus, but whilst this is mainstream 
development we are also addressing spiritual needs‖ (interview transcript 16/04/09). 
The scheme has been ‗enhanced‘ by re-designing some of the lending modalities 
according to the Shari‘ah, according to which the provision of money for a fixed 
return at a later stage is forbidden, instead providing the loan ‗in-kind‘ as a deferred 
payment sales contract (Murabaha). A fixed profit share is set at 10% which some, 
including the RDS manager, regard as problematic due to its likeness with interest, 
 - 262 - 
but administration of full profit and loss sharing schemes such as equity investments 
(Mudaraba) or full business partnerships (Musharaka) are deemed to be too 
cumbersome for most clients‘ accountancy skills or to risk exposing the bank to fraud 
(interview transcript 07/04/09 c).  Such an approach has been called the ‗Murabaha 
syndrome‘ (Yusuf 2004), as Murabaha dominates the vast majority of Islamic 
financing arrangements, but is held by the utopians to be in contravention of Islamic 
ethical principles such as profit and loss sharing and to mimic the economic function 
of interest. (Nienhaus, 1982 a). 
 
Importantly,as noted above, the scheme carries an Islamic educational dimension for 
the clients and in the weekly meetings officiated by RDS Field Officers, discussion of 
different Islamic topics is given priority over the collection of instalments and personal 
savings etc. (field notes 15/01/09). The RDS‘s approach is seen as an enhanced 
micro-credit model that does not just address material needs, but also has a spiritual 
dimension, which is for both the RDS management (interview transcript 07/04/09 c) 
and the loans officers (field notes 15/01/09) seen to be central to the success of the 
programme.  
The clients are organised into ‗centres‘ and each centre meeting is started by a 
recitation from the Qur‘an and concluded by Dua [prayer] led by the IBBL officer and 
a collective chanting of the 18 commandments, listed in Box 9. 
Box 9: 18 Commandments for RDS members  
 
The members of RDS memorize and utter loudly the 18 decisions at the Centre 
Meeting to implement those in their practical lives. The decisions are memorized 
after becoming a member and before investment. It is considered as pre condition of 
RDS investment. 
 
We shall 
1. seek help of Allah, the Almighty, in all conditions of life, speak truth and lead an 
honest life; 
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2. order others for good deeds and prohibit them from bad deeds; 
3. be law abiding, not do illegal work and not allow others to do the same; 
4. not remain dependent on others rather stand on our own feet; 
5. bring prosperity to our family Insha Allah; 
6. grow vegetables at the surroundings of our house, eat plenty of them and 
enhance income by selling the surplus; 
7. During the plantation season, plant as many seedlings as possible; 
8. not remain illiterate, establish night school if necessary; 
9. arrange education for the children; 
10. help each other, try to rescue any member of the Centre from danger if any; 
11. give preference to others, compete in good deeds and encourage others in it; 
12. Build and use sanitary latrine, if not possible, build latrine digging hole; 
13. drink water from tube-well, otherwise drink boiled water; 
14. keep our children and environment clean; 
15. take care of health, take balanced food; 
16. not take or give any dowry at our son‘s and daughter‘s wedding, tell others that it 
creates a social problem; 
17. follow discipline, unity, courage and hard work in all walks of our lives; 
18. keep words (Wadah) with others, not embezzle the deposit (Amanah) and never 
tell a lie. 
 
Source: Rural Development Scheme, IBBL internal document, n.d. 
 
 
The RDS commandments are taken from ‗Grameen‘s 16 Decisions‘ (interview 
transcript 07/04/09 c), albeit with some changes. These changes primarily seek to 
Islamise the ‘16 Decisions‘ by stressing, rather than the Grameen self-reliance 
model, the need to ultimately rely on Allah (commandment #1 and 5), whilst for 
example, the family planning element that is integral to Grameen is deemed as un-
Islamic and hence has been removed (interview transcript 07/04/09 c). 
Whilst this type of Islamic education is not in itself problematic within the context of  
social mobilisation of clients in a Muslim-majority country, a RDS senior manager is 
adamant that this Daw‘ah [Islamic propagation] is one of the key objectives of the 
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programme (interview transcript 07/04/09 c). It is important, however, to point out that 
a number of IBBL clients have been intentionally selected from the Hindu community 
and that in these instances Hindu ethical teachings are utilised in the motivational 
dimension of the RDS. Why an Islamic bank targets non-Muslims as clients is 
interesting and one IBBL manager admitted that it is important for the bank to be 
seen as impartial (interview transcript 07/04/09 c), regarding Daw‘ah as 
‗development‘ (interview transcript 07/04/09). Others, for example a senior researcher 
at Islami Bank Training and Research Academy (IBTRA), echoed this in a more 
differentiated manner by pointing out that in Islam ‗development‘ is ‗Daw‘ah‘, whereby 
meaning that the ―process of change must encompass a social, economic, ethical and 
moral dimension contextualized by the Shari‘ah which provides guidance for all 
aspects of human existence‖ (interview transcript 16/04/09). Such an integrated vision 
of development as encompassing social and spiritual, as well as economic, 
development is further illustrated in an internal RDS document:  
―Development is basically a multi-dimensional process. No progress can take 
place unless appropriate steps are taken for the uplift of education, income 
generation and providing Health & Medicare services. The Bank, being a profit 
earning financial institution, can hardly afford time and attention to the areas 
and sectors other than income generating activities. Education and Health & 
Medicare are still not profit yielding commercially viable sectors especially in 
the rural areas. Islami Bank Foundation, a non-profit service oriented sister 
organization of Islami Bank, provides support programs to RDS. A good 
performed [sic] RDS member is provided, if he deem require, hand tube-well for 
safe drinking water and the articles for sanitary latrine on Quard-e-Hasana 
[goodly loan i.e. interest and mark-up free] after two years of his/her enrolment. 
In the rainy season, the RDS members are encouraged for plantation. The 
Bank gives each of the RDS member one small plant free of cost on condition 
to plant at least three. During the natural calamities like flood, storm etc. the 
Bank also distribute relief among the affected RDS members. […] 
Beside the financial activities, [the] Bank has also program to develop their 
moral values and to get them aware about their social rights and 
responsibilities. For the purpose, in the weekly centre meetings the Field 
Officers deliver lectures on different important topics. They also speak on 
health & hygiene to develop their health consciousness.  […] 
Moreover, Islamic Shariah model of micro-finance like RDS seems to be more 
effective, than GB [Grameen Bank], in income generation and poverty 
alleviation as it gives Islamic teachings to the members to lead the life 
according to tenets of Islam which provides moral values and spiritual strengths 
to be more disciplined, professional, hard working and to take care of others, 
 - 265 - 
maintain competitiveness in good deeds and productive activities, lead an 
honest life and not to waste any thing particularly, time, money and energy. All 
these qualities also contribute, it has been observed, to lead integrated social 
life based on Islamic brotherhood, an Ummatic concept. Since Islam prohibits 
interest, there exists a sheer abhorrence against interest-based system in the 
society; the exploitative NGOs are being countered by the Islamic micro-finance 
program like RDS. Islamic Shariah is the basis of banker-customer relationship 
in RDS, while interest acts as a major deficiency factor in banker-customer 
relationship. The distinguishing features of Islamic banking [is that it] 
established an ideological and improved relationship with its customers. It has 
been observed that all these factors immensely contributed in efficiency, 
reduction of cost of production and family expenditures which reinforce the 
higher savings and capital accumulation than other members of secular NGOs 
working side by side with the RDS operating in rural Bangladesh.‖  (Grameen 
Bank vs RDS of the IBBL, IBBL internal document, 2007). 
 
Whether or not Islamic microfinance is ‗more effective‘ than conventional Grameen 
lending is not a question this study is concerned with. Here what is of interest is the 
focus of the RDS on social reform through Islam, which provides both the moral 
framework through the Shari‘ah but also a way of life as an Islamic ‗brotherhood‘ or 
Ummah (community of believers) which underlies IBBL‘s development vision. As a 
former director of the Islami Bank pointed out, this understanding of development is, 
in his view, different from the ‗Western‘ understanding as it focuses comprehensively 
on the human being rather just than on material well-being (interview transcript 
23/03/09). This is expressed through a reference to the Maqasid-ul-Shari‘ah, the 
purpose of Islamic law, which seeks to promote and protect firstly faith, then intellect, 
health, progeny and wealth. This Maqasid approach has been discussed in the 
genealogy of the Islamic development discourse and is conceptually very closely 
related to Maududi‘s (1976) conceptualisation of Islam as a Deen governed by the 
Shari‘ah.   
At the same time, the RDS management is also keen to plug into the Western 
mainstream  discourse by relating the scheme to the rural development discourse, 
stating to the author that it is for ―people like you‖ (interview transcript 07/04/09 c), 
meaning ‗Western‘ development experts and English-speaking outsiders. This is also 
relevant because the development field in Bangladesh is very obviously dominated by 
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the big brands such as Grameen and BRAC. By branding the RDS in English, couched 
in the ubiquitous language of rural development, clearly a connection with this wider 
field is sought by the IBBL. At the local level, the RDS uses the Bangla term ‗unnayan‘, 
which means development, and is also utilised by secular organisations too. 
Intentionally, no references are made to Arabic or Islamic terminology, although other 
bank products are clearly labelled as Islamic. Senior managers express fear that if the 
RDS or indeed the bank is seen as too Islamic in the current (2008/9) circumstances, a 
link to Islamic fundamentalism could be easily construed (interview transcript 07/04/09 
c). The utilisation of the English-language discourse in particular, but also the use of 
Bangla at the local level, is a sign that the IBBL is very aware of the ‗political 
technology‘ (Foucault 1980, 1991) that governs the development field in Bangladesh. 
Moreover, the IBBL is very conscious about branding and creating associations 
through what is acceptable in policy terms, as most of its commercial financial 
products are labelled in clear Islamic terms such as the IBBL Murabaha savings 
account in order to appeal to a large consumer base which values Shari‘ah banking, 
whilst also not antagonising the state, which is committed to Islamic finance. 
 
At the centre of the development vision for the future of Bangladesh of Islamic 
organisations such as the Islami Bank stands a recasting of what development 
actually means, although not necessarily how it can be achieved, which as is evident 
from the RDS, is not dissimilar to conventional micro-credit models. Whilst in a 
technical sense the microfinance model focuses on banking without interest, this is 
deeply interwoven with a vision for how society, politics and the economy should be 
organised. Interestingly, the destination here is not a futuristic utopia, but the 
reclaiming of the past Golden Age of Islam where, according to a constructed 
historical narrative, poverty was eradicated, a welfare state existed and the Shari‘ah 
enabled rulers to reign with justice over every aspect of the life of their subjects 
(Farooq, 2008).  In doing so, the IBBL positions itself not just at a particular location 
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on the contemporary Bangladeshi political rollercoaster described in the previous 
chapter, but also casts its roots back to a re-imagined illustrious Islamic era during 
which economic growth was facilitated through general adherence to the Shari‘ah 
and poverty alleviated through public works (Waqf) and alms (Zakat). 
 
In this sense, the vision for development has been recast by the Islami Bank 
Bangladesh. Whilst its commercial banking operations are driven technically by 
Islamic ideology and offer products that, judging by their commercial success, 
resonate with the wider public, it is actually its rural development work that is 
explicitly committed to Shari‘ah-compliant social development. Through an emphasis 
on Islamic values, prayer and fasting which become part and parcel of receiving a 
loan, the scheme is creating its own power relationship with clients.  
 
Hence, the IBBL combines a range of features that make it not only a commercially 
very successful financial institution but also a social development agency by using 
programmatic interventions that are designed to promote economic development 
based on Shari‘ah-compliant social transformation, which will be further explored in 
the following section. Within the context of the Bangladeshi political rollercoaster, the 
IBBL also positions itself, wittingly or unwittingly, within the camp of political Islam 
through the way it articulates its practice in Islamic terminology and references to the 
Shari‘ah. Thus, the IBBL, by the very way it articulates its practices along utopian 
Islamic lines, is both directly and indirectly embroiled within the political maelstrom 
that has formed and continues to shape the public policy field in Bangladesh. 
 
The IBBL‘s Rural Development Scheme is clearly engaged in material growth 
 programmes akin to the social development work that is at the core of the rural 
finance programme of, for example, Grameen. However, the objectives of social 
development set out by the RDS are based on its Islamic conceptualisation of 
development, in which the purpose of human material existence is spiritual and 
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transcendental (via the RDS‘s emphasis on prayer, Hijab, reliance on Allah etc.) and 
can, in their eyes, only be achieved if it is in accordance with the Islamic Shari‘ah, 
particularly but not exclusively in financial transactions. By subscribing to this type of 
Islamic discourse in development policy-making, an antagonistic frontier is created, 
at which the IBBL positions itself wittingly and unwittingly as outside, if not opposing, 
the current mainstream of secular development objectives, championed by the 
majority of development NGOs such as Grameen and indeed by the current Awami 
League-led government. 
 
In this light, the following section explores the relationship between Islamic banking, 
political Islam and its development narrative in Bangladesh through an analysis of 
the country‘s leading Islamic bank‘s relationship and influence with mainstream 
development policy-makers. 
 
6.6 Mapping out IBBL’s policy footprint and network of practice 
The development studies literature and particularly the literature on micro-credit are 
awash with references to the Grameen model of micro-credit developed by Professor 
Muhammad Yunus. The model has gained international recognition19 and has been 
rolled out globally, in both low and high income countries. IBBL‘s Rural Development 
Scheme is still relatively small and only at best marginally profitable, but the bank‘s 
management has targeted the RDS as one of its intended growth areas, particularly 
because new customers, can after ‗graduation‘, be introduced to more commercially 
focused products the bank has to offer.  
 
Despite the relative small size of the scheme, it would be expected that both policy-
makers and academics would take an interest in the micro-credit scheme of a bank 
that has managed to become the largest private commercial bank (PCB) in the 
                                                 
19 See, for example, Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), a consortium of 33 public and private 
development agencies working together to expand access to financial services for the poor in developing countries. 
http://www.cgap.org and its information sharing site http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m/library/ 
 - 269 - 
country within 20 years of its coming into existence. It is therefore astonishing that 
there are practically no references to IBBL in the local academic literature, let alone 
internationally. One notable exception is a publication by the Asian Development 
Bank that looks at commercial viability of microfinance and makes a very brief 
assessment of the RDS, concluding that ―… it is unclear whether or not IBBL‘s 
microfinance activities are sustainable‖ (ADB, 2002:17). Whilst sustainability is one of 
the key debates in microfinance (see CGAP, 2008), the question is in itself not of 
concern for this study. However, the raison-d‘être for IBBL‘s RDS, which has been 
operational since 1995 is important. Whilst it might be a loss-leader or part of the 
Bank‘s CSR agenda due to its close links with the Islami Bank Foundation, it also 
appears to serve a broader religious purpose, that of Islamisation of society through 
its economy.  
 
Despite the interest that both the innovative lending model and its possibly 
controversial social development focus should generate, it looks as if IBBL‘s rural 
development scheme almost does not exist for the academic or policy-making world. 
In order to gauge the network of practice that the RDS is embedded in, the author 
engaged in a mapping exercise, utilising a snow-balling method to delineate its 
perimeters (Burgess, 1984, Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The complexity of internal 
and external relationships has limited the map primarily to a first order zone 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994) without allowing the snowball to explore what second 
order relationships exist. The map (see Fig 10, overleaf) was then superimposed 
onto the antagonistic frontiers identified in this and the previous chapter to illustrate 
the relationship between Islamist, neo-liberal and neo-Mujibist discourses. The often-
mentioned nodal points of ‗Western liberalism‘, ‗socialism‘ ‗history‘, ‗the state‘, 
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‗Islamic ideology‘ were introduced to weave in the inter-textual relationships identified 
in the previous chapter. As a next level, the types of discursive relationships 
observed or reported were differentiated as ‗direct influence‘ such as line 
management or regulatory powers, ‗indirect influence‘ such as working relationships 
and lobbying and ‗conditioning‘ which refers to the setting of overall cultural, political 
or historical agendas. This map clearly shows that the policy relationships in the 
development field in Bangladesh are highly complex and due to the limitations of a 
doctoral study only a selected number have been expounded above. 
 
By mapping out the RDS policy footprint, meaning its pro-active and responsive 
engagements with actors in the development field, two issues became evident. 
Firstly, the IBBL has strong links with neither the World Bank nor the Asian 
Development Bank, even though the IBBL finances a large proportion of 
Bangladesh‘s export oriented industries. Secondly, most organisations that the IBBL 
would describe as key stakeholders are those which would be considered to be 
outside the mainstream development field. In its international policy relations, it looks 
to Jeddah where the Islamic Development bank is located.  
 
This is not just perhaps due to a sense of obligation, as the IDB provided a 
considerable proportion of the IBBL‘s start-up capital and is still represented on its 
board, but goes much deeper. Not only does it seem that the IDB has proposed the 
acquisition of the IBBL‘s Rural Development Scheme operations (interview transcript 
IBBL 29/04/09), but also in many ways the IBBL has taken a leadership role within 
the circles of Islamic development finance. The IBBL turned down the IDB‘s 
acquisition offer, because it is seeking to act as a global champion for successful 
Islamic banking and microfinance in the Muslim world. IBBL and its Rural 
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Development Division operate successfully within a context where the Islamic 
development discourse reigns supreme and the discussions are about the Miskin 
(the poor), the Shari‘ah, Zakat and Daw‘ah. There is almost a reversal of the power 
relationship between founder and follower, in which some senior IBBL staff now look 
at the Islamic Development Bank and bemoan its lack of principled engagement in 
the sector, seen to be manifested either in mark-up rates on loans from Jeddah that 
are benchmarked against LIBOR and is then regarded by some as if it were interest, 
or by supporting secular development agencies more than their ‗brothers‘. For 
example, according to one source, the IDB apparently gave $9m to Grameen and 
$5m to BRAC for rehabilitation work after the Sidr cyclone, lamenting that this was 
more than the Islami Bank Foundation had received (interview transcript IBBL 
29/04/09). 
 
It is also interesting that for the IBBL generally and not just because of the more local 
focus of the RDS, the ‗Western‘ development actors (signified in figure 10 in various 
shades of blue) are not very significant, although it has, nevertheless, constructed its 
own development narrative to counter ‗Western materialism‘. Arguably the 
statist/socialist/neo-Mujibist ideology (signified in Fig. 10 in various shades of red) is 
also a ‗Western‘ ideology, but the IBBL clearly differentiates between the capitalist 
‗West‘ of the northern hemisphere and the more recent statist model of the Indian 
‗West‘. 
 
At the national level, the IBBL‘s Rural Development Division has strong relationships 
with the Bangladesh Bank as the industry regulator, although senior managers 
expressed their disappointment at the lack of co-operation from the Central Bank. 
They complained that branch licenses are not forthcoming, meaning that the IBBL as 
a scheduled bank rather than an NGO or development finance organisation can only 
operate at zilla (district) rather than upazilla/thana (sub-district) level, restricting the 
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efficiency of its microfinance operations, which would need to be rolled out further to 
achieve scale economies. Suggestions that the RDS could be rendered an NGO 
have also met with resistance from officials.  
 
The RDS also maintains relationships with the Ministry for Rural Development and 
the Planning Commission at the Ministry of Finance and Planning, with the present 
PRSP document prepared by the Commission taking a prominent position on the 
bookshelf of a senior manager of the Rural Development Division. Upon asking 
about the role in and importance of the PRSP to the work of the Rural Development 
Division, the reply was, ―the PRSP is a government strategy and we should consult it 
and work towards it‖ (interview transcript IBBL 29/04/09), which is perhaps telling, 
given that neither IBBL‘s public nor the internal documents seen by the author make 
reference to Bangladesh‘s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.  A question as to 
whether the IBBL participated in the consultation process during the preparation of 
the PRSP prompted a resentful reply in the negative. However, this might have less 
to do with the exclusion of the IBBL from public policy debates, than with the lack of 
opportunities for participation in the PRSP process in Bangladesh (Stewart and 
Wang 2003). This view was echoed in an interview with the Planning Commission 
(interview transcript PC19/01/09). The RDS‘s involvement in other development 
policy fora, however, has also been negligible, and, in these instances, self-inflicted. 
Apart from providing monthly performance reports to the government-backed Credit 
and Development Forum, the national umbrella body for micro-finance institutions, 
little other engagement takes place. Full attention, however, is paid to the Islamic 
Economics Research Bureau, a small Jamaat linked body that carries out research 
and provides training but does in itself not possess a mainstream identity, unlike the 
Islamic Banks Consultative Forum, chaired by the IBBL chairman. The Forum, which 
represents all the banks, whether fully fledged or mainstream banks with an Islamic 
banking window, plays a key but very narrow role in lobbying the government about 
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legislation for Shari‘ah-compliant finance. Whether IBBL‘s leadership of it is 
detrimental to its ability to influence government cannot be ascertained. 
 
It also appears that a number of IBBL departments might have a formal function in 
engaging with public policy, but they are not pursuing it. The research results 
produced at Islami Bank Training and Research Academy (IBTRA) are primarily of 
academic interest, with researchers giving papers as far away as Australia, whilst the 
Research, Planning and Development Department primarily acts as an internal think-
tank. Moreover, the work of the Public Relations department appears to be very one-
dimensional. Whilst the local media is full of reports, opinion pieces and press 
releases by Bangladeshi NGOs, only occasional mention is made of the IBBL, almost 
exclusively, based on press releases, about board meetings and other official events. 
A senior researcher at the IBTRA has succeeded in publishing a number of letters 
and opinion pieces, including one on the Bank‘s micro-credit scheme. He is, 
however, not publishing them in his official capacity but as ‗an economist and 
researcher‘, out of fear, he admitted, that they otherwise will not get published in 
what he regards as some of the anti-Islamic English-language media such as the 
Daily Star or the Financial Express newspapers. In addition, his one success story in 
the latter was tainted by the interference of the headline editor who changed the 
initial benign title to ‗Micro-credit of IBBL needs to rectify itself‘ (The Financial 
Express, April 1st, 2008). This earned the researcher a reprimand from the Managing 
Director of the Bank. Otherwise, the IBBL, and particularly its human resource 
department, maintains strong links with Islamic Universities, from which many of the 
staff are recruited, particularly the Islamic University of Chittagong, which also has 
links with the Jamaat.    
 
From this indicative map of policy influences, it is evident that IBBL‘s clear focus is 
on the Islamic stage, and as a result it operates primarily outside of the mainstream 
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arena, both internationally and nationally. The Rural Development Scheme, by name 
at least, seeks to plug into the mainstream development discourse, but fails, if there 
is an intention to do so, to engage with other mainstream development actors. 
Reasons for this may lie in either the lack of capacity of key staff or in a lack of an 
internal mandate or desire to engage. This is a very interesting paradox, given that 
the enormous growth of Islamic banking in the domestic finance sector has caused 
mainstream banks to open Islamic ‗windows‘ and it seems to be acceptable to brand 
products with Islamic terminology. The development sector, in contrast, is still 
dominated by a secular discourse, with which the RDS seeks to associate itself, so 
as not to appear to be challenging the status quo. 
 
 At the same time the Rural Development Scheme, despite its lack of an Islamic 
label, resonates with those who share IBBL‘s worldview. Within that context, it has 
gained widespread admiration and has become a bench mark within the Islamic 
economics and finance circles of South Asia and the Gulf. Evidently the Rural 
Development Scheme resonates with those who share IBBL‘s worldview, 
underpinned by the particular discourse of political Islam discussed above which 
rules supreme in some global and national dimensions of the Muslim world.  
 
Both the Islamic and the mainstream discourses compete in seeking to hegemonise 
the development field, building on a number of hegemonic formations. The Islamic 
hegemonic articulation based on the formations that Islam is a Deen and on a 
counter-constructed Islamisation of the economy (see Figure 11: Hegemonic 
articulation of Islamist development in Bangladesh) competes with secular 
hegemonic articulations, here referred to as ‗mainstream‘, that include the neo-
Mujibist and neo-liberal discourses identified.  
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This opposition to the mainstream creates, as illustrated in Fig 11, a logic of 
equivalence through the insistance on viewing Islam as a Deen, the counter-
construction of Islamic economics as an alternative to Western economic and social 
systems, and advocacy for an overall Islamisation of the economy despite the 
considerable variance in legitimate interpretations by different Islamic groups along 
the typology proposed in section 4.8 that can also be found, to some extent, within 
the IBBL as discussed above. 
Within this hegemonic articulation, the IBBL has attained mainstream status for those 
actors within the chain but is also constantly challenged within the order of discourse 
by other formations that seek give Islam their own meaning. 
 
6.7 Conclusion: ‘Islamist’ banking and development in Bangladesh – 
articulatory practices subverting, challenging or re-claiming the 
dominant paradigm?  
 
This chapter has explored the local or micro articulations of the discourses identified 
in the previous chapters through a single ‗telling‘ case study of the Islami Bank‘s 
Rural Development Scheme, in order to shed light on the question at the centre of 
Figure 11: Hegemonic articulation of Islamist development in Bangladesh 
Islamisation of development 
Islam as a Deen  ∞  Islamic economics as a counter-construct  to the ‗West‘ ∞  Islamisation of the economy 
Mainstream development 
  (Antagonistic frontier) 
(Chain of 
logic of 
equivalence) 
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this doctoral thesis as to how discourses frame meaning-making in the development 
policy field in Bangladesh. 
 
This chapter has explored the connections between ‗Islamist‘ banking, political Islam 
and its development narrative in Bangladesh. The case study focused on select 
discursive moments that shine a spotlight on various hegemonic practices within 
development policy-making in the country. 
 
A key observation made here is that both Islamic and mainstream development 
discourses are embedded within a range of assumptions that suggest what 
‗development‘ should look like. These assumptions have implications for the power 
relationships between the IBBL and the secular state, between IBBL staff of slightly 
different Islamic orientation and between the Bank and its clients. 
 
For the IBBL, driven by an Islamic discourse that also provides the underpinning for a 
political Islamic movement represented by the Jamaat-e-Islami, the creation of an 
economic and social system that is just and must therefore be based on the Islamic 
Shariah, with Allah as the only all-wise and therefore legitimate law-giver is at the 
forefront. These discursive articulations seek to establish hegemony and thereby 
create an antagonistic frontier with opposing secular discourses as is the case with 
the IBBL and certain state organs. The resultant power relationships lead to claims 
and counterclaims of being either ‗anti-liberation‘ or ‗anti-Islamic‘, both of which 
amount to high treason in the respective discourses. 
 
The Shari‘ah-based development truths constructed by the IBBL about the 
organisation of the economy, governance, society and the ideal-type human being 
could be seen by those in power as overtly challenging or subverting the current 
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mainstream paradigm of secular post-liberation Bangladesh or post-Washington 
consensus type policies such as free (financial) markets and liberal democracy.  
 
The challenge that the IBBL represents can primarily be found in the way it has re-
conceptualised development as a strategic convergence of religious, political and 
broader socio-economic objectives. Whilst a ‗modern‘ business, the vision of 
development upheld by the IBBL and manifested in its Rural Development Scheme 
can be seen to be identifying with a very traditional Islamic concept of development, 
as manifested in the example of the Islamic Ummah as an ideal society. Within its 
own networks, the IBBL has taken on mainstream status, enabling the Islami Bank to 
seek to reclaim the dominant paradigm, which it does successfully within Islamic 
circles, both nationally and internationally, with the discourse of political Islam 
bestowing legitimacy on its own role. But importantly, by claiming a position of 
historical pre-eminence through linking itself to an Islamic history of 1400 years, an 
inversion of the ‗dominant‘ and ‗alternative‘ roles has become part of the Islami 
Bank‘s constructed narrative. In this way, ‗mainstream‘ for the Islami Bank is an 
economy without interest and with all other aspects of life governed by the Shari‘ah, 
which until very recently was challenged and dominated by colonialism, Mujibism and 
capitalism.   
 
Thus the Islami Bank, associating itself through its personnel and ideological 
reference points to the Islamic movement around the Jamaat-e-Islami, subscribes to 
a particular interpretation of Islam that frames its policy-making. Both traditional and 
pragmatist interpretations are rejected, as insufficient and unprincipled respectively, 
leaving the IBBL at a location on the fundamentalist-modernist spectrum in which 
Islam is seen as a complete way of life governed by the Shari‘ah.  
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But the process of fixating meaning within the Islamic discourse the IBBL subscribes 
to also generates power relationships within the organisation, in which both the 
modernist leaning professional banker and the more traditionalist Shari‘ah scholar 
work side-by-side and are unified through a logic of equivalence that helps them to 
overcome their different Islamic values by jointly opposing Western secular 
materialism.  
 
Moreover, the conceptualisation of development espoused by the IBBL seeks to instil 
a particular Islamic ethos in their clients, creating an order in the Islamic discourse in 
which traditional folk Islam is seen as insufficient, whilst pragmatism is rejected as 
un-Islamic. This seeks to aid the creation of a vanguard (see the discussion of Qutb‘s 
Islamisation strategy in Chapter 3), which is indoctrinated to see Islam in ideological 
terms and is freed from material needs through its Shari‘ah-compliant banking 
products in the urban centres, but also through RDS outreach in rural areas. To what 
extent this Islamisation strategy is actually working, however, cannot be ascertained, 
since although clients are required, for example, to recite the ‗18 RDS 
Commandments‘, similarly to the Grameen practice, this is not evidence that they 
actually subscribe to the ethos. But, nevertheless, for the RDS management this 
indoctrination is an important part of their development practice. 
 
IBBL operations, particularly the Rural Development Scheme and its HR policies 
such the Annual Confidential Report or collective prayer, demonstrate that both 
clients and staff have to be, at least, seen to submit to IBBL ideology.  
 
In this chapter, it has been argued that advocacy of Islamisation of the economy can 
best be understood as a floating signifier in the development field.  There appear to 
be a range of discursive articulations, ranging from fundamentalist to pragmatic, 
struggling for legitimacy and seeking to co-opt Islam for their particular discourse. 
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These orders of discourse appear to be based on assumptions embedded within 
them about the role of Islam in public policy through hegemonic formations.   
 
As has been demonstrated, for the IBBL at least, the Islamisation of the economy as 
a development strategy, despite being an entirely legitimate endeavour, is according 
to Fairclough‘s (2001) suggested approach to CDA, which was the methodological 
underpinning for this chapter, a ‗social problem‘. This problem has been analysed 
revealing a number of networks of practice that define the semiotic processes within 
the development field, across and along the antagonistic frontier between political 
Islam and secularism. It has been suggested in this research that the discourses 
need each other to sustain their momentum, fuelled by mutual excluding procedures.  
 
In terms of development policy in Bangladesh, it appears that this antagonistic 
frontier and the associated excluding procedures constitute a major obstacle in 
formulating public policy that is broad-based, leading to the existence and the 
continuation of what has been described by the author as the political rollercoaster.  
 
Nevertheless, there are opportunities for the development field to embrace a more 
broad-based consensus and the Islami Bank, which served as the single telling case 
study for this research, in itself offers a number of insights in this respect. The Islami 
Bank is not a monolithic entity and a number of different voices are audible in its 
development narrative. There are a number of gaps and contradictions within the 
network of practice surrounding the Bank, which further critical discursive research 
could utilise in a more emancipatory manner by expanding the theoretical concepts 
associated with hegemony, which have proven valuable here to analyse power and 
shed light on the complexities within the development field.   
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The next chapter concludes this research and goes into further depth in terms of 
issues of antagonism and fragmentation in the development field, drawing together 
issues that arose in this chapter as well as the previous chapter, coupled with the 
genealogies of the mainstream and Islamic development discourses, as well as 
theoretical implications related to Chapters 3 and 4 and methodological implications 
related to Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
 
7 Introduction 
This doctoral research study focused on the process of making meaning of 
development and progress in the mainstream and Islamic discourses.  It has 
investigated how, at the macro, meso and micro levels, particular mainstream and 
Islamic discourses ‗frame‘ development. As an illustration, selected ‗discursive 
moments‘ within the development field in Bangladesh were investigated to critically 
engage with these issues, using the Islami Bank in Bangladesh as a single telling 
case study.   
 
The aim of this concluding chapter is to extract key issues emerging from this 
research study for further critical reflection and to support policy dialogue across the 
anatgonstic frontier between mainstream and alternative development discourses 
identified.   
 
7.1 Summary of the dissertation 
Chapter 1 set out the conceptual and theoretical framework for this thesis, which was 
based on Foucauldian notions of discourse, power and knowledge, coupled with 
Laclau‘s hegemonic theory. Subsequently in Chapter 2, an appropriate analytical 
strategy was outlined, expounding the tool box for this study, which was assembled 
from Foucauldian genealogical methods and critical discourse analysis.  In Chapter 
3, a genealogy of the mainstream development discourses was presented, whilst 
Chapter 4 traced the Islamic discourse, exploring the ‗global‘ or macro structures, 
such as the main topics and the schematic organisation of the relevant discourses as 
a whole. Chapter 5 presented a meso-level outline of the development field in 
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Bangladesh by providing an overview of the diversity of development actors and 
policies within the development field, underpinned by the colourful history of the 
country, referred to as a political ‗rollercoaster‘. It identified a number of hegemonic 
articulations across an antagonistic frontier between secular mainstream and Islamic 
conceptualisations of development. Chapter 6 was a micro-level analysis that shed 
light onto how the overall discourses frame the policy making of an Islamic 
development actor, for which the Islami Bank was selected as a single telling case 
study.   
 
The next section of this concluding chapter highlights the primary findings and 
implications with reference to the underlying questions driving this research study. 
 
7.2 Key findings: answering the research questions 
The key question driving this research study was to understand how discourses 
frame the meaning-making of development by Islamic organisations.  
 
As a starting point, the breadth and depth of assumptions embedded within 
mainstream and Islamic development discourses were investigated. Right across the 
genealogy of mainstream development in Chapter 3 and in the development field in 
Bangladesh in Chapter 5, assumptions about the importance of economic growth 
and modernisation based on materialistically-determined conceptualisations of 
poverty were deeply embedded in the discourse. These assumptions were not static, 
nor were they monolithic. Rather, they varied in accordance with the diversity of the 
contexts and practices they were constituted within.  The diverse manifestations of 
the assumptions appeared to sustain themselves through continued hegemonic 
formations.  This implies a degree of fluidity in the hegemonic formations of 
mainstream development discourses, in spite of their continued dominance.   
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The Islamic discourse, investigated in Chapter 4, is an equally non-monolithic entity, 
with wide diversity in belief and practice within what could be referred to as ‗Islams‘. 
What was particularly relevant for this study was the fact that a concern for 
development as such did not feature in this discourse until very recently. A concern 
for progress was, however, associated with the phenomenon of revivalism, which 
occurred in response to the European expansion of the late 19th century. 
Development only entered the vocabulary of the Islamic discourse in the 1970s, in 
the form of a Foucauldian irruption. 
 
The Islamic discourse more closely investigated in Chapter 6 proposes a strategic 
convergence of spiritual, social, political and economic objectives, often referred to 
as ‗political Islam‘. This discourse is underpinned by the main assumption that the 
Shari‘ah is the perfect and only legitimate source of law, governing all human affairs. 
Islam was seen as a Deen, a complete way of life, an ideology which dominates the 
worldview of those who subscribe to it and condemns, in effect, those who do not as 
not ‗true‘ Muslims. 
 
The dominant position accorded to the respective discourses by their subscribers 
has created an antagonistic frontier along which a very intense hegemonic struggle 
has taken place. In the case of Bangladesh, Mujibist socialism, neo-liberalism and 
political Islam have been vying for influence in the public policy arena, with their 
respective contributions conditioned by the particular assumptions held about the 
ideal state of society, politics or the economic order. 
 
Nevetheless, within the mainstream development discourse and in spite of a 
continued hegemonic formation status, there is an abundance of alternative 
discourses that have surfaced from within the development field to challenge the 
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assumptions embedded within neo-liberalism, as well as the other key assumptions 
embedded within these discourses.  
 
Despite this, due to the continued dominance of notions of progress and modernity, 
coupled with its monetary and materialistically-determined poverty 
conceptualisations, the mainstream development discourse can be regarded as the 
mirror image of the more spiritually-based Islamic discourses, which are underpinned 
to varying degrees by calls for adherence to the Shari‘ah.  
 
The latter has multiple interpretations, ranging from traditional, fundamentalist, 
modernist to pragmatist, which might in their own right offer a degree of overlap with 
what have been called ‗Western‘ development concepts. In practice, however, 
Islamic economics in particular has counter-constructed itself in opposition to or as 
an alternative to the essentialised ‗Western‘ model. In both discourses the political 
technology offered by development experts set the parameters for a self-disciplining 
process, in which conventional and Islamic economic knowledge respectively wield 
considerable bio-power, allowing for very limited engagement with alternative 
approaches. 
 
As to the question of reasons about why and how development practices are done, it 
was insightful to see that assumptions about development were located along the 
antagonistic frontier between the ‗West‘ and ‗Islamism‘, as the IBBL case study in 
Chapter 6 demonstrated. Due to excluding procedures put in place, which labelled 
the other as an ‗enemy of Islam‘ or an ‗obstacle to development‘, the development 
practices of their opposites were condemned as ‗extremist‘ (as the IBBL was alleged 
to be) or ‗neo-colonial‘ (as expressed by the criticism of Indian influence on 
Bangladeshi culture and politics). Interestingly, the development practice of the RDS 
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is very similar to mainstream interventions; in fact it was inspired by the Grameen 
model and then transferred to an Islamic context.  
 
Islamic banking and important sources of funding such as the IDB, moreover, were 
primarily instrumentalised by successive Bangladeshi Governments and despite 
being labelled as extremist and funding fundamentalism, the IBBL continues to be of 
considerable value to Awami League government as a bargaining chip in 
negotiations with the OIC and the IDB.  
 
As for the main charge of post-development thought that development is a Western 
or Euro-centric endeavour, it is interesting to note that the essentialised way of 
seeing the world in purely binary terms, in Said‘s (1979) sense as ‗us‘ and ‗them‘, 
cannot be sustained in face of the complexities of the development discourses in 
Bangladesh. Whilst the IBBL, for example, might have conceptualised development 
on the basis of Islamic social teachings, its development practices as seen in the 
RDS are operationalised in a manner very similar to the mainstream, which 
questions the neatness of the concept of an antagonistic frontier. Such antagonistic 
frontiers are much more ‗fuzzy‘, often riven by internal tension and held together 
through logics of equivalence in opposition to a common enemy. 
 
In order to understand how the hegemonic formations in development are 
constructed and sustained, an investigation of the development field, understood as 
a metaphor for the rules of the development ‗game‘, was conducted. The policy 
space in Bangladesh is highly fragmented by the antagonistic frontiers made up of 
chains of logics of equivalence as described in Chapter 5 and 6. Due to the dramatic 
political changes, which have been labelled by the author as a ‗rollercoaster‘, these 
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logics of equivalence on either side of the frontier articulate themselves as 
hegemonic practices, although in reality they are fleeting and relatively weak.  
 
The public policy field around the country‘s development and poverty reduction 
strategies is highly contested and has been in flux over many years, leading to a 
number of articulations being empty or floating signifiers such as poverty related 
interventions, which have been articulated interchangeably as ‗reduction‘, ‗alleviation‘ 
or ‗elimination‘.   
 
The opposing discourses struggle for hegemony by seeking to fill empty signifiers 
and fix floating signifiers in the policy field. This fluctuating dominance in the 
development policy field was both made possible by unifying logics of equivalence 
that aimed to counter assumptions embedded within the mainstream and alternative 
Islamic development discourses respectively.  As depicted in Chapter 6, the 
practices and associated assumptions within these logics of equivalence, heavily 
contextualised by Bangladesh‘s war of independence, which was a key nodal point, 
formed a prism through which current realities were evaluated. 
 
Across the antagonistic frontier between the two main discourses considered, the 
research found that attempts to contest the policy space were closed down by 
excluding procedures that labelled the other as ‗anti-Islamic‘ or ‗anti-independence, 
both regarded as high treason.  
 
Within the specific Islamic discourse that was explored in the case study in Chapter 
6, it was also noteworthy that at the Islami Bank, any internal space for opposition 
was closed down through equalising procedures of Islamic propagation towards and 
disciplining/incentivising of staff. In the Foucauldian (1978, 1980) sense, this shows 
the dual nature of power as both sovereign power and bio-power.  Sovereign power 
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was exercised in the policy field through cultural practices, in which rule is carried out 
by force, and excluding procedures, as the anti-Islam or anti-independence 
statements show, whilst bio-power refers to individual self-discipline through 
internalised surveillance, as demonstrated by the IBBL‘s deeply intrusive staff 
evaluations.  
 
The next section discusses theoretical and methodological implications emerging 
from this research study. 
 
7.3 Theoretical and methodological implications 
This exploratory research study demonstrated that through the application of a 
theoretical lens comprised of conceptions of power, discourse, hegemony, field and 
orders of discourse, it is possible to better understand power relations within the 
development field and their ramifications, particularly through the examination of 
discursive moments.  A combined conception of hegemony and power was 
particularly valuable.  Distinguishing hegemonic articulations as practices and 
formations as assumptions helped to better understand both how countering 
practices have organised themselves and how they square up to other hegemonic 
formations of assumptions in the form of antagonistic frontiers.   
 
To achieve this, this study assembled a toolbox containing several theoretical and 
methodological approaches that have been advocated by post-development thought, 
although rarely applied. A Foucault-inspired toolbox consisting of Bourdieu and 
Wacquant‘s field theory, Fairclough and Chouliaraki‘s orders of discourse and a more 
rigorous use of Laclau‘s work on hegemony has been instrumental in understanding 
how meaning is made in the development field and revealing to which types of power 
relations this leads.   
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This research cannot claim to have rigorously combined these complex theoretical 
and methodological approaches, but it has explored ways of overcoming the impasse 
for such research that the theoretical shortcomings of the post-development critique 
have created.   
 
Methodologically, it was also possible to discern power relations beyond those which 
are evident in textual formations by combining discourse analysis with ethnographic 
approaches.  This methodology opens up areas for future research that will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
7.4 Questions and considerations for further research 
The motivation of this research was to contribute to policy dialogue, based on it 
creating spaces for critical reflection and enquiry.  A number of further questions 
arise that might be useful to address in future research, such as how can hegemonic 
formations, that appear to be monolithic and strive to quell internal opposition 
through processes of bio-power, be better understood, in order to reveal internal 
differences that could constitute opportunities for policy dialogue? And how can 
power dynamics at the micro-level help us to better understand how the dominance 
of hegemonic formations might be reduced, to allow for consideration of alternatives?  
 
Investigations into these types of questions would provide valuable insights for 
facilitating dialogue between mainstream and alternative development actors.  
 
7.5 Policy recommendations 
As has been demonstrated, for the IBBL at least, the Islamisation of the economy as 
a development strategy is in Fairclough‘s sense a ‗social problem‘. This problem was 
analysed, revealing a number of networks of practice that define the semiotic 
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processes within the development field, across and along the antagonistic frontier 
between political Islam and secularism. It has been suggested in this research that 
both discourses need each other to sustain their momentum and that their quest for 
dominance is fuelled by mutual excluding procedures. The prevalent social and 
discursive order in Bangladesh is dominated by the hegemonic formations of political 
Islam and neo-Mujibism, and to a lesser extent, neo-liberalism.  
 
In terms of development policy in Bangladesh, it appears that the antagonistic 
frontier between these formations is a major obstacle to the formulation of poverty 
reduction strategies that are more broad-based, underpinned by what has been 
described by the author as the Bangladeshi political rollercoaster, which has 
polarised public policy making since the country‘s independence. Nevertheless, there 
are opportunities for the development field to embrace a more broad-based 
consensus.  
 
First, neither of the advocates of the competing discourses in the development field 
in Bangladesh are monolithic entities. A number of slightly different voices are 
audible in each development narrative, despite the attempts of dominant actors to 
close down internal opposition. Second, there are a number of gaps and 
contradictions within the different networks of practice, which further critical 
discursive research and policy consultation processes could utilise in a more 
emancipatory manner. Research might expand the theoretical concepts associated 
with hegemony, which proved valuable to analyse power and shed light on the 
complexities within the development field.   
 
It is also noteworthy, that in the practice of Islamic rural finance investigated, the 
practicalities of the intervention were very similar to the mainstream model, despite 
the underlying semiotic processes being diametrically opposed. Open policy dialogue 
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with marginalised key actors such as the IBBL might therefore be possible on 
pragmatic matters, given the similarities in practice, which might underline the value 
of dialogue despite the ideological disconnect. This would require some honest 
brokerage, a role that, for example, the Islamic Development Bank might be able to 
play, given its overlapping interests and relationships and its ability to function in both 
the mainstream and Islamic development discourses. 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTERVIEWED ORGANISATIONS 
 
Islami Bank Bangladesh 
- Members of the Board of Directors and Executive Committee  
  
- Research, Planning and Development Department (junior and senior staff) 
- Law department (junior and senior staff) 
- PR Department (junior and senior staff) 
- HR Department (senior staff) 
- Shari‘ah secretariat (junior and senior staff) 
- Islami Bank Training and Research Academy (junior and senior staff) 
  
- Rural Development Division (junior and senior staff) 
- ICT Department (senior staff)  
- Branch (junior and senior staff)      
    
 
Government of Bangladesh 
- Implementation, Monitoring & Evaluation Division, Ministry of Planning (junior 
and senior staff)  
- Social Science Research Council , Ministry of Planning (senior staff)  
- Bangladesh Bank (mid-ranking staff)  
- Bangladesh Rural Development Board (junior staff)  
 
 
Academia 
- Development Studies Department, Dhaka University (junior and senior staff) 
- Department of Banking, Dhaka University (mid-ranking staff) 
- Political Science Department, Dhaka University (mid-ranking staff) 
 
Policy bodies 
- Bangladesh Institute for Development Studies (junior and senior staff) 
- Micro Finance Institute 
- Centre for Policy Dialogue (junior and senior staff) 
- Islamic Economics Research Bureau (junior and senior staff) 
 
 
Civil Society Organisations 
- Association of Muslim Welfare Agencies in Bangladesh (AMWAB)  
  
- Social and Welfare Agency Bangladesh (SAWAB)    
  
- Jamat-e-Islami Student Wing (member and former Dhaka University leader) 
- Bangladesh Institute for Islamic Thought (Senior member) 
- Bharidara Mosque (senior Imam) 
 
Private Sector 
- Islamic banking consultant     
- Dhaka Chamber of Commerce (Senior member)    
  
- Association of Bankers Bangladesh  (Senior members)   
- KATALYST (Senior consultant)      
   
 
International donors 
-  Asian Development Bank (junior and mid-ranking staff)   
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW GUIDE (FOR IBBL STAFF) 
 
Research question: 
 
How does the ‗mainstream‘ international development discourse frame contemporary 
institutional ‗Islamic‘ conceptualizations of poverty and development policies? 
 
 What is IBBL‘s poverty reduction & development footprint in Bangladesh? 
o Who are IBBL‘s stakeholders? Who has an interest in or role to play 
for the functioning of IBBL (primary, secondary and external)? 
o Who are the critical players within IBBL‘s context (supporting/blocking 
– influential/weak external actors) 
o IBBL‘s policy influence? (PRSP, BB etc.) 
 
 What is the breadth and depth of assumptions embedded within the dominant 
mainstream development and alternative Islamic discourses? 
 
o What is the position of Islamic development (IBBL) thinking in relation 
to: 
 human nature 
 political, economic and social order 
 progress, growth and development 
 conceptualisation and measurements of poverty  
 moral values 
 
o What type of development concepts are used by mainstream and 
Islamic development actors in poverty reduction policy-making and 
why?  
 How, if so, are these different? 
 Where, if so, is the overlap? 
 
 If so, how does the dominant discourse provide a framework of possible 
thought: 
 
o Is the relationship between the State, international donors and Islamic 
FBOs conditioned by the use of ‗mainstream‘ development concepts? 
 How does IBBL engage with international development 
partners? 
 Does IBBL receive funding from development partners? 
 
o If so, is a potential dissonance due to diverging underlying discourses 
on poverty and development?  
 
 What factors shape the way that State and Islamic NGOs (such as 
IBBL as a leading PCB) perceive their respective roles in poverty 
reduction policy dialogue? 
 Historical perspective (civil society, political 
processes, PRSP etc) 
 Mandate, motivation & legitimacy 
 Power relations 
 
o How much space is there for countering dominant development and 
poverty reduction discourses? 
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APPENDIX C: KEY IBBL POLICY DOCUMENTS  
  
  
Hassan, K (2003) The Bangladesh Economy in the 21st Century, Islami Bank 
Bangladesh Ltd 
  
Report on International Seminar on Islamic Alternatives to Poverty Alleviation: Zakat, 
Awaqf and Microfinance (2007) Jointly Sponsored by the Islamic Development Bank, 
Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd, Islamic Economics Research Bureau 
  
Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd (2006) Rural Development Scheme (RDS) 
  
Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd (2007) Islami Bank 24 Years of Progress 
  
Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd (2007) Annual Report 
  
Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd (2009) Diary 
  
Islami Bank Training and Research Academy Monograph No. 1 (n.d) The Rural 
Development Scheme of Islami Bank Bangladesh: A Strategy for Better 
Implementation   
  
Islami Bank Training and Research Academy Monograph No 2. (n.d.) Relationship 
Between Rate of Return and Volume of Investment of Some Commercial Banks in 
Bangladesh 
  
Islami Bank Training and Research Academy Monograph No. 4 (n.d) Shariah 
Implementation in Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd: Problems and Prospects 
  
Islami Bank Training and Research Academy Monograph No. 5 (n.d.) Mudarabah 
Muhor Savings Scheme 
  
Islami Bank Training and Research Academy Monograph No. 6 (n.d) Customer 
Service in Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd.: Realities and Opportunities 
  
Islamic Economics Research Bureau Quarterly Journal (2009) Thoughts on 
Economics Vol 19, No. 1 Jan-March 
  
Rahman, M.M. (n.d.) Impact of Rural Development (RDS) of IBBL on the Rural 
Poor‘s Livelihood in Bangladesh Research Department Islami Bank Training and 
Research Academy 
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